MELANIE CARA ERESIAN & Another v. SUPERIOR COURT IN WORCESTER COUNTY & Others

• Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
• Decided: November 7, 2025
• Docket: SJC-13775
• Status: Published

Opinion

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

MELANIE CARA ERESIAN & another[1] vs. SUPERIOR COURT IN WORCESTER COUNTY & others[2]

Docket:	SJC-13775
Dates:	November 7, 2025
Present:
County:
Keywords:	Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.

      The petitioners, Melanie Cara Eresian and Eva Marie Eresian, appeal from a judgment of the county court dismissing their petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  We affirm.

      Background.  In 2022, the petitioners both filed complaints in the county court against Webster First Federal Credit Union (Webster).[3]  A single justice of this court ordered that the two matters be consolidated and transferred to the Superior Court for disposition.  In a subsequent scheduling order, the parties were instructed to file any summary judgment motions by August 25, 2023, with a warning that "[n]o extensions will be granted on these deadlines absent extraordinary hardship."  Two months before the deadline, one of the petitioners filed an amended complaint naming numerous additional defendants.  See note 3, supra.  Thereafter, a judge in the Superior Court ordered that, while she was "reluctant to extend any deadlines in this case," it was necessary to do so in light of the additional parties named in the amended complaint.

      In accordance with the revised scheduling deadlines, Webster moved for summary judgment in February 2024.  Thereafter, the petitioners filed a series of pleadings requesting that the court either strike the motion for summary judgment or stay any deadline to respond until after the court had first ruled upon other pending motions or afforded the petitioners an opportunity to pursue interlocutory appeals of various rulings.

      At a hearing held on May 28, 2024, a judge in the Superior Court ordered the petitioners to respond to Webster's motion for summary judgment within twenty-one days.  Shortly before that deadline, on June 17, 2024, the petitioners again requested an enlargement of time to respond, claiming that they had "irretrievably lost" nearly two weeks of work product as a result of a town-wide Internet outage earlier that day.  At a subsequent motion hearing, one of the petitioners further claimed that she had only recently received notice of the denial of various motions that she had filed, for which she wished to pursue interlocutory appeals before responding to Webster's motion for summary judgment.

      On June 26, 2024, the same judge denied the petitioners' latest request for an enlargement of time.  Two weeks later, the judge allowed Webster's motion for summary judgment as to all the petitioners' claims.[4]  In her memorandum of decision, the judge made note of the various pleadings that the petitioners had filed in lieu of responding to the motion for summary judgment:

"[The petitioners' motions] urge the court to act upon outstanding motions filed by the [petitioners] and allow more time for the [petitioners] to respond to Webster's summary judgment motion.  Any perceived failure of the court to act on the [petitioners'] motions does not excuse the [petitioners] from complying with the strict deadlines of which they had ample notice, and the [petitioners'] continued attempts to further extend the summary judgment deadlines exemplify their pattern of excuses and delay throughout this action. . . .

"Given the [scheduling] orders issued by the court in May and August 2023, the [petitioners] were well aware of the summary judgment deadlines.  They had eight months to prepare their own summary judgment motion and four months to prepare their opposition to Webster's motion. . . .  The [petitioners] had twenty-one days from May 28 to submit their opposition and/or cross motion, and they have not done so."

      Three weeks after the judge ruled on Webster's motion for summary judgment, the petitioners filed the instant petition in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The petition sought review of the denial of various interlocutory motions, most of which concerned their requests for rulings upon other motions, as well as requests to strike, stay, or otherwise defer ruling upon Webster's motion for summary judgment.  During the pendency of the petition, final judgment entered in favor of Webster in the Superior Court.  See note 4, supra.

      On December 27, 2024, the single justice denied the petition without a hearing.  The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was similarly denied, and this appeal followed.

      Discussion.  Where, as here, a petition is filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, the "single justice is not required to become involved if the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy or if the single justice determines, in his or her discretion, that the subject of the petition is not sufficiently important and extraordinary as to require general superintendence intervention."  Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24–25 (2019).  That determination will not be disturbed on appeal "absent a clear error of law or abuse of discretion" (citation omitted).  Roberts v. Hingham Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 486 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2020).

      On appeal, the petitioners have submitted a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001).  Rule 2:21, which concerns the denial of relief from a challenged interlocutory ruling in the trial court, does not technically apply because the consolidated matters have gone to final judgment in the Superior Court.  See Costello v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 480 Mass. 1027, 1027-1028 (2018).  Even though rule 2:21 is inapplicable, it is clear that this is not a circumstance in which the petitioners are entitled to relief.  The majority of the rulings that the petitioners seek to challenge concern the denial of their requests to stay any ruling upon Webster's motion for summary judgment until the Superior Court had first ruled upon other pending motions or afforded them an opportunity to pursue interlocutory appeals.  Given that the motion for summary judgment, as well as the petitioners' then-pending motions, were decided in the trial court over one year ago, any challenge to the denial of these requests for additional time have long since "become academic."  See Rosenthal v. Glickman, 441 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2004); Kol v. Joshi, 439 Mass. 1004, 1005 (2003).  See also Ewing v. Commonwealth, 454 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2009).

      Insofar as the rulings that the petitioners seek to challenge are not moot, the petitioners have plainly failed to demonstrate that they lacked an adequate alternative remedy in the ordinary course of appeal.  See Hudson v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst., Concord, 480 Mass. 1038, 1039 n.4 (2018) (ordinary appellate process provided adequate remedy for denial of motion to amend complaint); Boston Pipe Covering, Inc. v. Rosati, 428 Mass. 1018, 1018 (1998) (petitioner failed to demonstrate absence of adequate alternative remedy for challenging denial of motion to strike pleadings).  Cf. Sabree v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 437 Mass. 1015, 1015 (2002) (denying relief where petitioner sought order compelling defendants to answer interrogatories or entry of default judgment for failing to do so).[5]  Accordingly, the single justice did not commit a clear error of law or otherwise abuse her discretion in denying relief.

Judgment affirmed.

      The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.

      Melanie Cara Eresian & Eva Marie Eresian, pro se.

footnotes

[1] Eva Marie Eresian.

[2] Webster First Federal Credit Union; Dale W. Schaetzke; AMG Marketing Group, Inc.; Arrow Financial Services, LLC; Household Financial Services, II; AME Realty Corporation; the heirs or legal representative of JJD; and the United States of America.

[3] The original complaints identified numerous other defendants, but the single justice determined that these defendants were nominal parties only and dismissed them from both matters.

[4] Webster's motion for summary judgment was denied as to its counterclaims for abuse of process.  After these counterclaims were voluntarily dismissed, final judgment entered on October 8, 2024.

[5] We reject the petitioners' assertion that they lacked an adequate alternative remedy because they belatedly received notice of certain rulings, thereby shortening their time to pursue interlocutory review in the Appeals Court under G. L. c. 231, § 118.  Significantly, the petitioners did not attempt to pursue any such review even after they received notice of the relevant rulings.  In addition, the petitioners did not pursue a direct appeal after final judgment entered in the Superior Court more than one year ago.