M.E.H. v. C.K.H.

2025 Ohio 1394

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 18, 2025
• Docket: 30298
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as M.E.H. v. C.K.H., 2025-Ohio-1394.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

M.E.H. : : Petitioner-Appellee : C.A. No. 30298 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2024 DV 00065 : C.K.H. : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- : Domestic Relations) Respondent-Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on April 18, 2025

RYAN L. THOMAS, Attorney for Respondent-Appellant

LORI R. CICERO, Attorney for Petitioner-Appellee

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TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Respondent-appellant C.K.H. appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying and dismissing

his motion for contempt against the Dayton Police Department (“DPD”) and DPD

Sergeant Roberta Bailey. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. -2-

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On January 11, 2024, M.E.H. filed a petition for a domestic violence civil

protection order (“CPO”) against her husband, C.K.H. An ex parte CPO was entered

that same day. The CPO contained a provision prohibiting C.K.H. from possessing,

using, carrying or obtaining any deadly weapon during the effective dates of the order. It

further contained the following provision:

RESPONDENT SHALL TURN OVER ALL DEADLY WEAPONS

owned by Respondent or in Respondent’s possession to the law

enforcement agency that serves Respondent with this Order no later than

receipt of [the] CPO.

Any law enforcement agency is authorized to accept possession of

deadly weapons pursuant to this paragraph and hold them in protective

custody for the duration of this Order.

Law enforcement shall immediately notify the Court upon receiving

Respondent’s deadly weapons for protective custody as set forth in the

Order.

Upon the expiration or termination of the Order and if a full hearing

order is not issued or consent agreement approved, Respondent may

reclaim any deadly weapons held in protective custody by law enforcement

pursuant to this Order unless Respondent is otherwise disqualified as

verified by a check of the NCIC protection order file. -3-

(Emphasis in original.)

{¶ 3} DPD served the CPO on C.K.H. and, according to C.K.H.’s appellate brief, it

seized 14 firearms from his residence.

{¶ 4} On July 1, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing M.E.H.’s

petition for a CPO and the ex parte order it had issued, noting that M.E.H. had appeared

before the court and orally requested the dismissal of the case. The dismissal order

provided that C.K.H. was entitled to retrieve his weapons from the Montgomery County

Sheriff’s Office.

{¶ 5} According to C.K.H., he presented the order to the DPD, but staff “refused to

honor the entry” because it was directed to the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, not

the Dayton Police Department. Therefore, C.K.H. filed a motion requesting that the trial

court enter a new order directed to the DPD. The trial court granted the motion and

entered the following order, which is identical to the one filed on July 1, 2024, in all

respects except the named law enforcement agency:

The parties should immediately check with the Dayton Police Department

to determine whether property, including weapons, if any, was taken from

the Respondent. If the property, including weapons, if any, is in the

custody of the Dayton Police Department, it may be picked up by presenting

this entry to the property room, Dayton Police Department. . . . Property,

including weapons, if any, left in the possession of the Dayton Police

Department 30 days from the date of this entry is hereby found to be

abandoned and therefore shall be subject to a forfeiture. -4-

{¶ 6} Thereafter, C.K.H. filed a motion seeking an order finding the DPD and its

agent, Seargeant Roberta Bailey, in contempt for failing to return his weapons after he

presented the revised order to the department. In the motion, C.K.H. alleged that, when

he presented the order to the DPD, he was informed that Bailey “was under the

impression that [he] was under a firearms disability and that she had no obligation to

comply with this Court’s Order.”

{¶ 7} The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, finding that neither the

DPD nor Bailey was a party to the action.

{¶ 8} C.K.H. appeals.

II. Contempt

{¶ 9} The sole assignment of error asserted by C.K.H. states:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT.

{¶ 10} C.K.H. contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for contempt,

because courts “have inherent and statutory authority to punish and hold nonparties in

contempt for the disobedience of valid court orders.”

{¶ 11} “Contempt is defined in general terms as disobedience of a court order.”

State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554 (2001). Contempt involves “conduct

which brings the administration of justice into disrespect, or which tends to embarrass,

impede or obstruct a court in the performance of its functions.” Windham Bank v. -5-

Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio St.2d 55 (1971), paragraph one of syllabus. Courts typically

distinguish between civil and criminal contempt proceedings. State v. Chavez-Juarez,

2009-Ohio-6130, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.). “ ‘Civil contempt sanctions are designed for remedial

or coercive purposes and are often employed to compel obedience to a court order.’ ”

Id. at 25, quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). “Criminal

contempt sanctions, however, are punitive in nature and are designed to vindicate the

authority of the court.” Id., citing Denovchek v. Trumball Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 36 Ohio

St.3d 14, 15 (1988). “Thus, civil contempts are characterized as violations against the

party for whose benefit the order was made, whereas criminal contempts are most often

described as offenses against the dignity or process of the court.” Russo at 551, citing

State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 204-205 (1980). “A common pleas court has both

inherent and statutory power to punish contempts . . . .” Burt v. Dodge, 65 Ohio St.3d

34, 35 (1992), citing Zakany v. Zakany, 9 Ohio St.3d 192 (1984), syllabus.

