Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 360 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III
No. CV-26-41
MELISSA BRUNSON Opinion Delivered August 19, 2026 APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 23JV-24-307]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE DAVID M. CLARK, HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE CHILD APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
Appellant Melissa Brunson appeals from the Faulkner County Circuit Court’s order granting permanent legal custody of her minor child (MC) to MC’s father, Aaron Hamilton; leaving visitation—and any restrictions deemed appropriate—to Hamilton’s discretion; and closing the case. Brunson argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that the trial court’s custody and visitation decisions are in MC’s best interest. We affirm.
I. Background
On December 2, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for dependency-neglect and emergency less than custody with respect to MC, who was almost six years old. In an affidavit attached to the petition, family-service worker (FSW) Laquanta Lewis attested that DHS was contacted on November 17 by a reporter who stated
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that a welfare check had been requested on MC; that the reporter had gone to the home, and Brunson “was making statements that weren’t making any sense,” such as claiming to have been raped on the battlefield during the Civil War and that various people had drugged and raped her; that MC, however, appeared to be a “perfectly healthy little girl”; that the home had food, water, and electricity; and that Brunson appeared to have been experiencing a “mental episode.” Lewis further attested that on November 19, she went to Greenbrier Westside Elementary School to speak with MC but that MC was not at school. Lewis stated that Brunson was not at home and that, when she called her, Brunson would not disclose her location and “wasn’t talking in a normal mental state.” Lewis stated that she and another social worker later went to Brunson’s home with a police officer; that Brunson was again not in a good mental state; that Brunson became upset and hit the police officer; that Brunson was arrested; and that MC was met at the DHS office by her maternal grandparents. Lewis attested that on November 21, she went to Hamilton’s home and found that both he and his home were appropriate.1 Lewis alleged in the petition that MC’s health and safety were in danger due to Brunson’s mental instability and requested an order prohibiting Brunson from removing MC from Hamilton’s home and asked that any contact between Brunson and MC be supervised.
1 Lewis included information that MC’s older two half siblings were in the physical custody of their legal father, Scott Trower. On November 20, 2024, Trower had been granted temporary full custody of his children.
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The trial court entered an ex parte order for emergency less than custody after finding probable cause to believe that MC was dependent-neglected. The trial court ordered that MC would remain in Hamilton’s physical custody and that Brunson was prohibited from having any unsupervised contact with MC unless ordered by the court. The parties later stipulated that probable cause existed at the time a hold was placed on MC and that probable cause continued to exist given the allegations in DHS’s petition.
On January 21, 2025, the trial court entered an order adjudicating MC dependent-
neglected due to Brunson’s ongoing mental-health issues that posed a risk to MC if returned to Brunson’s custody. The trial court found that Brunson had been involuntarily committed three times since November 2024. The trial court further found that, although Brunson was no longer confined, she appeared to still be “suffering from a disconnect from reality.” The trial court found that it was in MC’s best interest to remain in Hamilton’s custody but set the goal of reunification with a concurrent goal of guardianship. The trial court ordered that Brunson’s visitation with MC was to be supervised as previously ordered and that Hamilton had discretion to allow additional visitation. Brunson was ordered to cooperate with DHS and keep DHS informed; submit to a psychological evaluation and follow the recommendations; participate in counseling; take medications as prescribed; refrain from using illegal drugs and alcohol; obtain stable employment and housing; maintain a clean, safe home; and demonstrate the ability to protect MC.
The case was reviewed, and the trial court found in an order entered on April 22 that reunification continued to be the goal with a concurrent goal of guardianship. The trial court
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found that Brunson had complied with the case plan and court orders and. ordered that Brunson’s visitation be expanded such that it was unsupervised and that the parties work toward overnight visitation.
