Mejia v. Navarro

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Mejia v. Navarro

276 A.D.2d 535, 714 N.Y.S.2d 686, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10155

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 10, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 276 A.D.2d 535 (Mejia v. Navarro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mejia v. Navarro, 276 A.D.2d 535, 714 N.Y.S.2d 686, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10155 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Golia, J.), dated September 7, 1999, as denied that branch of her motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the branch of the motion which is for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

In opposition to the defendant’s prima facie demonstration of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the defendant created or increased an existing hazard by negligently removing snow and ice that had accumulated on the sidewalk (see, Blum v City of New York, 267 AD2d 341; Faiz v City of New York, 254 AD2d 322). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Ritter, J. P., Thompson, Friedmann, H. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Golia, J.), dated September 7, 1999, as denied that branch of her motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the branch of the motion which is for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

In opposition to the defendant’s prima facie demonstration of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the defendant created or increased an existing hazard by negligently removing snow and ice that had accumulated on the sidewalk (see, Blum v City of New York, 267 AD2d 341; Faiz v City of New York, 254 AD2d 322). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Ritter, J. P., Thompson, Friedmann, H. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

276 A.D.2d 535, 714 N.Y.S.2d 686, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10155, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mejia-v-navarro-nyappdiv-2000.

Opinion

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