Meier v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.

275 N.W. 139, 224 Iowa 295
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedSeptember 28, 1937
DocketNo. 43625.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 275 N.W. 139 (Meier v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Meier v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 275 N.W. 139, 224 Iowa 295 (iowa 1937).

Opinion

Sager, J.

This case is one of much difficulty, not because of the absence of precedent on the subject involved, but rather because of the number of decisions on it, with the almost infinite variety of facts upon which' they turn.

As a preliminary to the examination of the record, we can do no better in the way of stating general principles applicable than to quote the concise and lucid language of Faville, J., in Lutz v. Davis, 195 Iowa 1049, at page 1052, 192 N. W. 15, 17 :

“The rules of law applicable to cases of this kind are well defined, and should be generally understood. The difficulty lies in applying the well established rules to the facts of any particular casé. These rules have been reiterated time and again in the pronouncements of this court. Ordinarily and usually, the question of whether or not a plaintiff in an action of this character has been guilty of contributory negligence is one for the determination of the jury. This is true because the question as - to whether or not a party has been guilty of contributory negligence is usually a question of fact. Contributory negligence is such an act or omission on the part of a plaintiff as amounts to a want of ordinary care, which, cooperating or concurring with a negligent act by the defendant, is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. The degree of care which a plaintiff must exercise in order to be free from contributory negligence is that degree of care which a man of ordinary prudence and caution *297 would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. It is obvious that the question as-to whether or not a plaintiff has conducted himself as a man of ordinary care and prudence would have acted under the same or similar circumstances is a fact question, ordinarily and usually to be determined by the jury under the evidence in any given case.

“But there are cases in which it is the duty of the court to direct the jury to return a verdict for a defendant on the ground that the evidence shows that the plaintiff in the action had been guilty of contributory negligence, or a want of ordinary care. This situation arises when it appears that the plaintiff has failed to establish material facts essential to show the exercise of due care. In such instance, it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. The basic and fundamental reason for this is that, in such a situation, there is no question to submit to the jury in this regard, under the established rules of law.

“The general rules of law regarding the duty of one about to cross a railway crossing, in order to be free from contributory negligence, are not intricate nor obscure. All courts agree that due care requires that a traveler, under such circumstances, must use his senses of sight and hearing, before attempting to cross a railway track, and in order to be free from contributory negligence, must look and listen for an approaching train. A failure so to do constitutes negligence on his part, as a matter of law. Now, if such plaintiff fails to prove that he did look and listen, then, applying the established rules of law, the court must hold that, as ‘ a matter of law, ’ the plaintiff has failed in an essential legal requisite of his proof, and cannot recover. * * *

“The foregoing observations are elementary and confessedly quite academic. They may, however, serve to emphasize a fact, which should be patent, that no two eases of this character are ever identical in their facts in regard to contributory negligence. It therefore follows that precedents on this question are of value only because of similarity of fact situations; and even then it is apparent that there are almost invariably points of distinction and differentiation that, even though apparently slight, may serve to carry one case to a jury and require a directed verdict in another. The cases must all come under the same general rules and be measured by these rules. ’ ’

On the statement of facts which will appear later, the al *298 leged absence of the ordinary crossing* signal, the failure of an automatic gong to operate, and a violation of a speed ordinance, distinguish the instant case from the many cited in the briefs of the parties. In announcing the conclusion hereafter expressed, we assume, without deciding, that the jury was warranted in finding the defendant guilty of negligence on all of these grounds.

We have then the question whether the failure of Meier to take notice of the approach of the train, under the facts, made him guilty, as a matter of law, of contributory negligence. Under many decisions of this court the decedent would have been guilty of such negligence without question, except for the fact that he had a certain right to rely both upon the automatic signal and upon the ordinance which regulated the speed of trains over the crossing on which he was killed.

To one even passingly familiar with the number of cases upon the questions involved it will be apparent that an examination of even a small part of them is out of the question, and we content ourselves with calling attention to a few which seem to us to stand out as guides to a correct solution of the problem confronting us.

Among the propositions about which there may be no dispute is that the traveler and the railroad company .are under mutual and reciprocal rights and duties. This statement is to be taken with the implied limitation stated by this court in Dombrenos v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 174 N. W. 596, at page 598 (not reported in Iowa reports), Weaver, J., speaking for the court:

“It is true that for manifest reasons the passing train has the preference or right of way over the driver of an ordinary vehicle, but, subject to this rule, the railway company and the driver stand on equal footing in the matter of right to use the crossing, and each is bound to exercise that right in a manner not to unnecessarily increase the dangers naturally incident to such use, and each may rig’htfully place some degree of reliance upon the performance of that duty by the other. Those duties may be, and often are, emphasized by circumstances which render the crossing unusually dangerous, thus calling for greater watchfulness, but the rule of reasonable care remains the same, though what is reasonable care under some circumstances may *299 not be reasonable under others. Every collision or other accident is marked by more or less varying surroundings. No two are in all respects alike, and negligence of the one party and contributory negligence of the other are questions to be determined by consideration of all the circumstances.”

Through all the cases there runs as a thread the general principle that both the traveler and the railroad must use such care as a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the circumstances, either as they actually were, or as they might appear to one acting with the required prudence and care. Another principle upon which there seems to be little or no difference of opinion is that it is negligence per se to violate a statute or ordinance duly passed as a measure of safety for persons or property.

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Bluebook (online)
275 N.W. 139, 224 Iowa 295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meier-v-chicago-rock-island-pacific-railway-co-iowa-1937.