Meagan Garland v. Director, Family Support Division, Missouri Department of Social Services and Jeffrey Ruhl

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 15, 2014
• Docket: ED99773
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FOUR

MEAGAN GARLAND, ) No. ED99773 ) Petitioner/Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) St. Charles County vs. ) ) Honorable John P. Banas DIRECTOR, FAMILY SUPPORT ) DIVISION, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT ) OF SOCIAL SERVICES AND JEFFREY ) RUHL, ) ) Respondents. ) Filed: April 15, 2014

INTRODUCTION

Meagan Garland (“Mother”) appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying

her claim for attorney’s fees against the Missouri Department of Social Services’ Family

Support Division (“FSD”). Mother contends the trial court erred by denying her claim for

attorney’s fees because, as the prevailing party within the meaning of section 536.087,

RSMo. (2000), she was entitled to such fees. We agree that the trial court erred in

concluding Mother was not a prevailing party within the meaning of section 536.087. We

reverse and remand to the trial court for further findings regarding whether FSD’s

Decision was substantially justified, and ultimately whether Mother should be awarded

attorney’s fees. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In May 2010, Mother filed an application for child support with FSD seeking

financial support from Jefferey Ruhl (“Father”) in caring for their minor child, born

December 4, 2007. Thereafter, Mother and Father provided financial statements to FSD,

and on October 20, 2010, FSD issued its Notice of Findings of Financial Responsibility

(“Findings”) concluding Father should pay $558 per month in child support to Mother

and enroll the minor child in his health insurance plan.

Father requested an administrative hearing to contest these Findings, and FSD

held a hearing on July 15, 2011. Prior to the start of the hearing, Father offered to pay

$500 per month for the support of the parties’ minor child. Mother refused the offer. FSD

then held the hearing and considered additional evidence regarding Father’s personal

finances. Thereafter, on September 6, 2011, FSD issued its Decision and Order

(“Decision”) reducing Father’s monthly support obligation from $558 to $357, but

reaffirming his responsibility to provide health insurance for the minor child.

Mother appealed FSD’s Decision by filing a petition for judicial review in the

Circuit Court of St. Charles County, pursuant to section 536.100, RSMo. (Cum. Supp.

2006).1 Mother challenged, among other things, the amount of child support the Decision

ordered Father to pay, as well as his obligation to provide health insurance for the minor

child. She claimed she “has access to better and more affordable health coverage.” In

response to Mother’s petition, FSD entered its appearance, filed an answer, and moved to

dismiss the appeal and strike Mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs.2

1 Mother’s petition was later amended to include Father as a respondent. 2 FSD’s initial Motion to Dismiss alleged Mother’s petition for attorney’s fees should be dismissed, inter alia, based on sovereign immunity and because FSD’s Decision was “substantially justified.”

2 Before the trial court scheduled a hearing, however, Mother and Father agreed on

terms of settlement. They submitted to the trial court a signed consent agreement

stipulating that FSD’s administrative order “is abandoned,” and that Father would pay

“$500 per month” in child support and provide health insurance coverage for the minor

child “if Mother’s current health insurance policy . . . becomes unavailable,” (emphasis

added). The court signed and entered a consent judgment on February 27, 2012, reciting

the specific terms to which the parties agreed.

Mother then timely filed a motion for attorney’s fees against FSD. In her motion,

Mother claimed she was the prevailing party within the meaning of section 536.087, and

thus entitled to attorney’s fees. FSD filed an amended answer and motion to dismiss,

arguing Mother entered into a pre-trial consent judgment with Father and was therefore

not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 536.087. FSD’s motion was taken under

submission and on May 9, 2012, the court entered an order denying the motion.

Thereafter, the trial court scheduled the matter for an evidentiary hearing on March 1,

2013. After the hearing, the court denied Mother’s request for attorney’s fees, concluding

Mother was not a prevailing party within the meaning of section 536.087, because the

court had not granted Mother’s petition for judicial review before it entered a consent

judgment “based on the parents’ stipulation and not on a review of the administrative

record,” and the consent judgment stipulated that the FSD administrative order “was

abandoned.”3 Mother appeals.

3 Although the trial court’s order and findings of fact were entered as “sustaining FSD’s amended motion to dismiss,” the judge had already denied the motion to dismiss and set the case for “trial.” The judgment Mother appeals from was entered following a hearing and the submission of evidence, and the court orally confirmed at the conclusion of the hearing that his order was a judgment based on the evidence submitted, not a dismissal based on FSD’s motion.

3 STANDARD OF REVIEW

We will affirm the trial court’s judgment regarding attorney’s fees under section

536.087 absent a finding that the award was arbitrary and capricious, unreasonable,

unsupported by competent and substantial evidence, made contrary to law, or was made

in excess of the court’s jurisdiction. § 536.087.7; Gasconade Cnty. Counseling Servs., Inc.

v. Mo. Dept. of Mental Health, 360 S.W.3d 831, 833 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). “Our

determination must be made solely on the record before the trial court.” Gasconade, 360

S.W.3d at 833. “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment.” Id.

However, the definition of a prevailing party within the meaning of section 536.087 is a

matter of statutory interpretation, a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Id.;

see also Lumetta v. Sheriff of St. Charles Co., 413 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Mo. App. E.D.

