PD-0484-15
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
NO. CR-2011-196 ALBERT RODRIGUEZ MEDELLIN, Petitioner
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Respondent
ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF THE FOLLOWING:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 13TH DISTRICT NO. 03-13-00158-CR ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM COMAL COUNTY, TEXAS
TRIAL COURT CASE NO. CR2011-196 Honorable Carl E. Stewart, Chief Judge Presiding
Larry Warner, Counsel for Petitioner Alberto Rodriguez Medellin 3109 Banyan Circle Harlingen, Texas 78550 Phone: (956) 230-0361 June 12, 2015 Facsimile: 1-866-408-1968 office@larrywarner.com Texas Bar#20871500;USDC,SDTX 1230; Board Certified, Criminal Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization(1983) Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States (1984)
Page 1 of 20 Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4,Appellant provides the following identity of parties
and counsel:
Identity of parties and counsel
Alberto Rodriguez Medellin, Appellant
FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS at trial and on appeal and on petition for
discretionary review:
Ms. Jennifer C. Smith *** and ***
Ms. Laura B. Bates COMAL COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 150 North Seguin, Suite 307 New Braunfels, Texas 78130 (830) 221-1300
FOR THE DEFENDANT ALBERT RODRIGUEZ MEDELLIN at trial: Thomas P. 'Tom' Clark ATTORNEY AT LAW 800 West San Antonio Street, Suite B New Braunfels, Texas 78130 (830) 624-0804
FOR THE DEFENDANT ALBERT RODRIGUEZ MEDELLIN On Appeal and on petition for discretionary review: Larry Warner, Counsel for Petitioner Alberto Rodriguez Medellin 3109 Banyan Circle Harlingen,Tx 78550 Phone: (956) 230-0361 Facsimile: 1-866-408-1968 office@larrywarner.com Texas Bar#20871500;USDC,SDTX 1230; Board Certified, Criminal Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization(1983) Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States (1984)
Page 2 of 20 Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(a), Petitioner provides this Table of Contents with reference to the pages of the Petition, indicating the subject of each ground or question presented for review.
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Statement re oral argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
Statement of the case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7
Statement of procedural history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Grounds for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
1. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state or federal law in a way that conflicts with the applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States.
The question is: Does the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying a change of venue when the evidence is otherwise in equipoise but the District Attorney herself announces publicly pretrial her personal opinion that the defendant is guilty? Does the district attorney’s publicized opinion fulfill the prejudice requirement of TEX.CODE CRIM.P.art.31.02(a)?
The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is Ransonnette v. State,522S.W.2d509(Tex.Crim.App.1975)
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12
Prayer for Relief......................... 16
Page 3 of 20 Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(b), Petitioner provides an Index of Authorities,
arranged alphabetically and indicating the pages of the petition where the authorities
are cited.
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: PAGES
Ransonnette v. State,522S.W.2d509(Tex.Crim.App.1975)
McCutcheon v. State,363 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App. 1962)
Refusal of defendant's motion for change of venue on ground that publicity given by radio, television and newspapers of district attorney's announcement that defendant was one of 12 persons he most wanted to convict and send to penitentiary deprived defendant of fair and impartial trial was not error in absence of showing that any prejudice found its way into jury box.
Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P. 68.4©, Petitioner includes a short statement of why oral
argument would be helpful.
Statement re Oral Argument
Oral argument would be helpful to the decisional process. The Court and
Counsel could discuss the correct standard of review of the decision to deny a motion
for change of venue.
Most recently, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
“Indeed, even extensive knowledge of the case or defendant in
Page 4 of 20 the community as a result of pretrial publicity is not sufficient if there is not also some showing of prejudicial or inflammatory coverage.8" Gonzalez v. State,222 S.W.3d446,449hn2(Tex.Crim.App.2007) regresar
Earlier, the Court of Criminal Appeals had set a more exacting standard:
“Refusal of defendant's motion for change of venue on ground that publicity given by radio, television and newspapers of district attorney's announcement that defendant was one of 12 persons he most wanted to convict and send to penitentiary deprived defendant of fair and impartial trial was not error in absence of showing that any prejudice found its way into jury box. McCutcheon v. State,363 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App. 1962).
