Mederos v. US. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

• Court: District Court, D. Massachusetts
• Decided: October 2, 2019
• Docket: 1:19-cv-12007
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

ANTONIO MEDEROS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 19-12007-WGY ) U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ) ENFORCEMENT, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER

October 2, 2019

YOUNG, D.J. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction. Antonio Mederos brings this action in which he asks that the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) be required to execute a 2001 order by the Immigration Judge that he be removed. Mederos is presently confined at the Massachusetts Treatment Center. He represents that he was previously serving a state sentence that was completed on January 14, 2003. Prior to completion of the sentence, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought to have him civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person under M.G.L. ch. 123A. In October 16, 2003, Mederos was adjudicated to be a sexually dangerous person and was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center. The papers Mederos filed demonstrate that he has contacted

state and federal authorities in an attempt to be removed to Cuba rather than remain in Massachusetts as a sexually dangerous person. He has also filed four previous actions in this Court in which has asserted different theories of liability to argue that ICE should be required to take him into custody and execute the removal order. See Mederos v. Massachusetts, C.A. No. 15- 13623-FDS, 2016 WL 370846 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2016) (denying relief and discussing three previous unsuccessful actions). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), this Court lacks jurisdiction “to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against

any alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This statute ensures that the Executive branch has the discretion to “abandon the endeavor” of executing a removal order without the threat of judicial interference. Reno v. Amer. Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999); see also Alvidres-Reyes v. Reno, 180 F.3d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The Congressional aim of § 1252(g) is to protect from judicial intervention the Attorney General’s long-established discretion to decide whether and when to prosecute or adjudicate removal proceedings or to execute removal orders.” (emphasis added)). Mederos’s request that the ICE be required to take him into custody and remove him is clearly a challenge to the Attorney General’s decision not to

execute a removal order. Therefore, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this claim. See Duamutef v. I.N.S., 386 F.3d 172, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that, under § 1252(g), court did not have jurisdiction over mandamus petition to require government to execute removal). In accordance with the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion for appointment of counsel and orders that this action be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.

/s/ William G. Young WILLIAM G. YOUNG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE