Meekins v. Turner Towers Tenants Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Meekins v. Turner Towers Tenants Corp.

132 A.D.3d 963, 18 N.Y.S.3d 348

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 28, 2015

Docket2015-03302

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 132 A.D.3d 963 (Meekins v. Turner Towers Tenants Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Meekins v. Turner Towers Tenants Corp., 132 A.D.3d 963, 18 N.Y.S.3d 348 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of a proprietary lease, the defendants appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Baynes, J.), dated February 4, 2015, which granted the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against them, and (2) an order of the same court also dated February 4, 2015, which denied their cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer.

Ordered that the orders are reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with one bill of costs to the defendants, the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants is denied, and the cross motion of the defendants pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer is granted.

Within 17 days after the time to answer had expired, the defendants served their answer, which was rejected by the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the short delay in the service of an answer, and in light of the lack of willfulness on the part of the defendants, a reasonable excuse for their default, the existence of a potentially meritorious defense, and the public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to enter a judgment against the defendants upon their failure to answer, and in denying the defendants’ cross motion to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer (see CPLR 2004, 3012 [d]; Hutchinson v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 118 AD3d 945 [2014]; EHS Quickstops Corp. v GRJH, Inc., 112 AD3d 577 [2013]; Darlind Constr., Inc. *964 v Prism Solar Tech., Inc., 109 AD3d 783 [2013]; Covaci v Whitestone Constr. Corp., 78 AD3d 1108 [2010]; Sitigus Foods Corp. v 72-02 N. Blvd. Realty Corp., 293 AD2d 597 [2002]; Buderwitz v Cunningham, 101 AD2d 821 [1984]).

Dillon, J.P., Miller, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of a proprietary lease, the defendants appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Baynes, J.), dated February 4, 2015, which granted the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against them, and (2) an order of the same court also dated February 4, 2015, which denied their cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer.

Ordered that the orders are reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with one bill of costs to the defendants, the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants is denied, and the cross motion of the defendants pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer is granted.

Within 17 days after the time to answer had expired, the defendants served their answer, which was rejected by the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the short delay in the service of an answer, and in light of the lack of willfulness on the part of the defendants, a reasonable excuse for their default, the existence of a potentially meritorious defense, and the public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to enter a judgment against the defendants upon their failure to answer, and in denying the defendants’ cross motion to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer (see CPLR 2004, 3012 [d]; Hutchinson v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 118 AD3d 945 [2014]; EHS Quickstops Corp. v GRJH, Inc., 112 AD3d 577 [2013]; Darlind Constr., Inc. *964 v Prism Solar Tech., Inc., 109 AD3d 783 [2013]; Covaci v Whitestone Constr. Corp., 78 AD3d 1108 [2010]; Sitigus Foods Corp. v 72-02 N. Blvd. Realty Corp., 293 AD2d 597 [2002]; Buderwitz v Cunningham, 101 AD2d 821 [1984]).

Dillon, J.P., Miller, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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132 A.D.3d 963, 18 N.Y.S.3d 348, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meekins-v-turner-towers-tenants-corp-nyappdiv-2015.

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