The Court and Counsel could discuss whether the Court of Appeals correctly
interpreted the standard set out by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ransonnette v.
State,522S.W.2d509(Tex.Crim.App.1975) The Court of Appeals did not review the
prejudice from the publication of the District Attorney’s opinion that the defendant
was guilty.
Considering evolving standards of due process and due course, as well as
promulgation of higher standards of conduct and more precise rules of professional
conduct, the Court of Criminal Appeals and Counsel could discuss whether it is time
to revisit a half-century old opinion on the subject of the prosecutor’s public
expression of opinion on the defendant’s guilt. See: McCutcheon v. State,363 S.W.2d
457 (Tex.Crim.App. 1962)
Page 5 of 20 Refusal of defendant's motion for change of venue on ground that publicity given by radio, television and newspapers of district attorney's announcement that defendant was one of 12 persons he most wanted to convict and send to penitentiary deprived defendant of fair and impartial trial was not error in absence of showing that any prejudice found its way into jury box. McCutcheon v. State,363 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App. 1962)
Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(d), Petitioner provides a statement of the case,
noting briefly the nature of the case, and reserving the details of the case for statement
with the pertinent grounds or questions.
Statement of the case
The nature of the case was a prosecution of Petitioner for murder.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty and tried guilt/innocence to a jury.
The jury found him guilty of murder.
The jury recommended and the judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.
Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third
District of Texas. The Supreme Court of Texas transferred the matter to the Court of
Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas.
A Panel of the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed
the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed.
Petitioner sought and obtained an extension and then timely filed Motions for
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. The Court of Appeals overruled both Motions on
Page 6 of 20 May 14, 2015. (Before Petitioner filed timely motions for rehearing and rehearing en
banc, Petitioner sought from the Court of and obtained from the Court of Criminal
Appeals a thirty-day extension to file this Petition until June 3, 2015.)
Petitioner timely presents this Petition for Discretionary Review.
Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(e), Petitioner provides a Statement of
Procedural History.
Statement of the Procedural History of the Case
The court of appeals is the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas.
(The matter was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas. The
Supreme Court of Texas transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals for the
Thirteenth District of Texas.)
Re: TEX.R.APP.P.10.5(b)(3)(B), the date of Court of Appeals’ judgment is April 2,
2015.
Re: TEX.R.APP.P.10.5(b)(3)© the case number in the Court of Appeals is “NUMBER
13–13–00190–CR”.
Re: TEX.R.APP.P.10.5(b)(3) (D), the date every motion for rehearing or en banc
reconsideration was filed:
On May 1, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file the
Motion for Rehearing and to file the Motion for Rehearing En Banc. Those Motions
Page 7 of 20 for Rehearing were due on May 4, 2015. Petitioner asked till June 3, 2015 to file
those Motions for Rehearing.
An extension was granted until June 3, 2015. The Court of Appeals overruled
both motions on May 14, 2015. However, on May 4, 2015, Petitioner filed both
Motions for Rehearing and Motion for Rehearing En Banc. The 30th day after May 14,
2015 is Saturday, June 13, 2015. So, the Petition for Discretionary Review is due on
Monday, June 15, 2015.
This Petition is filed by sending it electronically to the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals to the following address:
Clerk, Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas, 5th Floor, Hidalgo
County Administration Building, 100 East Cano Street, Edinburg, Texas.
Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(f), Petitioner states briefly, without argument,
the questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the
case, but without unnecessary detail.
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
Grounds for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state or federal
law in a way that conflicts with the applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal
Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States.
Page 8 of 20 The question is: Does the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying a change
of venue when the evidence is otherwise in equipoise but the District Attorney herself
announces publicly pretrial her personal opinion that the defendant is guilty.
The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is Ransonnette v.
