Mejia v. Samuels

Opinion

24-2901-cv Mejia v. Samuels

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 2 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 3 27th day of February, two thousand twenty-six. 4 5 Present: 6 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 7 Chief Judge, 8 DENNIS JACOBS, 9 PIERRE N. LEVAL, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 JANERIS RODRIGUEZ MEJIA, AS PARENT AND 14 NATURAL GUARDIAN OF E.D. AND INDIVIDUALLY, 15 16 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 17 18 v. 24-2901 19 20 KAMAR H. SAMUELS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 21 CHANCELLOR OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT 22 OF EDUCATION, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF 23 EDUCATION, 24 25 Defendants-Appellees. 1 26 27 _____________________________________

1 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. Mejia originally filed her complaint against David C. Banks in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education. Kamar H. Samuels is the current chancellor and is automatically substituted as a party under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2)

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1 For Plaintiffs-Appellants: RORY J. BELLANTONI, David J. Markese, Jeffrey A. 2 Spinner, Liberty & Freedom Legal Group, Ltd., New 3 York, NY. 4 5 Carissa Shipley, Brain Injury Rights Group, Ltd., 6 New York, NY. 7 8 For Defendants-Appellees: DIANA LAWLESS, Richard Dearing, Claude S. Platton 9 for Muriel Goode-Trufant, Corporation Counsel of 10 the City of New York, New York, NY. 11 12 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

13 New York (Ho, J.). 14 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 15 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 16 Plaintiff-Appellant Janeris Rodriguez Mejia, the parent of E.D., a child with disabilities, 17 appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 18 entered on September 30, 2024, granting Defendants-Appellants the New York City Department 19 of Education’s (“DOE’s”) and its Chancellor’s motion for summary judgment. 20 As required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), DOE developed 21 an Individualized Educational Program (“IEP”) for E.D., detailing the accommodations it would 22 provide to ensure that E.D. received a Free and Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”). Mejia 23 unilaterally rejected the IEP and instead enrolled E.D. at a specialized school, iBrain, for the final 24 two months of the 2021–2022 school year. Following a 2022 due process complaint, both an 25 impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) and, on administrative appeal, a state review officer (“SRO”) 26 were unpersuaded by Mejia’s arguments seeking reimbursement for these two months’ tuition, 27 reasoning that, because she did not provide the statutorily contemplated 10 business days’ written 28 notice to the DOE, the equities disfavored reimbursement. On July 24, 2023, Mejia sought review 29 of the SRO’s decision in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

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1 The district court declined to consider additional evidence proffered by Mejia and likewise 2 concluded that the equities disfavored reimbursement for the 2021–2022 school year. Mejia 3 appealed. 4 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the 5 case, and the issues on appeal, which we set forth in this summary order only as necessary to 6 explain our decision to AFFIRM. 7 * * * 8 Under the IDEA, a parent who believes that their child’s IEP fails to comply with statutory 9 requirements (i.e., that the school district fails to provide a FAPE) can unilaterally remove their 10 child from the proposed public school and place them in a non-public school at their own financial 11 risk. See Ventura de Paulino v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 959 F.3d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 2020). Parents 12 can obtain retroactive reimbursement “if they satisfy a three-part test that has come to be known 13 as the Burlington-Carter test.” Id. The test allows for reimbursement where (1) the school 14 district’s proposed placement violated the IDEA, e.g., by denying a FAPE; (2) the parents’ 15 alternative placement was appropriate; and (3) equitable considerations favor reimbursement. Id. 16 at 526–27. Under the third prong, parents seeking reimbursement “bear the burden of 17 showing . . . that the equities weigh in their favor.” C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 18 F.3d 826, 836 (2d. Cir. 2014). 19 Relevant here, the IDEA allows the adjudicator to reduce or deny reimbursement if “10 20 business days (including any holidays that occur on a business day) prior to the removal of the 21 child from the public school, the parents did not give written notice to the public agency.” 20 22 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(bb). The Supreme Court has cast this analysis as part of 23 Burlington-Carter’s third step: “[C]ourts retain discretion to reduce the amount of a

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1 reimbursement award if the equities so warrant—for instance, if the parents failed to give the 2 school district adequate notice of their intent to enroll the child in private school. In considering 3 the equities, courts should generally presume that public-school officials are properly performing 4 their obligations under IDEA.” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009). 5 On appeal, Mejia argues that the district court incorrectly declined to consider her 6 purported 10 days’ notice letter and that the district court incorrectly balanced the equities under 7 the Burlington-Carter framework. 2 We disagree. 8 As the DOE’s file contained no record of having received a prior notice letter, and because 9 Mejia initially made no claim of having sent a prior notice letter pertaining to this two-month 10 period (while claiming to have sent such a letter with respect to a subsequent period of private 11 education), the IHO concluded that Mejia had not complied with the 10 days prior notice 12 requirement. Mejia proffered the purported notice letter for the first time to the SRO, alleging that 13 it was inadvertently omitted from the record. The SRO declined to admit it and sustained the 14 IHO’s resolution of the dispute, finding it to be reasonable. 15 Before the district court, Mejia renewed her contention that she had sent a notice letter. 16 Even if we were to assume arguendo that the letter was sent in spite of strong evidence that the 17 purported letter proffered by Mejia was an after-the-fact fabrication, this would have done nothing 18 to change the outcome. As the district court noted, even taken at face value, the letter, dated April 19 22, only provided six business days’ notice to the school district. Indeed, Mejia concedes that the 20 letter “failed . . . to provide the DOE with a Ten-Day written notice.” Reply Br. at 17. Accordingly,

2 Mejia also argues that the district court improperly deferred to the state administrative officers in balancing the equities in contravention of our decision in Ferreira. See Ferreira v. Aviles-Ramos, 120 F.4th 323, 327 (2d Cir.

2024). There, we held that “a district court reviewing a claim for reimbursement under the IDEA must independently evaluate the equities, without deferring to the state administrative agency’s conclusion.” Id.

Mejia’s argument is unavailing. As in Ferreira, the district court here “ultimately did balance the equities and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.” Id. Mejia’s claim to the contrary is without merit.

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1 the district court properly exercised its explicit statutory grant of authority to deny or reduce 2 reimbursement based on this failure to give timely notice. See 20 U.S.C. § 3 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(bb). 4 * * * 5 We have considered Mejia’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 6 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

7 FOR THE COURT: 8 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk