Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed September 17, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-1510 Lower Tribunal No. 19-13245-CA-01 ________________
Megan Cauble, Appellant,
vs.
Gregory Kaczmarski, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice Butchko Sanchez, Judge.
Warren Gammill & Associates, P.L., and Warren P. Gammill, for appellant.
No appearance on behalf of appellee. 1
Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER, and GORDO, JJ.
1 Appellee was precluded from filing an answer brief after failing to adhere to court-imposed time standards. MILLER, J.
Appellant, Megan Cauble, appeals a final judgment rendered by the
trial court in consolidated partition actions. The judgments distributed the
proceeds garnered from the court-ordered sale of two condominium units,
Castle Beach and Porto Bellagio, which Cauble jointly owned with her former
fiancé, appellee, Gregory Kaczmarski, and awarded statutory attorney’s fees
and costs. We summarily affirm on all grounds, save the allocation of
carrying costs and preclusion of expert testimony on fair rental value.
BACKGROUND
Cauble and Kaczmarski jointly purchased Castle Beach and Porto
Bellagio together over two decades ago. Two years later, they ended their
relationship. Each agreed to assume possession of a single property.
Cauble moved into Castle Beach, and Kaczmarski began residing at Porto
Bellagio. The respective carrying costs were to be borne by the party in
possession.
In December of 2009, Cauble lost her job and determined she could
no longer afford to maintain Castle Beach. She surrendered possession of
the unit to Kaczmarski. The following month, he began renting out the
property to vacationers through Airbnb and HomeAway. Cauble and her
friends rented the unit from Kaczmarski on several occasions.
2 In 2019, Cauble filed suit in the circuit court seeking to partition Castle
Beach and Porto Bellagio. Kaczmarski answered, raised affirmative
defenses, and counterclaimed for breach of contract, equitable lien
foreclosure, unjust enrichment, and accounting. He contended that Cauble
had previously agreed to relinquish any ownership interest in Castle Beach
in exchange for a lump sum of $10,000, which was payable upon satisfaction
of the mortgage.
After Kaczmarski served a motion for sanctions and a safe harbor letter
under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2019), Cauble abandoned the aspect
of her action relating to Castle Beach. Incongruently, Kaczmarski then
retained separate counsel and filed an independent lawsuit to partition
Castle Beach. Cauble counterclaimed in that suit and reasserted her
abandoned partition claim.
Kaczmarski did not file a responsive pleading. The trial court struck
Kaczmarski’s answer and counterclaim with prejudice in the original lawsuit
and dismissed his second complaint. The court then entered a partial
summary judgment of partition as to both properties against Kaczmarski.
A court-ordered sale ensued, and the trial court convened a nonjury
trial to determine the proper allocation of proceeds and fees. At trial,
Kaczmarski sought contribution from Cauble for the Castle Beach carrying
3 costs. Cauble attempted to present expert testimony to offset the
contribution claim by the reasonable rental value of the property. The trial
court denied her request.
At the end of the trial, the court found that Cauble was in joint
possession of both units after she surrendered Castle Beach to Kaczmarski.
The court denied Cauble’s request for a credit as to certain delinquent
carrying costs that had been deducted from the Porto Bellagio sale proceeds
and afforded Kaczmarski a credit for all of the Castle Beach carrying costs
from 2010 to 2022, which consisted of $293,000. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review factual findings in a nonjury trial court for competent,
substantial evidence. See Q.G.S. Dev., Inc. v. Nat’l Lining Sys., Inc., 386
So. 3d 596, 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). In doing so, we recognize that the trial
judge has the “superior vantage point to see and hear the witnesses and
judge their credibility.” Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998).
ANALYSIS
Chapter 64, Florida Statutes governs partition actions in Florida. Such
actions lie in chancery; hence, they are equitable in nature. See § 64.011,
Fla. Stat. (2019). Following a partition sale, the trial court is charged with
first determining each owner’s percentage of ownership and then
4 proportionally distributing the partition proceeds. See § 64.071, Fla. Stat.
(2019); see also Biondo v. Powers, 743 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
In partition proceedings, the trial court must conduct an accounting to
determine whether joint owners have borne an equal share of the expenses.
