Med-Stop, Inc. v. Vandutch, Inc., et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. Florida
• Decided: February 9, 2026
• Docket: 1:23-cv-21875
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-cv-21875-ALTMAN/Reid

MED-STOP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

VANDUTCH, INC., et al.,

Defendants. _________________________/

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT & RECCOMENDATION

On January 3, 2025, we dismissed Med-Stop’s claims against the four Defendants that remained in this case—Vandutch, Inc. (“VDI”), Vandutch USA (“VDUSA”), Jacobus Mast (collectively, the “Mast Parties”), and Reed Nicol. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 154] at 20 (“[W]e hereby ORDER and ADJUDGE that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 115] is GRANTED. The Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED with prejudice.”). As prevailing parties, these four Defendants then moved for attorneys’ fees. See Motion for Attorneys’ Fees by Reed Nicol [ECF No. 161]; see also Motion for Attorneys’ Fees by the Mast Parties [ECF No. 174]. We referred those motions to Magistrate Judge Lisette M. Reid for a Report and Recommendation, see Amended Order of Referral [ECF No. 175], and she recommended that we award Nicol $87,332.30 in attorneys’ fees and costs and the Mast Parties $103,682.69 in attorneys’ fees, see Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) [ECF No. 179]. Med-Stop filed a “limited objection” to the R&R, claiming that the R&R “did not address the allocation” of the attorneys’-fees award between the Mast Parties. Objections to R&R (“Objections”) [ECF No. 180] at 2. The Mast Parties filed a response, asking us to overrule the objection. See Response to Objections [ECF No. 182] at 1 (“[The] Plaintiff’s Objection should be denied/overruled because [the] Plaintiff failed to raise the legal arguments asserted in the Objection before the magistrate, [ ] and because neither the facts, nor the law, support the Objection.”). Alternatively, the Mast Parties request that we award “100% of the attorney’s fees [ ] to Jacobus Mast” because “[a]ll attorney’s fees paid on behalf of the Mast Defendants for services rendered herein on or after October 17, 2023 were paid by Jacobus Mast[.]” Id. at 5, 3. THE LAW District courts must review de novo any part of a magistrate judge’s disposition that has been

properly objected to. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). Although Rule 72 itself is silent on the standard of review, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress’s intent was to require a de novo review only where objections have been properly filed—and not when neither party objects. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate [judge]’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.”). “If no objection or only [a] partial objection is made to the magistrate judge’s report, the district judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up)). When a party timely objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district judge must make a de novo determination “of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Leonard v.

Polk Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2019 WL 11641375, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2019) (Jung, J.). “Parties filing objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” United States v. Tardon, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (Lenard, J.) (quoting Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988)). The “[f]ailure to object to the magistrate [judge]’s factual findings after notice precludes a later attack on these findings.” Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). ANALYSIS For four reasons, we overrule Med-Stop’s objection. First, Med-Stop concedes that Magistrate Judge Reid didn’t err by failing to allocate the attorneys’ fees between the Mast Parties—it merely argues that “judicial economy” would be best served by such an allocation. See Objections at 4 (“While this Court could elect simply to issue a joint fee award to all three Mast Defendants, Plaintiff submits

that judicial economy could be best served by this Court either by allocating the entire fee award to VDI or, alternatively, by identifying the portion, if any, allocable to VDI.”). That’s not a good enough reason to overrule a magistrate judge. Second, Med-Stop doesn’t cite any authority for the proposition that we must allocate an attorneys’-fee award between prevailing parties who are represented by the same counsel. The only case Med-Stop cites on this issue is Oxford Asset Management, Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002). See Objections at 4 (“As a general proposition, ‘the district court has wide latitude in determining how to apportion [an attorneys’ fee] award, but it must explain its decision such that it is capable of meaningful review.’” (quoting Oxford, 297 F.3d at 1197)). But this case is inapposite. Med- Stop’s quoted language involved the district court’s determination of a reasonable fee, not the allocation of that fee between prevailing parties. As to fee allocation, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “fees must not always, or even usually, be apportioned.” Council for Periodical Distributors Assc’n. v. Evans, 827

F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1987). Third, even if we thought it necessary to allocate the fee award between the Mast Parties (we don’t), Med-Stop hasn’t given us any evidence with which we might determine how the award should be allocated. The Mast Parties, on the other hand, tell us that Jacobus Mast incurred the relevant attorneys’ fees—not VDI or VDUSA. See Response to Objections at 3 (“All attorney’s fees paid on behalf of the Mast Defendants for services rendered herein on or after October 17, 2023 were paid by Jacobus Mast through other entities owned by him that are neither defendants, nor judgment debtors”’). We think it’s clear that the Mast Parties—not this Court—are best positioned to determine how to allocate their attorneys’-fees. Finally, as the Mast Parties correctly observe, Med-Stop didn’t raise the allocation issue in its underlying briefing. See generally Response to Motion for Attorneys’ Fees by the Mast Parties [ECF No. 176]. In its Response, Med-Stop only asked that, if the Magistrate Judge were inclined to award fees, those fees should be reduced. See zd. at 19 (‘While Med-Stop continues to maintain that Defendants should not be entitled to any fees, this Court may disagree. If so, Med-Stop maintains that any fee award should at least be reduced.’’). Med-Stop’s failure to raise this issue before the Magistrate Judge is reason alone to overrule its objection. See Wiliams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A] district court has discretion to decline to consider a party’s argument when that argument was not first presented to the magistrate judge.”’). The Magistrate Judge Reid thus didn’t err by failing to allocate the attorneys’-fee award between the Mast Parties. We’ve reviewed the rest of Magistrate Judge Reid’s R&R for clear error— and, finding none, concur in her well-reasoned judgment. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we hereby ORDER and ADJUDGE that Med-Stop’s Objections [ECF No. 180] ace OVERRULED. We ADOPT Magistrate Judge Reid’s Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 179] in full. The case shall remain CLOSED. DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District "aC 2026.

ROYK.ALTMAN ———s UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE cc: counsel of record