Megan Elizabeth Hauck v. Merck Animal Health USA - Home Again
Opinion
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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 MEGAN ELIZABETH HAUCK, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01656-JNW 8 Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER 9 v. 10 MERCK ANIMAL HEALTH USA - 11 HOME AGAIN, Defendant. 12 13
14 1. INTRODUCTION 15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Dkt 16 No. 30. Having reviewed the motion, Plaintiff’s opposition, Dkt. No. 31, the reply, 17 Dkt. No. 32, and all other supporting materials, the Court GRANTS the motion for 18 the reasons stated below. 19 2. BACKGROUND 20 Defendant operates the HomeAgain microchip registry system, a nationwide 21 database used to identify ownership of lost pets who have been implanted with a 22 23 1 microchip. Dkt. No. 27 (“FAC”) ¶ 3. Veterinarians, shelters, and municipal 2 authorities rely on this database to determine ownership of animals. FAC ¶ 11.
3 Hauck owned a dog named Pearl, who was implanted with a HomeAgain 4 microchip identifying Hauck as the owner. Id. ¶ 9. Around March 2024, Pearl’s 5 HomeAgain registration was changed to list a third party as Pearl’s owner. Id. ¶ 12. 6 Hauck attempted to contact Defendant to correct Pearl’s registration but was 7 unsuccessful. Id. ¶¶ 15–18. Relying on the incorrect registration information, 8 municipal authorities removed Pearl from Hauck’s possession for a “prolonged
9 period,” during which Pearl’s health declined. Id. ¶¶ 19–23. Pearl was eventually 10 returned to Hauck pursuant to a court order but was euthanized shortly thereafter 11 due to medical complications. Id. ¶¶ 24–26. Hauck then sued Defendant, which now 12 moves to dismiss. Dkt. No. 30. 13 3. DISCUSSION 14 Defendant seeks dismissal on jurisdictional grounds and based on the legal 15 sufficiency of Hauck’s claims. The Court need only reach the jurisdictional questions
16 to conclude that dismissal is warranted. 17 3.1 Article III standing. 18 Federal judicial power extends only to “cases” and “controversies.” Spokeo, 19 Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338, (2016). “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the 20 traditional understanding of a case or controversy.” Id. To have standing, a plaintiff 21 must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 22 challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a 23 1 favorable judicial decision.” Id. To show that an injury in fact is “fairly traceable” to 2 the defendant’s conduct, a plaintiff must show a causal connection between the
3 injury and the defendant’s challenged conduct—not merely “the result of the 4 independent action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan v. Defs. of 5 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 6 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)) (alterations omitted). 7 Hauck alleges that “[t]hird parties, including municipal authorities, relied on 8 Defendant’s registry,” and that she “lost effective control over Pearl” as a “direct
9 result of Defendant’s actions.” FAC ¶¶ 19, 21. But these conclusory statements do 10 not show how Defendant’s challenged conduct caused the alleged harms to Hauck 11 (or Pearl). The complaint is devoid of any allegations regarding how Hauck lost 12 possession of Pearl, what specific third party relied on HomeAgain, the extent of 13 that reliance, and what role—if any—Defendant played in the removal of Pearl from 14 Hauck’s possession. Without these facts to provide the necessary connective tissue 15 between Defendant and the alleged injuries, Hauck’s case rests on the sort of
16 “speculation about the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the 17 courts,” that cannot support Article III standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. 18 Accordingly, the Court finds that Hauck fails to establish the Article III standing 19 necessary for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 20 3.2 Personal jurisdiction. 21 A federal court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties to preside 22 over their legal dispute. There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and 23 1 specific. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017). General 2 jurisdiction “enables a court to hear cases unrelated to the defendant’s forum
3 activities ... if the defendant has ‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and systematic’ 4 contacts with the forum.” Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 5 1986) (quoting Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 6 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986)). Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, requires that the suit 7 “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,” which in turn 8 requires “an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.’ ”
9 Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262 (cleaned up) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 10 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 11 915, 919 (2011) (cleaned up). “For this reason, ‘specific jurisdiction is confined to 12 adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that 13 establishes jurisdiction.’” Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262 (quoting Goodyear, 564 14 U.S. at 919). 15 Hauck alleges no facts demonstrating that Defendant, a Delaware
16 corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey, has contacts with 17 Washington sufficient to establish either general or specific jurisdiction. In 18 opposition, Hauck appears to rely on the test set forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 19 783 (1984), to argue that specific jurisdiction is established because “Defendant 20 maintained and altered [Hauck’s] [HomeAgain] account while [she] was a resident 21 of Washington, and the resulting harm was suffered in Washington.” Dkt. No. 31 at
22 7. But this argument fails under Calder, which “requires more than the defendant’s 23 awareness that the plaintiff it is alleged to have harmed resides in or has strong 1 ties to the forum, because ‘the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the 2 defendant and the forum.’” Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 980 (9th
3 Cir. 2021) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)). Accordingly, the 4 Court finds that Hauck fails to show that Defendant is subject to personal 5 jurisdiction in this Court. 6 3.3 Leave to amend. 7 Hauck requests leave to amend her complaint, should the Court grant 8 Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 31 at 8. She does not explain how she plans 9 to cure the significant deficiencies in her complaint, and the Court is skeptical that 10 she will be able to do so. Nevertheless, district courts must grant leave to amend 11 “unless it is clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by 12 amendment.” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 13 Polich v. Burlington N., Inc., 942 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir.1991)). Because Hauck— 14 who is self-represented—might be able to save the complaint by pleading more facts 15 and fewer legal conclusions, the Court grants her request for leave to amend. 16 4. CONCLUSION 17 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No.
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