In this vein, cotenants ordinarily have a mutual obligation to pay carrying
costs on a jointly owned property. See Lupo v. Lawson, 301 So. 3d 366, 368
(Fla. 2d DCA 2020). A cotenant bearing a disproportionate share of carrying
costs is entitled to reimbursement in the form of a credit upon the sale of the
property. See Goolsby v. Wiley, 547 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
Equally established is the principle that “when a cotenant in possession
seeks contribution for amounts expended in the improvement or preservation
of the property, that claim may be offset by cotenants out of possession by
the reasonable rental value of the use of the property by the cotenant in
possession to the extent it has exceeded his or her proportionate share of
ownership.” Barrow v. Barrow, 527 So. 2d 1373, 1377 (Fla. 1988). If the
reasonable rental value exceeds the cotenant’s claim, the claim for rental
value is limited to the amount of the contribution claim. See id.
Against these principles, we examine the case at hand. Here, the court
determined the parties owned an equal interest in each unit. That conclusion
is supported by competent, substantial evidence.
5 The undisputed evidence further established that the parties agreed
Kaczmarski would have exclusive possession and use of Porto Bellagio and
pay all carrying costs after they called off their engagement. Indeed,
Kaczmarski stipulated through counsel that he was not seeking Porto
Bellagio carrying costs from Cauble. Consequently, Cauble should have
received a credit for one-half of the delinquent charges that were deducted
from the proceeds.
The finding regarding joint possession after 2010 as to Castle Beach
is unsustainable. Cauble surrendered the unit to Kaczmarski after she lost
her employment. Kaczmarski began renting out the property and retained
the rental proceeds. Cauble had no key and paid rent to Kaczmarski to stay
in the unit with friends.
Given these circumstances, Kaczmarski’s possession and use was
disproportionate to his fifty-percent ownership interest. As an out-of-
possession cotenant, Cauble was entitled to receive a credit for, at a
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed September 17, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-1510 Lower Tribunal No. 19-13245-CA-01 ________________
Megan Cauble, Appellant,
vs.
Gregory Kaczmarski, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice Butchko Sanchez, Judge.
Warren Gammill & Associates, P.L., and Warren P. Gammill, for appellant.
No appearance on behalf of appellee. 1
Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER, and GORDO, JJ.
1 Appellee was precluded from filing an answer brief after failing to adhere to court-imposed time standards. MILLER, J.
Appellant, Megan Cauble, appeals a final judgment rendered by the
trial court in consolidated partition actions. The judgments distributed the
proceeds garnered from the court-ordered sale of two condominium units,
Castle Beach and Porto Bellagio, which Cauble jointly owned with her former
fiancé, appellee, Gregory Kaczmarski, and awarded statutory attorney’s fees
and costs. We summarily affirm on all grounds, save the allocation of
carrying costs and preclusion of expert testimony on fair rental value.
BACKGROUND
Cauble and Kaczmarski jointly purchased Castle Beach and Porto
Bellagio together over two decades ago. Two years later, they ended their
relationship. Each agreed to assume possession of a single property.
Cauble moved into Castle Beach, and Kaczmarski began residing at Porto
Bellagio. The respective carrying costs were to be borne by the party in
possession.
In December of 2009, Cauble lost her job and determined she could
no longer afford to maintain Castle Beach. She surrendered possession of
the unit to Kaczmarski. The following month, he began renting out the
property to vacationers through Airbnb and HomeAway. Cauble and her
friends rented the unit from Kaczmarski on several occasions.
2 In 2019, Cauble filed suit in the circuit court seeking to partition Castle
Beach and Porto Bellagio. Kaczmarski answered, raised affirmative
defenses, and counterclaimed for breach of contract, equitable lien
foreclosure, unjust enrichment, and accounting. He contended that Cauble
had previously agreed to relinquish any ownership interest in Castle Beach
in exchange for a lump sum of $10,000, which was payable upon satisfaction
of the mortgage.
After Kaczmarski served a motion for sanctions and a safe harbor letter
under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2019), Cauble abandoned the aspect
of her action relating to Castle Beach. Incongruently, Kaczmarski then
retained separate counsel and filed an independent lawsuit to partition
Castle Beach. Cauble counterclaimed in that suit and reasserted her
abandoned partition claim.
Kaczmarski did not file a responsive pleading. The trial court struck
Kaczmarski’s answer and counterclaim with prejudice in the original lawsuit
and dismissed his second complaint. The court then entered a partial
summary judgment of partition as to both properties against Kaczmarski.
A court-ordered sale ensued, and the trial court convened a nonjury
trial to determine the proper allocation of proceeds and fees. At trial,
Kaczmarski sought contribution from Cauble for the Castle Beach carrying
3 costs. Cauble attempted to present expert testimony to offset the
contribution claim by the reasonable rental value of the property. The trial
court denied her request.
