Medina v. Mapes

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 11, 2025
• Docket: 1:21-cv-00844
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRADLEY MEDINA and SVETLANA Case No. 1:21-cv-00844-JLT-EPG KRIVENCHEVA, 12 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT Plaintiffs, COURTNEY L. MAPES’ MOTIONS IN 13 LIMINE v. 14 (Doc. 102) COURTNEY L. MAPES, M.D., 15 Defendant. 16 17 STANDARD OF DECISION 18 “[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, [but] the 19 practice has developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of 20 trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n. 2 (1984). Motions in limine are “an important 21 tool available to the trial judge to ensure the expeditious and evenhanded management of the trial 22 proceedings.” Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Services, 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997). 23 The Ninth Circuit explains, motions in limine “allow parties to resolve evidentiary disputes ahead 24 of trial, without first having to present potentially prejudicial evidence in front of a jury.” Brodit 25 v. Cabra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a party may 26 file a motion in limine to exclude inadmissible or prejudicial evidence before the evidence is 27 introduced at trial. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 40 n.2. However, “a motion in limine should not be 28 used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence,” C & E Services, Inc. v. Ashland Inc., 539 F. 1 Supp. 2d 316, 323 (D. D.C. 2008), as such an inquiry usurps the role of the jury. See Reeves v. 2 Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 3 Moreover, “[t]he movant has the burden of establishing that the evidence is not admissible 4 for any purpose.” United States v. Wager, 651 F. Supp. 3d 594, 598 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (citation 5 omitted).1 To satisfy its burden, the movant “must identify the evidence at issue and state with 6 specificity why such evidence is inadmissible.” United States v. Lewis, 493 F. Supp. 3d 858, 861 7 (C.D. Cal. 2020). Otherwise, the Court disfavors “[m]otions in limine that seek exclusion of 8 broad and unspecific categories of evidence,” Jackson v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 194 F. Supp. 9 3d 1004, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (citation omitted). Essentially, non-specific, vague, and 10 boilerplate motions in limine are prohibited. Nichia Corp. v. Feit Elec. Co., Inc., No. CV 20-359- 11 GW-EX, 2022 WL 17885683, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2022); Banga v. Kanios, No. 16-CV- 12 04270-RS, 2021 WL 4133754, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2021). 13 DISCUSSION 14 The Pretrial Order (Doc. 99), set forth the deadlines for filing and opposing motions in 15 limine. Plaintiffs did not file motions in limine, but Defendant filed eight motions in limine (see 16 generally Doc. 102). Plaintiffs opposed Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 6, which seeks to 17 exclude or limit Plaintiffs’ rebuttal expert testimony. (See generally Doc. 106.) A district court 18 may grant, deny, or defer a motion in limine, including when the motion is unopposed, and may 19 independently revisit its ruling at trial. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42. 20 A. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 1 21 Defendant moves to preclude “Plaintiffs, and through them any witness from making any 22 inquiry, comment, or argument before the jury” suggesting the “jurors should base Plaintiffs’ 23 damages, if any, on an amount [the] jurors would charge to endure similar injuries or to imagine a 24 loved one in Plaintiffs’ position when calculating damages.” (Doc. 102 at 2.) Defendant relies on 25 1 For additional authority regarding the movant’s burden, see also Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 570 F. Supp. 3d 26 1131, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (citation omitted); Wilder v. World of Boxing LLC, 220 F. Supp. 3d 473, 478–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted); United States v. Pugh, 162 F. Supp. 3d 97, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Leonard v. Stemtech Health 27 Scis., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 273, 276 (D. Del. 2013) (citation omitted); United States v. Goodale, 831 F. Supp. 2d 804, 808 (D. Vt. 2011); United States v. Gonzalez, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (citation omitted); Wilson 28 v. Pepsi Bottling Grp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (citation omitted); Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 1 Federal Evidence Rule 403 arguing “such argument is prohibited and will create a substantial 2 danger of undue prejudice.” (Id.) Moreover, such an argument, frequently called the “Golden 3 Rule,” has been universally condemned because it encourages jurors to depart from neutrality and 4 decide the case based on personal interest and bias rather on the evidence. (Id. at 3, citing Loose 5 v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1982).) 