{¶ 12} As C.K.H. correctly notes, we have held that trial courts may hold non-

parties in contempt. Chavez-Juarez at ¶ 35. However, that power is not unlimited, as

we have also noted that a court may only do so “under the proper circumstances.” Id.,

quoting Scarnecchia v. Rebhan, 2006-Ohio-7053, ¶ 9 (7th Dist.).

For example, in Planned Parenthood Assn. of Cincinnati, Inc. v.

Project Jericho, 52 Ohio St.3d 56 (1990), the Supreme Court of Ohio

considered whether picketers who were not parties to an action between

Planned Parenthood and certain anti-abortion groups could be held in

contempt for violating terms of a preliminary injunction that had been issued. -6-

The court concluded that the non-parties were bound by the terms of the

injunction, because they were “persons in active concert or participation

with [the parties to the action].” This was based on the theory that

“[n]onparties are bound by an injunction to ensure ‘that defendants [do] not

nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors,

although they were not parties to the original proceeding.’ ” The non-

parties must have had actual notice of the injunction, however, in order to

be bound.

The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the picketers had actual

knowledge of the injunction, and that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in holding them in contempt.

Id. at ¶ 35-37.

{¶ 13} Similarly, in State ex rel. Rogers v. Republic Environmental Sys., Inc., 2010-

Ohio-5523 (2d Dist.), we held that a non-party corporation could be held in contempt. In

that case, Republic Environmental Systems, Inc. and the Ohio Environmental Protection

Agency entered into a consent agreement concerning cleanup of hazardous materials

located at a property owned by Republic. Id. at ¶ 1-2. While that action was pending,

Republic sold the property to McCabe Corporation. The purchase agreement between

the Republic and McCabe established that the purchase was made subject to the consent

agreement. Id. The State subsequently filed a motion to hold both Republic and

McCabe in contempt for failure to comply with the agreement, and the trial court found

them both to be in contempt. Id. at ¶ 5, ¶ 7. We affirmed, finding that McCabe had been -7-

in active concert or participation with Republic. Id. at ¶ 51.

{¶ 14} A review of case law reveals that non-parties have also been found in

contempt when they represent the interests of a party. See Citicasters Co. v. Stop 26-

Riverbend, Inc., 2002-Ohio-2286, ¶ 65-92 (7th Dist.) (holding an attorney in contempt for

failing to ensure a client's compliance with a temporary restraining order); Adkins v.

Hansen, 2002-Ohio-2676 (5th Dist.) (noting that the trial court would have had jurisdiction

for purposes of indirect civil contempt over a non-party insurance company to the extent

that the insurance company represented the interests of the defendants in the action);

Advantage Bank v. Waldo Pub., L.L.C., 2009-Ohio-2816 (3d Dist.) (the principal

shareholder in a corporation could be held in contempt for actions of the corporation).

{¶ 15} In this case, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that DPD or Bailey

represented the interest of either party to this action or that they were in active concert or

participation with either party. Thus, the above-cited cases upon which C.K.H. relies do

not provide a basis for holding DPD or Bailey in contempt.

{¶ 16} Furthermore, we note that “[i]n order to be ‘guilty of contempt for failure to

comply with a court order, there must be an order with which the person charged has

failed to comply.’ ” Washington Mut. Bank v. Beatley, 2020-Ohio-4658, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.),

quoting Godward v. Kory, 2011-Ohio-5265, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.). “In general, ‘[p]roceedings

for contempt for noncompliance will not lie where the order does not expressly address

the alleged act of disobedience.’ ” Id. at 28, quoting Cortland United Methodist Church v.

Knowles, 2007-Ohio-3383, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.). “[A] court order cannot be enforced in

contempt unless the order was ‘clear and definite, unambiguous, and not subject to dual -8-

interpretations.’ ” Toledo v. State, 2018-Ohio-2358, ¶ 23, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati

Enquirer v. Hunter, 2013-Ohio-5614, ¶ 25.

{¶ 17} The trial court order in this case merely stated that C.K.H. “may” pick up his

property. It did not contain any express or affirmative command, order, or directive to

either the DPD or Bailey requiring the return of the weapons. Without such, the failure

to return C.K.H.’s property cannot be the basis for finding them in contempt. See South

Euclid Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 80 v. D’Amico, 29 Ohio St.3d 50, 52 (1987).

{¶ 18} The assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 19} The sole assignment of error being overruled, the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed.

LEWIS, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.