18-2389 Meihua v. Barr BIA Loprest, IJ A087 403 415 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of September, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
NI MEIHUA, Petitioner,
v. 18-2389 NAC WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: John S. Yong, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Jonathan Robbins, Senior Litigation Counsel; D. Nicholas Harling, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that this petition for review of a decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is DENIED.
Petitioner Meihua Ni, 1 a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 23, 2018
decision of the BIA affirming an August 17, 2017 decision of
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her asylum application. 2
In re Ni Meihua, No. A087 403 415 (B.I.A. Jul. 23, 2018),
aff’g No. A087 403 415 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 17, 2017).
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history.
“Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning and
offers additional commentary, we review the decision of the
IJ as supplemented by the BIA.” Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d
102, 105 (2d Cir. 2007). The applicable standards of review
are well established. “We review the BIA’s legal conclusions
de novo, and its factual findings . . . under the substantial
1 Petitioner’s name, Meihua Ni, is transposed in the agency’s decisions as Ni Meihua. We refer to her in this order as “Ni.” 2Ni also applied for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture, but did not appeal those denials to the BIA, nor does she challenge them in the present petition. 2 evidence standard.” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Absent past persecution, a noncitizen may establish
eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear
of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2);
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004).
To do so, an applicant must show either a reasonable
possibility that she will be singled out for persecution or
that the country of removal has a pattern or practice of
persecuting similarly situated individuals. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741
(B.I.A. 2005) (explaining that a pattern or practice of
persecution is the “systemic or pervasive” persecution of a
group).
The agency reasonably found that Ni did not show that
she will be targeted for persecution. First, she did not
provide any evidence that Chinese authorities were aware of
her religious practice in the United States. See Hongsheng
Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]o
establish eligibility for relief based exclusively on
activities undertaken after [her] arrival in the United
3 States, an alien must make some showing that authorities in
[her] country of nationality are (1) aware of [her] activities
or (2) likely to become aware of [her] activities.”). Second,
the agency reasonably afforded minimal weight to the unsworn
letters from Ni’s relatives in China stating that the police
sought to arrest her for distributing religious materials in
2011. See Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334 (deferring to agency’s
decision to give little weight to unsworn letter from
applicant’s spouse in China that alleged authorities were
looking for the applicant). Those letters lacked detail to
substantiate the claim that police still sought to arrest Ni.
Thus, given the “absence of solid support in the record” that
Chinese authorities will target Ni for her Christian practice
in this country or for her distribution of religious materials
in China in 2011, her “fear is speculative at best.” Jian
Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005).
The agency also reasonably concluded that Ni did not show
a pattern or practice of persecution in Fujian Province of
Christians, like Ni, who do not hold positions of prominence
or high visibility within their congregations. The agency
relied on the State Department’s 2015 International Religious
Freedom Report, which states that approximately 45 million
4 Christians practice in unregistered churches in China, and
authorities in some areas allow unregistered churches to hold
services, although authorities in other areas target and
close such churches. The report does not identify Fujian
Province as an area where Christians are targeted. Given the
large number of Christians practicing in unregistered
churches, the fact that restrictions on their activities vary
by region, and the lack of evidence that Christians in Fujian
Province face heightened restrictions, the agency did not err
in determining that Ni did not establish a pattern or practice
of persecution of similarly situated Christians. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 &
n.1 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of pattern or practice
claim where evidence reflected that violence was not
nationwide and that Catholics in many parts of Indonesia were
free to practice their faith); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546
F.3d 138, 149, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no error in
requiring locality-specific evidence where the record
reflects that conditions vary by region).
Ni’s appellate arguments are unavailing. First, she
urges us to take administrative notice of the 2018 Religious
Freedom Report, but that report is not part of the
5 administrative record and was not considered by the agency.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (limiting judicial review to
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18-2389 Meihua v. Barr BIA Loprest, IJ A087 403 415 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of September, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
NI MEIHUA, Petitioner,
v. 18-2389 NAC WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: John S. Yong, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Jonathan Robbins, Senior Litigation Counsel; D. Nicholas Harling, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that this petition for review of a decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is DENIED.
Petitioner Meihua Ni, 1 a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 23, 2018
decision of the BIA affirming an August 17, 2017 decision of
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her asylum application. 2
In re Ni Meihua, No. A087 403 415 (B.I.A. Jul. 23, 2018),
aff’g No. A087 403 415 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 17, 2017).