6 The Ninth Circuit defines a “Golden Rule” argument as “a suggestion to the jury by an 7 attorney that the jurors should do unto others ... as they would have others do unto them.” Minato 8 v. Scenic Airlines, Inc., 908 F.2d 977, at *5 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts have found Golden Rule 9 arguments to be improper, because “a jury which has put itself in the shoes of one of the parties is 10 no longer an impartial jury.” Id. at *6. Thus, the “majority of circuit courts prohibit Golden Rule 11 arguments on the issue of damages.” Brewer v. Leprino Foods Co., Inc., No. 16-1091, 2019 WL 12 3208193, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2019); see also Hardesty v. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. 13 Dist., No. 2:10-CV-02414KJMKJN, 2023 WL 4564748, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2023). Accordingly, to 14 the extent Defendant seeks to preclude Plaintiffs from making “Golden Rule” arguments on the 15 issue of damages, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 1. 16 B. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 2 17 Defendant moves to preclude evidence of Defendant’s liability insurance under Rule 411 18 asserting, “Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon 19 the issues of whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.” (Doc. 102 at 3.) 20 Defendant also relies on Rules 403 and 401 arguing the probative value of such evidence “is 21 substantially outweighed . . .” and irrelevant because “[t]he existence of liability insurance is not 22 a fact of consequence in determining whether or not [Defendant] was deliberately indifferent to a 23 serious medical need of [P]laintiff such that it rises to the level of a civil rights violation pursuant 24 to 42 USC 1983.” (Id.) Lastly, Defendant contends “public policy” requires the evidence’s 25 preclusion because “insurance polices . . . cannot indemnify for civil rights violations” and 26 “Plaintiffs lack foundation to infer or allege that should a jury award damages against 27 [Defendant], said damages would be covered under any theoretical liability insurance coverage.” 28 (Id.) 1 Rule 411 specifically states “[e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against 2 liability is not admissible to prove whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.” 3 Fed. R. Evid. 411. The evidence Defendant seeks to exclude falls squarely within the purview of 4 Rule 411. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not contested the motion. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 5 Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 2. 6 C. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 3 7 Defendant moves to exclude testimony and/or evidence “concerning any other lawsuits in 8 which Defendant, or [its] professional medical entity, may have been named as a defendant.” 9 (Doc. 102 at 4.) Defendant also requests the Court preclude any testimony implying “Defendant 10 (or her medical entity) is currently or in the past has been a party to any lawsuit.” (Id.) 11 Defendant argues the evidence and/or testimony is irrelevant to the issues and “substantially 12 outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” (Id.) Defendant further explains, “even if [the 13 evidence is] remotely relevant,” admitting such evidence “would improperly confuse the jury.” 14 (Id.) In addition, Defendant cites Rules 404, 406, and 608 as support arguing, Rule 404(a)(1) 15 “prevents the use of character evidence or a character trait to prove that on a particular occasion” 16 Defendant “acted in accordance with that character or trait.” (Id. at 4.) Therefore, “[r]eference to 17 or evidence of other lawsuits filed against [Defendant] Dr. Mapes or her medical entity cannot be 18 used to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identify, absence of 19 mistake or lack of accident.” (Id.) Defendant explains, “[t]he fact that other lawsuits may have 20 been filed against [Defendant] is not relevant” and does not “have a tendency to prove or disprove 21 whether or not [Defendant] committed medical malpractice.” (Id.) Moreover, “the filing of other 22 lawsuits against Dr. Mapes cannot establish a habit” because the term, “habit,” means “one’s 23 regular response to a repeated specific situation.” (Id. citing Fed. R. Evid. 406.) Accordingly, 24 whether “Dr. Mapes may have been a defendant in prior litigation” does not establish “that her 25 acts with regard to a certain habit with other patients or that she acted with a habit in connection 26 with the care and treatment rendered to [P]laintiff.” (Id.) Defendant asserts a similar argument 27 under Rule 608 contending “[p]rior lawsuits do not establish against [Defendant] or her medical 28 entity” do not establish “any kind of pattern, practice or habit of treating patients in any particular 1 fashion.” (Id.) The Court agrees that this evidence may not be admitted to prove liability. 2 Implicitly, plaintiffs agree that there is no other proper purpose for this evidence, through their 3 failure to oppose the motion. Thus, Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 3 is GRANTED. 