State,522S.W.2d509(Tex.Crim.App.1975)
The Court of Appeals did not apply the standard correctly because it did not
consider the extreme prejudice of the district attorney’s having publicly expressed to
the small-town newspaper her personal opinion that the defendant was guilty. The
District Attorney charged Petitioner with causing his wife’s death and then told the
media, “he caused her death”.
Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(g), Petitioner provides a direct and concise
argument, with supporting authorities, amplifying the reasons for granting review.
ARGUMENT
The question is: Does the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying a change
of venue when the evidence is otherwise in equipoise but the District Attorney herself
announces publicly pretrial her personal opinion that the defendant is guilty.
The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals are Ransonnette v.
State,522S.W.2d509(Tex.Crim.App.1975) In Ransonnette the Court of Criminal
Appeals determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a change
Page 9 of 20 of venue when the trial court was presented with an evenly divided choice of
witnesses and evidence regarding whether the defendant could receive a fair trial.
The Court of Appeals treated the record as if it were like the record in
Ransonnette...evenly divided. But the record was not evenly divided. The record
showed that the District Attorney herself expressed to the one newspaper in this
county of five-thousand subscribers her personal opinion that Petitioner was guilty.
Here the prosecutor expressed her personal opinion to the media that the defendant
“Jennifer Smith, stated that: We don't know the final 6 mechanism of death, but I want it to be clear that she died as 7 a result of Albert Medellin.” (RR 2 40) Another decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is Williams v. State,170
S.W.2d 482(Tex.Crim.App.1943). “The venue of this case should have been changed.”
Williams v. State,170 S.W.2d 482(Tex.Crim.App.1943)
The question is important to the jurisprudence of the state because the District
Attorney is prohibited from expressing such opinion.
“(b) A lawyer ordinarily will violate paragraph (a), and the likelihood of a violation increases if the adjudication is on- going or imminent, by making an extrajudicial statement of the type referred to in that paragraph when the statement refers to:***(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant
Page 10 of 20 or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;” Tx Disc.R.Prof.Conduct§3.07 The analysis of the Court of Appeals in relying on Gonzalez, Montanez, De
Blanc, and Salazar is flawed precisely because none of those cases involved a public
and publicized opinion by the very District Attorney who was to prosecute the
defendant that he was guilty.
In Gonzalez, “local newscasts aired the surveillance tape depicting the murder
of the convenience store clerk.” Gonzalez v. State,222
S.W.3d446,447(Tex.Crim.App.2007) There is nothing in Gonzalez from which the
public might conclude that the person who was to prosecute the case might have or did
have important evidence about the case supporting her/his opinion that the defendant
was guilty. The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Gonzalez was misplaced.
In Salazar,
“The trial court admitted several newspaper stories and tran- scripts of television news coverage concerning appellant's case and the similar cases underway at the time.” Salazar v. State,38SW3d141,150hn13(Tex.Crim.App.2001) Nor was there anything in Salazar about the district attorney saying in the media
that the defendant was guilty. In Medellin the district attorney told the newspaper that
Medellin caused the death of Medellin’s wife, exactly what Medellin was charged
with.
Page 11 of 20 Montanez deals with presumed findings of fact. It was a matter involving a
motion to suppress. Montanez v. State,195 S.W.3d101,106hn4(Tex.Crim.App.2006)
Montanez does not treat venue.
In DeBlanc, the appellant’s own evidence on publicity was weak and
conflicting and the state put on twenty-five witnesses who said the murder defendant
could get a fair trial in Liberty County. DeBlanc v.
State,799SW2d701,704hn2(Tex.Crim.App.1990)
Nor was there anything in DeBlanc about the district attorney saying in
the media that the defendant was guilty. In Medellin the district attorney told the
newspaper that Medellin caused the death of his wife, exactly what he was charged
McCutcheon distinguished
This is not an appeal and Petitioner is not trying to treat this process as if it were
one seeking a writ of error. The Court of Appeals simply did not apply the standard
correctly because it did not examine the prejudice adequately.
