Mejia Lopez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 1, 2025
• Docket: 23-3655
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 1 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS DURID MEJIA LOPEZ; No. 23-3655 I.D.M.U., Agency Nos. Petitioners, A220-307-527 A220-307-528 v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 27, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: TASHIMA, NGUYEN, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Carlos Durid Mejia Lopez and his minor son, natives and citizens of

Honduras, petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA). The BIA dismissed Petitioners’ appeal of a decision of the Immigration

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). Judge (IJ), who denied their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

1. The IJ did not err in relying on In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA

2008), to reject the proposed group of young Honduran men who opposed gangs

on the ground that being young is not an immutable characteristic. See id. at 583

(“We agree with the Immigration Judge that ‘youth’ is not an entirely immutable

characteristic but is, instead, by its very nature, a temporary state that changes over

time.”).

2. Petitioners contend the BIA erred by failing to consider all the

evidence, such as country conditions and human rights reports, but they do not

point to any evidence the BIA ignored that would establish that their proposed

social groups are socially distinct. See Diaz-Torres v. Barr, 963 F.3d 976, 978–79,

981 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding that the evidence did not establish that the

petitioner’s proposed social groups were distinct where “[n]othing in the record

addresses whether Mexican society views either of [the petitioner’s] proposed

social groups as distinct,” noting that no “country conditions reports or news

articles mention such a group”); Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th

Cir. 2020) (agreeing with the BIA that the proposed social group of “persons who

2 ‘report the criminal activity of gangs to the police’” in Guatemala was not socially

distinct because there was no evidence, “such as country reports, background

documents, or news articles,” showing that such persons “are perceived or

recognized as a group by society in Guatemala”).

3. Although the evidence that Mejia Lopez was kidnaped and beaten and

that his cousin was tortured and killed might indicate treatment that rises to the

level of persecution, Petitioners have not provided evidence that would establish

that their proposed groups are perceived as distinct in Honduran society.

Petitioners’ asylum claim thus must fail because they have not established that the

harm was on account of a protected ground. See Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th

1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023) (explaining that to qualify for asylum, the applicant

must establish that “the persecution was on account of one or more protected

grounds” (quoting Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir.

2017) (en banc))). Their withholding of removal claim also fails. See Singh v.

Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 658 (9th Cir. 2023) (stating that “an applicant who ‘fail[s]

to satisfy the lower standard of proof required to establish eligibility for asylum . . .

necessarily . . . fail[s] to demonstrate eligibility for withholding’” (quoting

Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000))).

3 4. Petitioners failed to establish eligibility for CAT relief because, even

if the harm Mejia Lopez suffered and fears rises to the level of torture, they have

failed to establish that they would be tortured with the acquiescence of a public

official if they returned. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1067 (9th Cir.

2021) (explaining that, “[t]o qualify for CAT protection, a petitioner must show”

not only that “it is ‘more likely than not he or she would be tortured if removed to

the proposed country of removal,’” but also that the torture would be “inflicted by

or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official”

(quoting 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(2), 208.18(a)(1))).

The petition for review is DENIED.