Means v. Rees

26 F. 210, 1886 U.S. App. LEXIS 1930
CourtUnited States Circuit Court
DecidedJanuary 4, 1886
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 26 F. 210 (Means v. Rees) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Means v. Rees, 26 F. 210, 1886 U.S. App. LEXIS 1930 (uscirct 1886).

Opinion

Key, J.

The bill in this case was filed by complainants in the chancery court of the state of Tennessee, in February, 1883. The cause was removed by respondents into this court. The bill alleges that respondent Rees, and his agent, respondent Wilder, sold them one-h’alf the stock in the Roane Mountain Steel & Iron Company, a corporation created by the state of North Carolina, for the price of $71,-500. This company had stock to the amount of $143,000. Complainants aver that, in making the trade, they relied upon the representations of Rees and Wilder as to the quantity of land belonging to the company, its character, cost, and value, the nature and quality of the title by which it was held, and all the general facts and ingredients which entered into their consideration in estimating the value of the stock. Complainants say that since the contract was executed they have discovered that they have been imposed upon, and that respondents’ representations were false, or exaggerated to such an ex[211]*211tent tliat they find a comparatively worthless purchase upon their hands, and complainants ask to have the contract rescinded and the parties placed in statu quo. The respondents deny all the fraud charged.

It is asserted that Wilder and Eees represented that the company owned 143,000 acres of land, which cost them, and was worth one dollar per acre; that it was covered with valuable timber of great variety, had wonderful beds of magnetic iron ore, fine and abundant water-power, and fertile soil; that the great inducement with them to trade grow' out of the quantity and value of the land for its timber and soil. I do not believe the record sustains this allegation. The record shows, beyond question, that the mineral properties of the land ■were the great and controlling matter in the purchase. Robinson, with a piece of ore taken from this land, came to Wilder to ascertain from whence the ore came, and whether the land where it was found could be purchased. The question discussed by every one, on all occasions pending the negotiations, was the ores, their quantity and quality; and the timber, water-power, and transportation were mentioned as incidental and auxiliary subjects, affecting the development and working of the mineral property. Perry and Wetherby were sent to examine the ores. When complainants wont upon the property, just after the purchase of their stock, they went to investigate the ores, and confined their examination to the ores, and when, as a step towards placing their stock in the market, Prof. Wetherby was sent to make an examination of the property, his attention was directed to the ores, and his report of his investigations deals with the ores as the controlling element of value, and with the timber, water-power, etc., as incidental to and useful in developing and operating the property. It is clear that complainants’ claim, that they negotiated for and purchased the stock because of the value of the lands for timber and agricultural purposes, has not been maintained successfully.

It was disclosed in the negotiations between the parties that a large amount of surface rights upon the property had been sold, but that the mineral rights had been reserved, and no objection was made on that account; and, at a later day, Means urged Wilder to convey to the company the mineral rights in some thousands of acres of land on the top of Roano mountain.' The minerals were always and everywhere considered; but, though this be so, it does not follow that if Wilder and Rees have made false statements in regard to the minor and inferior elements of value in the transaction, for the fraudulent purpose of inducing complainants to purchase the stock, and if they succeeded because complainants believed and relied upon such statements, the complainants are not entitled to relief. But if complainants give unreal reasons for their action, we may look to that fact, so far as it may shed light upon the entire transaction, — upon their motives and good or bad faith in bringing their suit.

[212]*212The great point of contention is as to the quantity of the land. Complainants say they believed they were purchasing 143,000 acres; that Wilder represented, as a positive fact, that there was that quantity, and they accepted his statement' as a fact. They say that if they had known that the deeds, the opinion of Pettibone, the attorney who had examined and reported upon the titles, or the minutes of the company, had shown that there were but 46,000 acres of the land, they would not have purchased the stock. Wilder admits that he always stated that he believed there were at least 143,000 acres, but that he gave it as a mere opinion, and one that he believed correct. There appears to me very little in the assertion of complainants on this point. Wilder never professed to know how many acres there were. He felt quite sure there were 143,000, and thought there might be more, — there might be 160,000 or 200,000. He had made a partial survey, and, coming to the conclusion that there was largely more land than was supposed in the assessment of taxes against the company, the survey was not closed. Their taxes were but $90. The inevitable inference from all this is that the general understanding of the tax assessors .and the public was that the company had greatly less than 143,000 acres. It is reasonable to presume that this conclusion was reached by examination of the recitations of the grants, or other title papers. At all events, there was so great a difference between the common estimate as to the acreage and Wilder’s estimate, predicated upon a partial survey, that the survey was never completed. From this it is clear that Wilder never knew, or professed to know, the number of acres; but gave it as 1ns firm and decided opinion always that there were 143,000 acres or more, but that the estimate of acreage has been greatly less, — so much so that the taxes on the land had been only $90. A partial survey, however, had convinced him that the area was so much larger than the estimate upon which assessments for taxes had been based, that his survey had not been closed, because, if completed, it would have shown so much larger acreage as to have very materially increased the taxation on the land. An examination or knowledge of what the papers and deeds of the company show as to this point would have added nothing to this, nor contradicted Wilder’s representations in this respect; so that complainants are mistaken when they assert that they should have incontinently abandoned the negotiations had they seen that the deeds and other papers and records of the company recited that there were only 46,000 acres of the land; for these recitations do not in any sense contradict Wilder’s statements. The proof shows that Wilder did have a surveyor, McElevee, to investigate the extent and boundaries of the land, and that he, after running one of the lines and examining the boundaries, reported .to Wilder that, in his opinion, to close the survey would show such an increase of area as to materially increase taxation, and that the survey had better be abandoned. He estimated that the average length of the lands was [213]*21328 miles, and their average breadth 8 miles, and the number of acres of such a territory would be a fraction over 143,000. It would seem, therefore, that Wilder had formed his opinion from MoElevee’s report of his investigations.

The complainants, in all their explorations, appear to have kept in view the mineral character and resources of the property. According to their own statements, Perry was sent to investigate the mineral resources of the property. When they, accompanied by Prof.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
26 F. 210, 1886 U.S. App. LEXIS 1930, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/means-v-rees-uscirct-1886.