Ryser, infra, relies on Mendez, another half-century old decision adopted
before the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure, before present rules of professional
conduct were in effect, and before American Bar Association Standards for a Fair
Trial and a Free Press were published.
Page 12 of 20 In Mendez:
“District Attorney Briscoe ‘has been reported by Television and Radio news reporters and by all of the three Houston news- papers both by story and photographs that Guadalupe Morales Mendez was a person charged with an offense in Harris County and was one of twelve he most wanted to convict and most wanted to see in the penitentiary..........’”
Mendez v. State,362SW2d841,842hn2(Tex.Crim.App.1962) The Court of Criminal Appeals did not reach the venue matter in Mendez
because trial counsel had not reserved an exception, another ancient practice no longer
used. Mendez v. State,362SW2d841,843hn3(Tex.Crim.App.1962)
The Court of Appeals did not consider the
“nature of the publicity”. Gonzalez at 451hn7
The Court of Criminal Appeals set out the test for whether pretrial publicity was
prejudicial:
“In examining whether the pretrial publicity is prejudicial and inflammatory, a trial court may take three matters into consider- ation: 1) the nature of the publicity, 2) any evidence presented at a change of venue hearing, and 3) testimony received from venire members at voir dire.17" Gonzalez at 451hn7
The Court of Appeals did not consider the "nature of the publicity", namely that
the District Attorney told the small-town's only newspaper that the defendant
caused his wife's death, that he was guilty.
In Gonzalez the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that it had only reversed for
Page 13 of 20 the trial court's failure to grant a change of venue onetime, in Jack Ruby's case,
Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966)
In Gonzalez, the Criminal Appeals said that showing a video of the crime was
"not sufficient to place beyond the zone of reasonable disagreement the trial court's
decision to deny appellant's motion." Gonzalez at 451 hn8
In Medellin, the Court of Criminal Appeals should clarify the standard in the
light of Rubenstein; it should hold that the District Attorney's publicizing of her
opinion that Petitioner "caused the death of his wife" after the very same District
Attorney had charged that Petitioner "caused the death of [his wife]" was indeed
sufficient to place beyond the zone of reasonable disagreement the trial court's
decision to deny appellant's motion."
Other jurisdictions' treatment of prosecutor's pretrial statements
re defendant’s guilt. The Court of Criminal Appeals may consider the
opinions of other jurisdictions . “ Numerous decisions of other appellate courts,
including Texas courts of appeals and courts of other jurisdictions, are in accord with
our holdings ...."Lawrence v. State ,240 S.W.3d 912,917 hn12 fn24(2007)
Those opinions about the prosecutor's pretrial statements about the
defendant's guilt are gathered at "Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Case as Ground for
Change of Venue" 33 A.L.R.3d 17.
Page 14 of 20 "Prosecuting attorney-
newspaper under control of § 27[a]
participation in release of publicity §§ 20, 27[a],
32[a], 40, 46 television appearances by § 32[a]"
When the judge said in a letter that defense counsel knew the defendant was guilty in a murder case, the judge was disqualified. His letter was publicized in the small-town newspaper. Even though there was a new judge, the trial was deemed unfair because of the comment by a trial official on the defendant’s guilt. People v. McKay,236 P2d145(Cal.1951) Where the newspaper coverage went beyond objective dissemination of information by reporting of extrajudicial statements by prosecutors, the trial judge abused his discretion in denying a change of venue and the Supreme Court of Montana granted a peremptory writ. State ex rel. Coburn v Bennett,655 P2d 502(Mont.1982) It was reversible error to refuse change of venue for defendant accused of trafficking in heroin where prosecutor, at press conference immediately after defendant's arrest, stated that defendant was guilty. State v Wilson (W Va) 202 SE2d 828 (W. Va.) “In this press conference which was reported by newspapers, radio and television in and around Monongalia County, the prosecutor made several extra-judicial assertions. He strongly indicated that this defendant, among others, was guilty. ”State v Wilson, 202 SE2d 828 (W. Va.1973)
The Court in Wilson found prosecutorial misconduct and cumulative error and ordered a new trial.
