Melinda Gibson v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 20, 2024
DocketNY-0752-22-0028-A-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Melinda Gibson v. Department of the Army (Melinda Gibson v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Melinda Gibson v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MELINDA GIBSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, NY-0752-22-0028-A-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: March 20, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Neil C. Bonney , Esquire, and Laura A. O’Reilly , Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.

John B. Gupton , Esquire, and Felix Lizasuain , Esquire, Kingshill, Virgin Islands, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the addendum initial decision, which granted the appellant’s motions for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $96,735.00. On petition for review, the agency disagrees with the administrative judge’s determination that the Board has the authority to order the U.S. Virgin Islands National Guard (VING)’s Adjutant General to provide relief. Attorney 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

Fee Petition for Review (AFPFR) File, Tab 1 at 6-18. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 2 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 On review, the agency maintains that pursuant to the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) in Singleton v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 244 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the Board cannot grant the appellant relief because it lacks authority over the VING Adjutant General. AFPFR File, Tab 1 at 10-16; Attorney Fees File (AFF), Tab 4 at 7-10. However, the holding in Singleton that the Board lacks the authority to issue enforceable orders to remedy improper employment actions taken against National Guard dual status technicians has been abrogated by Congress’s changes to 32 U.S.C. § 709, enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 932, 130 Stat. 2000, 2363-64 (2016). See Erdel v. Department of the Army, 2023 MSPB 27, ¶¶ 10-16. Moreover,

2 After the record closed on review, the appellant submitted two motions to provide supplemental authority and supplement her response to the agency’s petition for review. AFPFR File, Tabs 5, 7. The agency has responded to the first of these motions. AFPFR File, Tab 6. Due to our findings here, we deny the motions. 3

contrary to the agency’s argument, Singleton only applied to dual status National Guard technicians. The agency concedes that the appellant was a Title 5 employee and not a dual status National Guard technician. AFPFR File, Tab 4 at 5. Thus, even if Singleton had not been abrogated, it would not be controlling here. See Erdel, 2023 MSPB 27, ¶¶ 11-16. Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the Board may order relief in this appeal. AFF, Tab 6, Addendum Initial Decision (AID) at 6-8. On review, the parties do not challenge any of the administrative judge’s findings regarding the fee award factors or the amount of the fees and costs awarded. AFPFR File, Tabs 1, 3-4. To establish entitlement to an award of attorney fees under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1), an appellant must show that (1) she was the prevailing party; (2) she incurred attorney fees pursuant to an existing attorney-client relationship; (3) an award of attorney fees is warranted in the interest of justice; and (4) the amount of attorney fees claimed is reasonable. See Caros v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 231, ¶ 5 (2015). The administrative judge found that the appellant established that she was the prevailing party, that an attorney-client relationship existed, that the award of attorney fees was warranted in the interest of justice due to the agency’s due process violations and gross procedural errors, and that both the hourly rate and hours claimed by the appellant’s attorneys were reasonable. AID at 8-15. The administrative judge reduced the appellant’s request for costs by $2,045.50 when she excluded the appellant’s request for deposition and copying expenses. AID at 14-15. Neither party has disputed any of those findings on review, and we decline to disturb them. 3 3 In the agency’s December 22, 2022 reply to the appellant’s response to the agency’s petition for review, the agency “requests that the [Board] review the Initial Decision in [the removal appeal] and reverse the aforesaid Initial Decision and dismiss the [a]ppellant’s appeal of her removal by the [a]gency.” AFPFR, Tab 4 at 5 n.2. This request is denied. An attorney fees proceeding is an addendum proceeding in which the Board does not reconsider the merits of its final decision in the underlying appeal. Matthews v. Social Security Administration , 104 M.S.P.R. 130, ¶ 8 (2006) (citing Yorkshire v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 746 F.2d 1454, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 4

ORDER ¶3 We ORDER the agency to pay the attorney of record $96,735.00 in fees and costs. The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision. Title 5 of the United States Code, section 1204(a)(2) (5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(2)). ¶4 We also ORDER the agency to tell the appellant and the attorneys promptly in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has taken to carry out the Board’s Order. We ORDER the appellant and the attorneys to provide all necessary information that the agency requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant and the attorneys, if not notified, should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Jerome Yorkshire v. Merit Systems Protection Board
746 F.2d 1454 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
James Singleton v. Merit Systems Protection Board
244 F.3d 1331 (Federal Circuit, 2001)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Kenneth Erdel v. Department of the Army
2023 MSPB 27 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Melinda Gibson v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/melinda-gibson-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2024.