4 D. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 4 5 Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 4 requests the Court “to prevent mention, directly or 6 indirectly, concerning the wealth or economic condition of Defendant” on the grounds of such 7 evidence being irrelevant. Defendant asserts “Dr. Mapes’ wealth or economic condition does not 8 prove any elements of a claim of Medical Negligence.” (Doc. 102 at 5.) Moreover, “there has 9 been no discovery conducted to date by either party on the issue of [Defendant’s] wealth or 10 economic condition.” (Id.) 11 The Court agrees that this evidence may not be admitted to prove liability. Again, it 12 appears that plaintiffs agree that there is no other proper purpose for this evidence, through their 13 failure to oppose the motion. Thus, Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 4 is GRANTED. 14 E. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 5 15 Defendant argues “Plaintiffs should be barred from offering evidence” of “prior settlement 16 offers made in this case” because Rule 408(a)(1) “prohibits admission of any settlement offer to 17 plaintiffs to establish the validity of a disputed claim, absent certain statutory exceptions [, which 18 are inapplicable] herein.” (Doc. 102 at 5.) Defendant also cites Rule 408(a)(2) asserting the 19 Rule’s broader scope supports excluding the evidence. (Id. (“Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 20 408(a)(2) is even broader and states that no evidence of conduct or statements made during 21 compromise negotiations about a party’s claim are admissible in a civil lawsuit.”).) 22 Under Rule 408, evidence of both “furnishing, promising, or offering—or accepting, 23 promising to accept, or offering to accept—valuable consideration in compromising or attempting 24 to compromise a claim” and “conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about 25 the claim” is “not admissible—on behalf of any party—either to prove or disprove the validity or 26 amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.” 27 Fed. R. Evid. 408(a). Moreover, “an offer of settlement can be of no legal relevance as to the 28 offeror's liability, irrespective of whether the offer was made in the instant case or in a related 1 case.” Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 641 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The Court GRANTS Defendant’s 2 Motion in Limine No. 5. 3 F. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 6 4 Defendant moves to exclude or limit “the scope of the opinions from [P]laintiff’s 5 designated rebuttal expert, Daria Majzoubi, M.D.,” asserting Dr. Majzoubi’s “proposed testimony 6 exceeds the permissible scope of a rebuttal expert witness.” (Doc. 102-1 at 1.) Defendant 7 explains, “Plaintiffs were given leave . . . to designate Dr. Majzoubi strictly to rebut the opinions 8 of Defendant’s Infectious Disease expert as it relates to issues of medical causation presented in 9 this case [;]” however, “Dr. Majzoubi’s report testimony focuses nearly entirely on the issue of 10 standard of care” and “goes beyond the scope of her designation as rebuttal expert in this case.” 11 (Id. at 1-2.) Defendant also argues “any testimony from Dr. Majzoubi regarding the standard of 12 care is cumulative” because the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Mark Needham, M.D., provides 13 “standard of care opinions.” (Id. at 2.) Defendant contends “permitting such duplicative 14 testimony is unfairly prejudicial and will lead to undue delay and potentially mislead and confuse 15 the jury.” (Id.) “To the extent Dr. Majzoubi attempts [] to proffer new opinions rebutting Dr. 16 Posalski’s opinions on medical causation,” Defendant contends “such opinions should be 17 excluded [because] they were not properly set forth in her report.” Defendant also asserts Dr. 18 Majzoubi “is not qualified to render rebuttal opinions to those set forth by Defendant’s Infectious 19 Disease expert,” because she is not an Infectious Disease expert. (Id.) Defendant grounds its 20 arguments in Federal Civil Procedure Rules 26 and 37 and attaches the Declaration of Alan J. 21 Mish with Exhibits A-D to its motion. (Id.) 22 Plaintiffs do not address Defendant’s arguments regarding the permissibility and scope of 23 Dr. Majzoubi’s rebuttal expert testimony or directly dispute improper disclosure of Dr. 24 Majzoubi’s rebuttal expert testimony. (See Doc. 106 at 1 (“Dr. Majzoubi was consulted on the 25 veracity of this case prior to filing.”).) Plaintiffs also fail to address Defendant’s Rule 702 26 arguments regarding expert Dr. Majzoubi’s qualification “to render opinions regarding causation 27 as it relates to the field of Infectious Disease.” (See Doc. 102-1 at 9.) Instead, Plaintiffs focus on 28 the harm of the proposed exclusion asserting Dr. Majzoubi’s testimony is “the best evidence . . . 1 for res judicata” and argue “precluding Dr. Majzoubi’s expert report and factual testimony would 2 be highly prejudicial.” (Doc. 106 at 1.) Plaintiffs note Defendant’s ability to present an expert 3 report undermining its prima facie case to convey the prejudicial harm of excluding the testimony 4 while emphasizing its probative value. Plaintiffs state the testimony “can assist” the jury in 5 determining “who is ultimately the [] cause in fact of [its] injuries.” (Id. at 2.) 