Megginson v. Bilan, a Minor

Ohio Court of Appeals

Megginson v. Bilan, a Minor

178 N.E. 281, 40 Ohio App. 210, 10 Ohio Law. Abs. 26, 1931 Ohio App. LEXIS 588

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedJanuary 12, 1931

DocketNo 2433

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 178 N.E. 281 (Megginson v. Bilan, a Minor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Megginson v. Bilan, a Minor, 178 N.E. 281, 40 Ohio App. 210, 10 Ohio Law. Abs. 26, 1931 Ohio App. LEXIS 588 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931).

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Opinions

WILLIAMS, J.

The evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff below tendered to show that he was riding his bicycle on the right hand side of the street and that the defendant below turned out of the line of traffic and into his bicycle. The evidence adduced by the defendant tended to show that she was driving her automobile on the right hand side of the street and that the plaintiff ran his bicycle into her car. We are unable to say that the verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

Plaintiff suffered very severe injuries. His skull was fractured and as a result thereof he suffered paralysis of the shoulder, arm and hand. At the time of the last trial the muscles of his arm and shoulder were atrophied and he has what is sometimes referred to as a withered arm. Plaintiff offered evidence tending to show his injuries were permanent and that he would probably be compelled to have the arm amputated at the shoulder. Under the circumstances we can not say that the verdict is excessive.

The claimed error as to the admission of evidence relates to testimony regarding a telephone conversation between the defendant and one Raab. Raab himself did not testify, but Peter Bilan, the father, testified that Raab called Mrs. Megginson up and that he stood near the phone and heard what both of them said. It seems that there were three conversations which took place under such circumstances and Mrs. Megginson admitted that she talked three times with Raab. The testimony of Peter Bilan as to these conversations was competent. Licciardi v State, 18 Oh Ap, 118, 123, 124. With reference to the third of these conversations, the following appears in the record:

“Q. You may state whether or not Mr. Raab called her up again the third time? A. It was the next day. Q. The next day? A. Yes, sir. Q. And about what time of the day was that? A. Some time in the morning, about after nine. Q. You may state whether or not you heard the conversation, both ends? A. Yes, sir. Q. How did you hear what she said to that? A. I was holding the phone, with Mr. Raab, together. Q. What did he say to her then, and what did she say?

Objection, overruled, exception.

A. He askedf her again about the accident, and she said she got nothing to do, I should go to see the insurance company.”

It is claimed that there was error in the admission of this evidence. It appears that the only exception taken was to the overruling of an objection to the last question. It is apparent that this question was perfectly competent and the ruling of the court was correct. The answer to that question, however, is such as to imply that the defendant carried liability insurance. It is not *27 necessary for us to determine in this case 'whether or not testimony as to conversations with a defendant, in which he admits he carried liability insurance, is or is not admissible against him, for the reason that that question is not raised by the record, as there was no motion to strike out the whole or any part of the answer. As the question was itself proper, the trial court never ruled upon the competency of the answer, nor was the question of its competency ever raised by motion or otherwise on the trial of the case. There was, therefore, no prejudicial error in the rulings of the court as to the admission of evidence.

There being no reversible error apparent upon the face of the record, the judgment is affirmed.

RICHARDS, J, concurs.

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WILLIAMS, J.

The evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff below tendered to show that he was riding his bicycle on the right hand side of the street and that the defendant below turned out of the line of traffic and into his bicycle. The evidence adduced by the defendant tended to show that she was driving her automobile on the right hand side of the street and that the plaintiff ran his bicycle into her car. We are unable to say that the verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

Plaintiff suffered very severe injuries. His skull was fractured and as a result thereof he suffered paralysis of the shoulder, arm and hand. At the time of the last trial the muscles of his arm and shoulder were atrophied and he has what is sometimes referred to as a withered arm. Plaintiff offered evidence tending to show his injuries were permanent and that he would probably be compelled to have the arm amputated at the shoulder. Under the circumstances we can not say that the verdict is excessive.

The claimed error as to the admission of evidence relates to testimony regarding a telephone conversation between the defendant and one Raab. Raab himself did not testify, but Peter Bilan, the father, testified that Raab called Mrs. Megginson up and that he stood near the phone and heard what both of them said. It seems that there were three conversations which took place under such circumstances and Mrs. Megginson admitted that she talked three times with Raab. The testimony of Peter Bilan as to these conversations was competent. Licciardi v State, 18 Oh Ap, 118, 123, 124. With reference to the third of these conversations, the following appears in the record:

“Q. You may state whether or not Mr. Raab called her up again the third time? A. It was the next day. Q. The next day? A. Yes, sir. Q. And about what time of the day was that? A. Some time in the morning, about after nine. Q. You may state whether or not you heard the conversation, both ends? A. Yes, sir. Q. How did you hear what she said to that? A. I was holding the phone, with Mr. Raab, together. Q. What did he say to her then, and what did she say?

Objection, overruled, exception.

A. He askedf her again about the accident, and she said she got nothing to do, I should go to see the insurance company.”

It is claimed that there was error in the admission of this evidence. It appears that the only exception taken was to the overruling of an objection to the last question. It is apparent that this question was perfectly competent and the ruling of the court was correct. The answer to that question, however, is such as to imply that the defendant carried liability insurance. It is not *27 necessary for us to determine in this case 'whether or not testimony as to conversations with a defendant, in which he admits he carried liability insurance, is or is not admissible against him, for the reason that that question is not raised by the record, as there was no motion to strike out the whole or any part of the answer. As the question was itself proper, the trial court never ruled upon the competency of the answer, nor was the question of its competency ever raised by motion or otherwise on the trial of the case. There was, therefore, no prejudicial error in the rulings of the court as to the admission of evidence.

There being no reversible error apparent upon the face of the record, the judgment is affirmed.

RICHARDS, J, concurs.

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178 N.E. 281, 40 Ohio App. 210, 10 Ohio Law. Abs. 26, 1931 Ohio App. LEXIS 588, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/megginson-v-bilan-a-minor-ohioctapp-1931.

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