On May 19, however, Hamilton moved to terminate Brunson’s unsupervised visitation because of recommendations from Brunson’s psychological evaluation and statements she had made during the evaluation. For example, Brunson claimed that she had been raped and MC had been sexually abused at his (Hamilton’s) instruction; that God had told her (Brunson) that her name is “Mary”; that she disagreed with her diagnoses of bipolar disorder and reported psychosis; and that she disliked taking her prescribed medications. Moreover, the report recommended that Brunson’s visitation be supervised for four to six months while she is participating in therapy and taking her medications.
Another review hearing was held, and the trial court entered an order on July 22 finding that MC should remain in Hamilton’s custody but continuing the goal of reunification and guardianship. The trial court found that visitation with Brunson should be supervised until she is in therapy and taking her medications. The trial court found that Brunson had substantially complied with the case plan and court orders but that she had stopped seeing her therapist and quit taking her medications—she was, instead, seeking alternative treatment.
On October 21, another review hearing was held. FSW Cavorcia Carter testified that DHS had canceled Brunson’s last two visits with MC because Brunson self-reported sexually abusing MC and one of MC’s half siblings. Carter testified about Brunson’s overall
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compliance with the case plan but stated that DHS was still concerned with her mental- health issues. She said that Brunson was in counseling but not taking her medications to address her mental-health needs. Carter testified that Brunson had made some concerning statements at the most recent staffing, such as that she is the daughter of Princess Diana and that she had been raped in an underground tunnel by President Trump. Carter said that MC’s placement with Hamilton was going well and that MC could not be returned to Brunson’s custody. She testified that Brunson was doing chakra balancing and energy work as well as meditation and dream work to address her mental-health issues. Carter also stated that Brunson’s visits with MC go very well and that she did not fear for MC’s safety as long as Brunson’s visits are supervised. Carter further testified that she did not think Hamilton would be “fair” in allowing Brunson to visit with MC.
Twyliah Acklin, an advocate at Rise House where Brunson was staying, testified that Brunson is “very pleasant,” follows the rules, and does her chores. She said that Brunson is employed and was recently promoted to manager. She said that residents can live at Rise House for about a year and that Brunson had been there for approximately nine or ten months.
Brunson testified that she was asking for supervised visitation but did not think that Hamilton would allow her to see MC if the case is closed. Brunson stated that she is living in a domestic-violence shelter due to the nature of her relationship with Hamilton. She stated that her sexual-abuse report had been taken out of context and explained that she was speaking about systemic abuse. Brunson then testified about an occasion when she was a
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teenager and had confided in a teacher about being abused. She testified that she had been turned over to the Conway Police Department; that her parents had bandanas covering their noses and mouths; that she had been drugged and taken across the street to a furniture store that had a tunnel leading to an area underneath the courthouse; that there had been multiple other children there; that she had been gang-raped; that her legs had been pulled out of their sockets; that her tooth had been knocked out; that she had been taken to the hospital for treatment under the name Mary Payton to protect her from the people in power; and that her mother had wrecked her car in order to get her (Brunson) treatment. Brunson also testified that she had been forced to sexually abuse her children—she said that she would never do that of her own accord. Brunson said that it had taken a long time in therapy to “dig back” into her memories because she had been forced to take anti-psychotic drugs, which gave her brain fog.
On October 21, the trial court entered a review-hearing order/dismissal and case-
closure order. The trial court found that placement of MC in the permanent legal custody of Hamilton was in her best interest and necessary to protect her health and safety and that returning her to Brunson’s custody was contrary to MC’s welfare. The trial court found that visitation between Brunson and MC was appropriate but that visitation would be at Hamilton’s discretion and subject to any reasonable restrictions he deemed appropriate. The trial court found that Brunson had failed to comply with the case plan and court orders. Specifically, Brunson did not have her own housing; she self-reported sexual abuse of MC and MC’s half sibling; Brunson failed to address her mental-health issues by refusing bipolar
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treatment, not attending counseling, and not taking her medications; and Brunson made unfounded claims. The trial court found that Brunson had made no progress in alleviating or mitigating the causes for MC’s removal from her home. By contrast, the trial court found that both Hamilton and DHS had complied with the case plan and court orders. The trial court then dismissed the matter and closed the case.