6 1. Dr. Majzoubi Expert Rebuttal Testimony 7 Defendant requests the Court exclude and/or limit Dr. Majzoubi’s rebuttal expert 8 testimony on the grounds of the testimony exceeds the scope of permissible rebuttal testimony 9 and constitute “either untimely disclosed initial expert opinions or improper sur-related rebuttal.” 10 (Doc 102-1 at 6.). As previously stated, Plaintiffs respond only to Defendant’s Motion in Limine 11 No. 6 asserting “Dr. Majzoubi was consulted on the veracity of this case prior to filing” as “a 12 treating physician.” (See Doc. 106 at 2.) Thus, Plaintiffs do not directly dispute the failure to 13 disclose this expert timely. Instead, Plaintiffs contend Dr. Majzoubi can “offer the Court direct 14 evidence as well as expert testimony” and “believe Dr. Majzoubi’s testimony is the best evidence 15 in this trial for res judicata.” (Id.) Plaintiffs argue “precluding Dr. Majzoubi’s expert report and 16 factual testimony would be highly prejudicial,” because Defendant “has an expert report and [Dr. 17 Majzoubi’s] testimony is highly probative.” (Id.) 18 The Court liberally construes Plaintiffs’ Opposition as asserting Fed. R. Evid. 401 19 arguments. In other words, Plaintiffs appear to weigh the FRE 401 balancing factors in 20 explaining the testimony’s probative value. Plaintiffs state, “On balance, Dr. Majzoubi can 21 [provide] the court and the trier of fact factual testimony as well as opinions on Plaintiffs’ prima 22 facie case [because] Dr. Majzoubi has personal knowledge of all the tortious elements of medical 23 malpractice and who is ultimately the . . . cause in fact of Plaintiffs’ injuries.” (Id.) Plaintiffs 24 contend admitting Dr. Majzoubi’s testimony and report “will not confuse issues extending to the 25 trier of fact.” (Id.) Similarly, Plaintiffs’ indirect acknowledgment of improper disclosure is 26 liberally construed. Plaintiffs contend Dr. Majzoubi’s expert report and causation testimony is 27 essential to its case and precluding it would be unfair. However, Plaintiffs fail to explain why. 28 They timely disclosed Dr. Needham as an expert. Dr. Needham’s report indicates he 1 intends to testify as to the standard of care. Thus, Dr. Majzoubi’s testimony, though different in 2 tone, is not different in substance. Thus, even had Plaintiffs timely disclosed Dr. Majzoubi, both 3 she and Dr. Needham would not be permitted to testify because it would be cumulative and, 4 therefore, a waste of time. Fed. Rules Evid. 403. 5 By no stretch of the imagination can Dr. Majzoubi’s designation be called rebuttal 6 testimony. She speaks to standard of care only, which is an issue Plaintiffs must prove in their 7 case in chief. The fact that Dr. Majzoubi disagrees with the defense experts does not make her a 8 rebuttal expert. Moreover, her comments about Dr. Polaski’s testimony are speculative. For 9 example, she supposes that Dr. Polaski’s opinion that the leg was “grossly normal” would be 10 incorrect “if the patient’s pants were not removed for a proper exam.” (Doc. 102-2 at 61); 11 consequently, Dr. Majzoubi is not a proper rebuttal expert2. 12 Plaintiffs also assert Defendant would not suffer any prejudice or unfairness because 13 Defendant has retained an expert and expert report. The Court construes Plaintiffs’ assertion as 14 an argument under Rule 37(c)(1). In relevant parts, Rule 26(a)(2) provides, 15 In addition to the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1), a party must disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness it may use at 16 trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705. 17 Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, this disclosure 18 must be accompanied by a written report--prepared and signed by the witness--if the witness is one retained or specially employed to 19 provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony. The 20 report must contain: (i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; (ii) the facts 21 or data considered by the witness in forming them; (iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; (iv) the witness's 22 qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years; (v) a list of all other cases in which, during the 23 previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for 24 the study and testimony in the case. 25 A party must make these disclosures at the times and in the sequence 26 2 The fact that she disagrees with the defense’s experts does not make her a rebuttal expert. Moreover, her comments 27 about Dr. Polaski’s testimony are speculative. For example, she supposes that Dr. Polaski’s opinion that the leg was “grossly normal” would be incorrect “if the patient’s pants were not removed for a proper exam.” (Doc. 102-2 at 61) 28 However, apparently, Dr. Majzoubi has no idea whether this is the case. It appears she reviewed only the treatment 1 that the court orders. Absent a stipulation or a court order, the disclosures must be made: (i) at least 90 days before the date set for 2 trial or for the case to be ready for trial; or (ii) if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject 3 matter identified by another party under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or (C), within 30 days after the other party's disclosure. 