Melinda Valenzuela v. D. Masoon

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJuly 13, 2018
Docket17-17406
StatusUnpublished

This text of Melinda Valenzuela v. D. Masoon (Melinda Valenzuela v. D. Masoon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Melinda Valenzuela v. D. Masoon, (9th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MELINDA GABRIELLA VALENZUELA, No. 17-17406

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:17-cv-00441-FRZ- PSOT v.

D. W. MASOON; et al., MEMORANDUM*

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Frank R. Zapata, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 10, 2018**

Before: CANBY, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Arizona state prisoner Melinda Gabriella Valenzuela appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging claims arising under Title

II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) related to her conditions of

confinement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th

Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Mahoney v.

Sessions, 871 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2017), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Valenzuela’s claims against defendants

in their individual capacities because as individuals, they are not liable under the

ADA. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ADA

applies only to public entities[.]”).

Dismissal of Valenzuela’s ADA claim against defendant Corizon was proper

because Valenzuela failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings

are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff still must present factual allegations

sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz.,

609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010) (elements of a Title II ADA claim).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Valenzuela’s motions to compel (Docket Entry Nos. 9 and 11) are denied.

AFFIRMED.

2 17-17406

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Related

Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz.
609 F.3d 1011 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Hamilton v. Brown
630 F.3d 889 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Padgett v. Wright
587 F.3d 983 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Robert Mahoney v. City of Seattle
871 F.3d 873 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Lovell v. Chandler
303 F.3d 1039 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

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Melinda Valenzuela v. D. Masoon, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/melinda-valenzuela-v-d-masoon-ca9-2018.