Page 15 of 20 The Court of Appeals in Medellin misconstrued the standard of review on denial of a motion for change of venue. The Court of Criminal Appeals should grant this petition for discretionary review, allow full briefing, and order a new trial. The Court of Appeals in Medellin misapplied the test for prejudice in discounting the fact that there was only one newspaper in the county. In Coburn, there was only one newspaper in the county. The “Independent Record, the only daily newspaper in Lewis and Clark County.” The population of Lewis and Clark Co. In 1982 was about 52,000. (Google, “population Lewis and Clark County, accessed 06/11/15). Comal County had about 100,000 at the time of trial (Google, “population Lewis and Clark County, accessed 06/11/15). In Coburn, the prosecutors intimated their opinion of the strength of their evidence: ““County Attorney Charles Graveley was shaking his head in wonder. “ ‘When you read her statement,’ he said of Thursday's 11-year-old rape victim, ‘you'd think she was 28 or 29, and well-educated at that. “ ‘It's the best statement from a rape victim I have seen in five years,’ he said. “Assistant County Attorney Steve Garrison had another way of putting it this morning. “ ‘He picked the wrong little girl,’ he said. ‘She's the kind that when you say, “describe the vehicle,” she just does it.’” Coburn at 503 [internal quotations unchanged,lw] The County Attorney also said: “Graveley said it was his opinion that $100,000 bail to keep Coburn in jail to protect the community was legally proper.” Coburn at 504 “ ‘Once he's found insane, he virtually has a license to commit another crime and another crime and not go to prison,’ Graveley said.” Coburn at 504
Page 16 of 20 The prosecutor in Coburn plainly told the only newspaper in the county that he thought the defendant was guilty. “County Attorney Graveley was campaigning for reelection during the pendency of the Coburn case. The Independent Record ran a “Candidates Say”“ ‘The bail in serious crimes must be set sufficiently high to insure that the defendant is not going to commit any more crimes against our citizens while awaiting trial on the former charge.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.)” [Court supplied emphasis,lw] The Court condemned the prosecutor’s statements in Coburn: “County Attorney Graveley's campaign statement that bail should insure that “the defendant is not going to commit any more crimes” shows a total disregard for the fundamental constitutional protection embraced by the concept of presumed innocence, and under the circumstances implies that relator is guilty.” Coburn at 507hn5 Although not in the record, in deciding whether to grant this petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals may note that the prosecutor in Medellin was running for election after Medellin was arrested in 2010. She was sworn in January of 2011. Medellin was indicted in April of 2011. In Medellin, the District Attorney’s comments were even more explicit than those in Coburn. The District Attorney charged that Medellin caused the death of his wife and then told the county newspaper that “he caused the death of his wife”. The Court of Appeals misapplied the standard when it discounted the District Attorney’s comment. In applying the standard, the Court of Appeals did not consider the effect of there being one newspaper in the County. The evidence showed that Comal had 100,000 people and that 5,000 subscribed to the newspaper, the only newspaper. The Court of Appeals should have considered the prejudicial effect of publishing the prosecutor’s opinion that the Petitioner “caused his wife’s death”.
Page 17 of 20 “While the exact figures of the number of people who saw the telecast were in doubt, the court stated that there could be no doubt that it was a very large number and that the potential for influence on possible talesmen was significant, and that the effect of the telecast could only be prejudicial.” People v Martin (1963) 19 App Div 2d 804, 243 NYS2d 343 The Court of Appeals misapplied the standard by treating Harris County and Comal County as if they were the same for purposes of publicity. The population of the county matters when considering prejudice and change of venue. The Court of Appeals relied on Ryser v. State,453 SW3d 17,37(Tex.App.–Houston[1st Dist]2014,pet.ref’d) Ryser dealt with a news conference involving the mayor, a state representative, and the district attorney. The opinion in Ryser does not cite any statement or opinion from the district attorney. The Court of Appeals considered the size (population) of Harris County in deciding that prejudice was not proven. The Court of Appeals in Ryser also noted that there was a video of the crime.Ryser v. State,453 SW3d 17,37(Tex.App.–Houston[1st Dist]2014,pet.ref’d) The Thirteenth Court of Appeals’ reliance on Ryser was misplaced. Harris has almost thirty-six times more population that Comal. Harris has “population, 2014 estimate 4,441,370". http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48201.html accessed May 25, 2015) Comal has “population,2014 estimate123,694".(http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48091.html accessed May 25, 2015) The Court of Criminal Appeals will please take judicial notice of those statistices from the United States Census Bureau. TEX.R.EVID.201(d) The case against Medellin was circumstantial; there was no statement from the defendant and there were no eyewitnesses.