2013) (“The interpretation of a statute is a pure question of law, and therefore we give the

circuit court’s interpretation no deference.”) (quoting State v. Rodgers, 396 S.W.3d 398,

400 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013)).

DISCUSSION

In her sole point, Mother argues the trial court erred as a matter of law by denying

her claim for attorney’s fees. Specifically, she contends the court misapplied the law by

concluding that she was not a prevailing party within the meaning of section 536.087, and

therefore not entitled to attorney’s fees under this statute.

Section 536.087.1 provides:

A party who prevails in an agency proceeding or civil action arising therefrom, brought by or against the state, shall be awarded those reasonable fees and expenses incurred by that party in the civil action or agency proceeding, unless the court or agency finds that the position of the state was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

4 The issue now before us is whether Mother is a prevailing party within the

meaning of section 536.087 of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act.4 A prevailing

party within the meaning of section 536.087 is defined by section 536.085.3, RSMo.

(2000), as one who “obtains a favorable order, decision, judgment or dismissal in a civil

action or agency proceeding.” In Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 47

S.W.3d 346, 353 (Mo. banc 2001), the Missouri Supreme Court held that the term

“prevail,” as used in section 536.087, “is not limited to a favorable judgment following a

trial on the merits; it may also include obtaining a settlement, obtaining a voluntary

dismissal of a groundless complaint, or obtaining a favorable decision on a single issue if

the issue is one of significance to the underlying case.” Thus, the definition of “prevail”

includes any result from a civil proceeding that arises out of a prior administrative

proceeding, if the result corrects or modifies the prior administrative proceeding. Brown

v. Mo. Dept. of Family Support, 297 S.W.3d 668, 671 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (citing

Washington v. Jones, 154 S.W. 3d 346, 350 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004)).

FSD argues Mother’s agreement to the circuit court’s “superseding order”

rendered the issue of attorney’s fees moot. Specifically, because Mother accepted

Father’s settlement proposal and “abandoned” FSD’s Decision, she opted not to litigate

her appeal on the merits. Thus, the court did not rule on FSD’s Decision and absent such

a ruling, an award of attorney’s fees as the “prevailing” party cannot follow. We disagree.

We determine whether Mother prevailed under section 536.087 based on the end

result of the litigation. See Brown, 297 S.W.3d at 671-672 (identifying prevailing party

based on the “end result of the proceedings.”); Washington, 154 S.W.3d at 350-51

(focusing on the “end result of the court proceedings” to identify the prevailing party). 4 The Administrative Procedure and Review Act, Chapter 536, RSMo. (2000).

5 When a plaintiff has succeeded in achieving at least some of the benefit sought on a

significant issue of the litigation, the party prevails within the meaning of section 536.087.

See White v. Mo. Veterinary Medical Bd., 906 S.W.2d 753, 755-756 (Mo. App. W.D.

1995) (applying these principles to the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act and

section 536.087); see also Melahn v. Otto, 836 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992)

(recognizing “achievement of the ‘sought for result’” as an important factor).

Here, the facts show that Mother timely appealed FSD’s Decision ordering Father

to pay child support totaling $357 per month and to enroll the minor child in his health

insurance plan. While her appeal was pending, Mother and Father agreed to settlement

terms that increased Father’s monthly child support obligation from $357 to $500 and

conformed with Mother’s request on appeal to modify his duty to provide health

insurance coverage. Mother’s appeal to the circuit court was necessitated by FSD’s prior

Decision that awarded her a lower amount of child support than that which she ultimately

received and ordered Father to provide health insurance for the child despite Mother

allegedly having, as she claimed, “access to better and more affordable health coverage.”

The end result of Mother’s appeal was that the court approved a settlement and entered a

judgment in which she achieved at least some of the benefit that she sought on two

significant issues: child support and health insurance coverage for the minor child.5 Thus,

she was a prevailing party within the meaning of section 536.087.

The dissent argues that efficient justice requires that we find Mother was not the

prevailing party, because to rule otherwise would result in FSD “preventing” future

5 FSD further argues that because it did not sign or participate in the settlement, Mother cannot be a prevailing party. We find no support in section 536.087 or Missouri case law for such a proposition. As previously stated, the key issue is whether or not Mother was a “prevailing party” within the meaning of the statute, not whether FSD signed the settlement agreement.

6 settlements to avoid an award of attorney’s fees. The dissent does not explain how FSD

would be able to “prevent” parents from agreeing to proposed settlement terms.

Nevertheless, here, we do not reach the ultimate issue of whether attorney’s fees should

be awarded. Mother requests and we agree that remand is proper so that the trial court

has an opportunity to determine whether FSD’s Decision was substantially justified.

Section 536.087 requires the trial court to determine whether there was a reasonable basis

for FSD’s Decision before it may award attorney’s fees. Hutchings ex rel. Hutchings v.

Roling, 193 S.W.3d 334, 349 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006) (“[T]he trial court must consider the

question of substantial justification on the record made in the agency proceeding.”). On

remand, FSD may still argue that its actions were “substantially justified.”

CONCLUSION

We find Mother to be a prevailing party within the meaning of section 536.087

and on this ground reverse the trial court’s decision denying Mother attorney’s fees. We

reverse and remand to the trial court for a determination on the remaining issue of

whether FSD’s Decision was substantially justified.

___________________________________ Lisa S. Van Amburg, Presiding Judge

Patricia L. Cohen, Judge, concur. Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., Judge, dissents in separate opinion.