At the end of the trial, the court found that Cauble was in joint
possession of both units after she surrendered Castle Beach to Kaczmarski.
The court denied Cauble’s request for a credit as to certain delinquent
carrying costs that had been deducted from the Porto Bellagio sale proceeds
and afforded Kaczmarski a credit for all of the Castle Beach carrying costs
from 2010 to 2022, which consisted of $293,000. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review factual findings in a nonjury trial court for competent,
substantial evidence. See Q.G.S. Dev., Inc. v. Nat’l Lining Sys., Inc., 386
So. 3d 596, 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). In doing so, we recognize that the trial
judge has the “superior vantage point to see and hear the witnesses and
judge their credibility.” Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998).
ANALYSIS
Chapter 64, Florida Statutes governs partition actions in Florida. Such
actions lie in chancery; hence, they are equitable in nature. See § 64.011,
Fla. Stat. (2019). Following a partition sale, the trial court is charged with
first determining each owner’s percentage of ownership and then
4 proportionally distributing the partition proceeds. See § 64.071, Fla. Stat.
(2019); see also Biondo v. Powers, 743 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
In partition proceedings, the trial court must conduct an accounting to
determine whether joint owners have borne an equal share of the expenses.
In this vein, cotenants ordinarily have a mutual obligation to pay carrying
costs on a jointly owned property. See Lupo v. Lawson, 301 So. 3d 366, 368
(Fla. 2d DCA 2020). A cotenant bearing a disproportionate share of carrying
costs is entitled to reimbursement in the form of a credit upon the sale of the
property. See Goolsby v. Wiley, 547 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
Equally established is the principle that “when a cotenant in possession
seeks contribution for amounts expended in the improvement or preservation
of the property, that claim may be offset by cotenants out of possession by
the reasonable rental value of the use of the property by the cotenant in
possession to the extent it has exceeded his or her proportionate share of
ownership.” Barrow v. Barrow, 527 So. 2d 1373, 1377 (Fla. 1988). If the
reasonable rental value exceeds the cotenant’s claim, the claim for rental
value is limited to the amount of the contribution claim. See id.
Against these principles, we examine the case at hand. Here, the court
determined the parties owned an equal interest in each unit. That conclusion
is supported by competent, substantial evidence.
5 The undisputed evidence further established that the parties agreed
Kaczmarski would have exclusive possession and use of Porto Bellagio and
pay all carrying costs after they called off their engagement. Indeed,
Kaczmarski stipulated through counsel that he was not seeking Porto
Bellagio carrying costs from Cauble. Consequently, Cauble should have
received a credit for one-half of the delinquent charges that were deducted
from the proceeds.
The finding regarding joint possession after 2010 as to Castle Beach
is unsustainable. Cauble surrendered the unit to Kaczmarski after she lost
her employment. Kaczmarski began renting out the property and retained
the rental proceeds. Cauble had no key and paid rent to Kaczmarski to stay
in the unit with friends.
Given these circumstances, Kaczmarski’s possession and use was
disproportionate to his fifty-percent ownership interest. As an out-of-
possession cotenant, Cauble was entitled to receive a credit for, at a
minimum, half of the Castle Beach carrying costs. She was further
authorized to present expert testimony as to fair market value to offset those
costs. See id. (holding that a cotenant is not in possession of property when
communications between cotenants show ouster of that cotenant); see also
Goins v. Goins, 762 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (explaining that
6 even in cases where one tenant resides in the property but does not have
exclusive possession, the nonresident tenant is entitled to rent “as an offset
against the resident tenant’s claim for a contribution to property expenses”);
Brisciano v. Byard, 615 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (affirming trial
court’s order offsetting contribution sums “for mortgage payments, taxes,
and insurance paid” on property held as tenants in common by “reasonable
rental value” where in-possession tenant lived in property during exclusive
possession and there was no exclusive, adverse possession or ouster);
Ombres v. Ombres, 549 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (“[T]he
supreme court in Barrow held that the wife, despite the husband’s failure to
communicate his adverse possession, was entitled to claim a reasonable
rental value for the property, but only as a set-off to the husband’s claim for
maintenance costs.”); McCarthy v. McCarthy, 922 So. 2d 223, 226 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2005) (“[I]f one co-tenant pays an obligation for which all are liable, he
is entitled to have the other co-tenant pay his proportionate
share. . . . [U]pon partition . . ., the tenant paying those obligations of the
property is entitled to credit from the proceeds of the sale for the other co-
tenant’s proportionate share of those expenses.”). Accordingly, we affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.