Page 18 of 20 CONCLUSION The Court of Criminal Appeals should grant this petition and allow full briefing. In the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas No. CR-2011-196 On Petition for Discretionary Review of the following: CAUSE NO 03-13-00158-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ MEDELLIN, PETITIONER V. THE STATE OF TEXAS ON APPEAL FROM COMAL COUNTY, TX
TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. CR2011-196
********** CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ********** I mailed on a copy of the PDR Addressed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas to:
, State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 12405, Austin, TX 78711 Hon. Jennifer Tharp, District Attorney, 150 N. Seguin Ave., Suite 307, New Braunfels, TX 78130 Hon. Laura Burton Bates, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, 150 N. Seguin Ave., Suite 307, New Braunfels, TX 78130
I mailed the copies on June 12, 2015.
Page 19 of 20 Respectfully submitted June 12, 2015 By:/S/ LARRY WARNER Larry Warner, Counsel for Petitioner Alberto Rodriguez Medellin 3109 Banyan Circle Harlingen, Texas 78550 Phone: (956) 230-0361 Fax: 1-866-408-1968 email: office@larrywarner.com Texas Bar#20871500;USDC,SDTX 1230; Board Certified, Criminal Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization(1983) Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States (1984)
Page 20 of 20 Envelope Details
Print this page
Envelope 5663500 Case Information Location Court Of Criminal Appeals Date Filed 06/12/2015 04:11:55 PM Case Number Case Description Assigned to Judge Attorney LARRY WARNER Firm Name LAW OFFICE OF LARRY WARNER Filed By LARRY WARNER Filer Type Not Applicable Fees Convenience Fee $0.00 Total Court Case Fees $0.00 Total Court Filing Fees $0.00 Total Court Service Fees $0.00 Total Filing & Service Fees $0.00 Total Service Tax Fees $0.00 Total Provider Service Fees $0.00 Total Provider Tax Fees $0.00 Grand Total $0.00 Payment Account Name TX REG OPERATING Transaction Amount $0.00 Transaction Response Transaction ID 9294092 Order # 005663500-0
Petition for Discretionary Review Filing Type EFile Filing Code Petition for Discretionary Review Filing Description Medellin PRD Reference Number Alberto Rodriguez Medellin Comments Status Rejected Fees Court Fee $0.00 Service Fee $0.00 Rejection Information Rejection Time Rejection Comment Reason The petition for discretionary review does not contain a certification of compliance with T.R.A.P. 9.4(i)(3). The petition for discretionary review does not contain the 06/12/2015
https://reviewer.efiletexas.gov/EnvelopeDetails.aspx?envelopeguid=c82223d7-4f61-4250-af88-0ad27ebbc87d[6/12/2015 5:07:45 PM] Envelope Details
identity of Judge, Parties and Counsel in compliance with [Rule 68.4(a)]; the identity Other 05:05:38 PM of the trial court judge is missing. The petition for discretionary review does not contain a copy of the court of appeals opinion. [Rule 68.4(j)] Your petition remains due June 3, 2015. Documents Lead Document PDR 061215.pdf [Original]
https://reviewer.efiletexas.gov/EnvelopeDetails.aspx?envelopeguid=c82223d7-4f61-4250-af88-0ad27ebbc87d[6/12/2015 5:07:45 PM]