4 “If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the 5 party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a 6 hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 37(c)(1). 8 The Court does not find the failure to designate Dr. Majzoubi timely to be “substantially 9 justified or harmless.” The Court granted Plaintiffs several extensions solely for the purpose of 10 designating a rebuttal expert to respond to the opinions of Defendant’s retained Infectious Disease 11 expert, Dr. Posalski, but they did not do so. Also, Plaintiffs fail to provide the Court any 12 explanation or argument relating to untimely/improper disclosure. Accordingly, the Defendant’s 13 Motion in Limine No. 6 is GRANTED. 14 G. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 7 15 Defendant moves to preclude Plaintiffs from “introducing or mentioning evidence relating 16 to testimony from an undisclosed economist expert witness . . . regarding ongoing economic 17 damages.” (Doc. 102-3 at 1.) Defendant contends Plaintiffs “misused the discovery process by 18 failing to timely disclose the identity of their proposed expert witness and the subject matter of 19 the witness’s anticipated testimony” and allowing undisclosed expert testimony “would result in 20 unfair surprise and cause significant and undue prejudice to the Defendant.” (Id. at 1-2 citing 21 Fed. Civ. P 26(a).) Defendant also argues “Federal Rule of Evidence 403 justifies the preclusion 22 of . . . untimely disclosed expert’s testimony” because “[it] will likely confuse and mislead the 23 jury and the unfair surprise in the delayed disclosure will unfairly prejudice the Defendant.” (Id. 24 at 4.) 25 A party is not allowed to use undisclosed information or witness to supply evidence on a 26 motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Plaintiffs do not oppose or proffer an explanation for the untimely 28 1 disclosure. For this reason, the Court agrees with Defendant and finds “the Plaintiffs failed to 2 identify the expert witness prior to the deadlines set by this Court” and “[t]o allow an undisclosed 3 expert witness to testify to ongoing damages that were not a part of any previous expert testimony 4 would unfairly prejudice the Defendant.” (Doc. 102-3 at 7.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 5 Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 7. 6 G. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 8 7 Defendant requests “an order in limine permitting Defendant to introduce” the deposition 8 testimony given by Bradley Medina in a personal injury action filed in the Superior Court of the 9 State of California against Target Corporation. The deposition testimony given by Plaintiff 10 Medina on May 9, 2023, in Bradley Medina v. Target Corporation, et al., Case No. VCU292198. 11 (Doc. 102-5 at 1.) Defendant asserts “the testimony is directly relevant to both the cause and 12 extent of Plaintiff [Medina’s] alleged injuries and contradicts his current theory of liability against 13 Dr. Mapes.” (Id. at 3.) Defendant explains, “in a personal injury lawsuit [Medina] filed against 14 Target Corporation—Plaintiff [Medina] attributed the cause of” the alleged injuries to “a fall he 15 sustained in a Target parking lot in June of 2021.” (Id.) In other words, “plaintiff testified under 16 oath that the same injuries—pain in the right leg, hamstring, calf, lower extremity in general, and 17 emotional distress—were caused by his fall in the parking lot.” (Id. at 8.) Defendant’s motion is 18 made pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 32 and Federal Rules of 19 Evidence 801(d)(1)-(2). (Id. at 2.) Defendant also makes relevancy arguments under Fed. R. 20 Evid. 401. Defendant asserts “[t]his overlapping attribution of the same injuries to two separate 21 incidents gives rise to a central issue of causation. Mr. Medina cannot credibly claim that 22 identical injuries were caused by both incidents.” (Id. at 7.) Therefore, “[h]is testimony in the 23 Target action . . . bears directly on both the nature and extent of his claimed injuries in this case as 24 well as proximate cause—two essential elements in any negligence-based tort claim.” (Id.) 25 Accordingly, the Court finds Medina’s deposition relevant and admissible under Rule 401, 26 and it is admissible under Rule 801 as a party admission, if he testifies at trial. A statement is not 27 hearsay and is admissible as a statement of a party-opponent. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). For these 28 reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 7. 1 ORDER 2 For the reasons set forth, Defendant’s motions in limine | through 8 (Doc. 102) are 3 | GRANTED. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: _ August 10, 2025 Cerin | Tower TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11