II. Standard of Review
In juvenile proceedings, the standard of review on appeal is de novo, although we do not reverse unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Mixon v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 554, 590 S.W.3d 746. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We give due deference to the superior position of the trial court to view and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The primary consideration in child-custody cases is the welfare and best interest of the children involved; all other considerations are secondary. Id.
III. Discussion
Brunson does not dispute that the trial court had authority to award custody of MC to Hamilton as a noncustodial parent, and she acknowledges that the trial court had authority to permit visitation with MC at Hamilton’s discretion. Brunson argues, however, that there was insufficient evidence that these decisions were in MC’s best interest. We disagree.
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Regarding the trial court’s custody decision, Brunson argues that it was premature given that custody had been awarded to Hamilton only ten and a half months after the case was opened. She asserts that MC was stable in her placement with Hamilton and that there would have been no danger in allowing her additional time to work toward reunification with MC. She argues that, given her history of compliance, giving her more time to benefit from the services could have alleviated DHS’s concerns about her mental-health issues.
While we agree with DHS’s position that we could affirm given that no legal authority is cited for Brunson’s arguments, Lloyd v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 461, 655 S.W.3d 534, we point out that the trial court, which was not obligated to keep the case open for any specific length of time, said that keeping the case open for another forty-five days was not going to make a difference with respect to Brunson’s mental-health issues. While Brunson was initially complying with the case plan, by the time of the last review hearing, she was backsliding in that she had stopped taking her medications to treat bipolar disorder and was, instead, relying on chakras balancing and dream work. Moreover, the trial court heard for itself Brunson’s alarming statements, prompting the trial court to tell her that she is “not in touch with reality.” We hold that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that permanent custody with Hamilton was in MC’s best interest. Moreover, when a court grants permanent custody to a noncustodial parent, the case must be closed because at that point, permanency has been achieved, and the child is no longer dependent- neglected. Rodriguez v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 469, 700 S.W.3d 455.
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As for the trial court’s determination with respect to visitation, Brunson argues that not having a set visitation schedule is not in MC’s best interest. She asserts that there is no guarantee that Hamilton will permit her to visit MC and that even FSW Carter was concerned that Hamilton will not allow her to visit with MC without a court order in place. Brunson points out that Hamilton canceled a visit shortly before the final hearing. Moreover, she argues that it is unlikely she will be able to challenge the visitation order in the future given that she is indigent and considering that the burden will be on her to prove that the visitation should be changed. According to Brunson, the focus was on her behavior when consideration should have been given to the impact the visitation order will have on MC. She asserts that both the trial court and DHS thought that visitation was appropriate and that DHS reported that her visits with MC went very well.
Again, we could affirm on the basis that Brunson fails to cite any convincing authority on the subject of visitation.2 Lloyd, supra. Hamilton had good reason to cancel Brunson’s visit with MC shortly before the last review hearing given Brunson’s statement that Hamilton had arranged for her and MC to be sexually abused. Furthermore, Brunson had self-reported sexually abusing MC and MC’s half sibling. At the final hearing, it was clear that, given her
2 Brunson does cite Rhine v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2011 Ark. App.
649, at 10, 386 S.W.3d 577, 582–83, for the proposition that “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” Rhine, however, involved a parent whose rights had been terminated after what we deemed slight lapses in judgment. That case is inapposite to the custody and visitation situation here—Brunson’s parental rights remain intact.
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irrational testimony, Brunson was not taking her prescribed medications. As for whether Hamilton will be fair with visitation in the future, whether it will be financially feasible for Brunson to challenge the visitation order later, and whether Brunson will be able to satisfy her burden of proving a change of circumstances pertinent to visitation, we will not speculate on such matters. We are simply not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in concluding that it was in MC’s best interest to permit Brunson visitation with MC at Hamilton’s discretion and subject to any reasonable restrictions Hamilton deems appropriate.
Affirmed.
WOOD and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee Arkansas Department of Human Services; and Linda Hamilton, Attorney ad Litem, for appellee minor child.