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history.
“Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning and
offers additional commentary, we review the decision of the
IJ as supplemented by the BIA.” Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d
102, 105 (2d Cir. 2007). The applicable standards of review
are well established. “We review the BIA’s legal conclusions
de novo, and its factual findings . . . under the substantial
1 Petitioner’s name, Meihua Ni, is transposed in the agency’s decisions as Ni Meihua. We refer to her in this order as “Ni.” 2Ni also applied for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture, but did not appeal those denials to the BIA, nor does she challenge them in the present petition. 2 evidence standard.” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Absent past persecution, a noncitizen may establish
eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear
of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2);
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004).
To do so, an applicant must show either a reasonable
possibility that she will be singled out for persecution or
that the country of removal has a pattern or practice of
persecuting similarly situated individuals. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741
(B.I.A. 2005) (explaining that a pattern or practice of
persecution is the “systemic or pervasive” persecution of a
group).
The agency reasonably found that Ni did not show that
she will be targeted for persecution. First, she did not
provide any evidence that Chinese authorities were aware of
her religious practice in the United States. See Hongsheng
Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]o
establish eligibility for relief based exclusively on
activities undertaken after [her] arrival in the United
3 States, an alien must make some showing that authorities in
[her] country of nationality are (1) aware of [her] activities
or (2) likely to become aware of [her] activities.”). Second,
the agency reasonably afforded minimal weight to the unsworn
letters from Ni’s relatives in China stating that the police
sought to arrest her for distributing religious materials in
2011. See Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334 (deferring to agency’s
decision to give little weight to unsworn letter from
applicant’s spouse in China that alleged authorities were
looking for the applicant). Those letters lacked detail to
substantiate the claim that police still sought to arrest Ni.
Thus, given the “absence of solid support in the record” that
Chinese authorities will target Ni for her Christian practice
in this country or for her distribution of religious materials
in China in 2011, her “fear is speculative at best.” Jian
Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005).
The agency also reasonably concluded that Ni did not show
a pattern or practice of persecution in Fujian Province of
Christians, like Ni, who do not hold positions of prominence
or high visibility within their congregations. The agency
relied on the State Department’s 2015 International Religious
Freedom Report, which states that approximately 45 million
4 Christians practice in unregistered churches in China, and
authorities in some areas allow unregistered churches to hold
services, although authorities in other areas target and
close such churches. The report does not identify Fujian
Province as an area where Christians are targeted. Given the
large number of Christians practicing in unregistered
churches, the fact that restrictions on their activities vary
by region, and the lack of evidence that Christians in Fujian
Province face heightened restrictions, the agency did not err
in determining that Ni did not establish a pattern or practice
of persecution of similarly situated Christians. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 &
n.1 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of pattern or practice
claim where evidence reflected that violence was not
nationwide and that Catholics in many parts of Indonesia were
free to practice their faith); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546
F.3d 138, 149, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no error in
requiring locality-specific evidence where the record
reflects that conditions vary by region).
Ni’s appellate arguments are unavailing. First, she
urges us to take administrative notice of the 2018 Religious
Freedom Report, but that report is not part of the
5 administrative record and was not considered by the agency.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (limiting judicial review to
“the administrative record on which the order of removal is
based”). Moreover, even if the report were to be considered,
it nowhere identifies “extraordinary and compelling
circumstances” giving rise to a well-founded fear of future
persecution. Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 269 (2d
Cir. 2007); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). To the contrary, the
2018 report merely notes the one-day detention of a Catholic
bishop and a surprise inspection of a kindergarten operated
by an unregistered church in Fujian Province — neither of
which amounts to widespread targeting of Christians in the
area.
Second, Ni cites the 2010 Religious Freedom Report (which
was before the agency) as evidence of local targeting of
Christians in Fujian Province. But that report identified
only interference with the funeral of a Catholic bishop and
the detention of Catholic priests in Fujian Province, not the
targeting of individual Christians, like Ni, who do not hold
leadership positions. Thus, even in light of this report,
the agency did not err in finding that Ni had not established
“systemic or pervasive” persecution of similarly situated
6 Christians sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or practice of
persecution. In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 741; 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court