IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
MEAGAN CORBETT,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 5D21-3166 LT Case No. 21-MM-002429-A-O
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
________________________________/
Opinion filed May 13, 2022
Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Evellen H. Jewett, Respondent Judge.
Robert Wesley, Public Defender, and Robert Thompson Adams, IV, and Ali Almamluk, Assistant Public Defenders, Orlando, for Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard A. Pallas, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
Petitioner, Meagan Corbett, charged with one count of simple battery,
filed a motion in county court seeking to dismiss that charge based on Florida’s Stand Your Ground immunity, section 776.032, Florida Statutes
(2021). At the hearing on Corbett’s motion, the defense argued that the State
had the burden of proof. The State, however, argued that the burden of proof
was on Corbett to show by a preponderance of evidence that she was
entitled to immunity under the statute. The court agreed with the State,
required Corbett to present evidence, and following the hearing, concluded
that Corbett did not meet her burden of proving that immunity attached and
denied her motion to dismiss.
Corbett filed a petition for writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court
incorrectly ruled that she had the burden to prove that she was entitled to
statutory immunity, that she did not establish a prima facie claim of immunity,
and incorrectly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard used by
an older version of the Stand Your Ground statute. We agree with Corbett
that the trial court employed an incorrect procedure when ruling on her
motion, but for the reasons set forth below, we are compelled to deny relief.
Corbett argues before our Court that the use of prohibition has been
the established method when one seeks to review orders denying motions
to dismiss based on Stand Your Ground immunity. Specifically, since
Bretherick v. State, 135 So. 3d 337, 339–40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), aff’d, 170
So. 3d 776 (Fla. 2015), prohibition has been the recognized vehicle for
2 challenging Stand Your Ground denials, even when the denials were based
on procedural grounds. Corbett further relies on Heilman v. State, 135 So.
3d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), in which we granted a petition for writ of
prohibition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing where the trial court
denied the Stand Your Ground motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Typically, a writ of prohibition is the appropriate method for obtaining
review before trial of the denial on the merits of a motion to dismiss under
the Stand Your Ground statute. Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2012). This is because a “lower court has no authority to proceed
against an immunized defendant.” Jefferson v. State, 264 So. 3d 1019, 1023
(Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (citing Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 216 n.1 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2013) (explaining that “the supreme court has consistently held” that
prohibition “is an appropriate vehicle to review orders denying motions to
dismiss criminal prosecutions based on immunity”)).
However, within the last few years, the Second District has recognized
in a series of cases that where the issue is procedural, e.g., whether the trial
court applied the correct evidentiary burden, rather than substantive, e.g.,
whether the defendant is entitled to immunity, then prohibition is not the
appropriate remedy. See Rich v. State, 311 So. 3d 126, 130 (Fla. 2d DCA
2020) (“Recently, our court expanded the circumstances in which immunity
3 claim rulings under section 776.032 may alternatively be considered in
certiorari . . . . However, an elemental requisite of our court’s certiorari
jurisdiction is a definitive ruling on the merits by the lower tribunal of whatever
it is the petitioner would have us review.”); Garcia v. State, 286 So. 3d 348,
350 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (“[B]ecause the trial court erred in its construction of
the Stand Your Ground statute, we are unable to determine whether Mr.
Garcia is entitled to immunity on the merits. Thus, prohibition is not the
appropriate vehicle under which to proceed. We best proceed under our
certiorari jurisdiction.”); Jefferson, 264 So. 3d at 1023 (“[Where] petitioner
challenges the procedure the circuit court employed in denying his motion to
dismiss . . . we cannot discern whether petitioner is entitled to immunity on
the merits, and therefore prohibition is not the proper vehicle to review the
alleged error.”); Figueroa v. State, 247 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)
(treating petition for writ of prohibition as petition for writ of certiorari and
granting because trial court departed from essential requirements of law by
not applying section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2017)).
The Third and First Districts have also issued recent opinions in which
the courts addressed Stand Your Ground procedural errors in petitions for
writ of certiorari. Penalver v. State, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D320 (Fla. 3d DCA
Feb. 2, 2022) (reviewing order dismissing motion to dismiss based on Stand
4 Your Ground immunity by petition for writ of certiorari); Bailey v. State, 333
So. 3d 761, 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“This court has certiorari jurisdiction to
review the denial of a motion for statutory immunity.”); Casanova v. State, 46
Fla. L. Weekly D2326 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 27, 2021); Rogers v. State, 301 So.
3d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).
This Court, however, has not directly addressed the issue of when a
petitioner should file a petition for writ of prohibition or a writ of certiorari to
review orders denying Stand Your Ground immunity. As Corbett notes in this
case, confusion on the issue may derive from our opinion in Bretherick,
where we held that “the appropriate vehicle to obtain review before trial of
the denial of a ‘Stand Your Ground’ motion invoking self-defense immunity
is by petition for writ of prohibition.” Bretherick, 135 So. 3d at 339–40.
Bretherick dealt with which party had the burden of proof (pre-statutory
amendment), but it also discussed the merits of the immunity claim and
whether the findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence.
We take this opportunity to clarify our position on this issue by joining
the majority of our sister courts and holding that the determination of whether
the order denying Stand Your Ground immunity is reviewable by certiorari or
prohibition rests on the judicial acts challenged in the petition. If the
defendant asserts that on the merits he or she is entitled to immunity, is
5 challenging the legal determinations and factual findings of immunity or lack
of immunity, and the relief to be afforded is prohibition against further
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
MEAGAN CORBETT,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 5D21-3166 LT Case No. 21-MM-002429-A-O
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
________________________________/
Opinion filed May 13, 2022
Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Evellen H. Jewett, Respondent Judge.
Robert Wesley, Public Defender, and Robert Thompson Adams, IV, and Ali Almamluk, Assistant Public Defenders, Orlando, for Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard A. Pallas, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
Petitioner, Meagan Corbett, charged with one count of simple battery,
filed a motion in county court seeking to dismiss that charge based on Florida’s Stand Your Ground immunity, section 776.032, Florida Statutes
(2021). At the hearing on Corbett’s motion, the defense argued that the State
had the burden of proof. The State, however, argued that the burden of proof
was on Corbett to show by a preponderance of evidence that she was
entitled to immunity under the statute. The court agreed with the State,
required Corbett to present evidence, and following the hearing, concluded
that Corbett did not meet her burden of proving that immunity attached and
denied her motion to dismiss.
Corbett filed a petition for writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court
incorrectly ruled that she had the burden to prove that she was entitled to
statutory immunity, that she did not establish a prima facie claim of immunity,
and incorrectly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard used by
an older version of the Stand Your Ground statute. We agree with Corbett
that the trial court employed an incorrect procedure when ruling on her
motion, but for the reasons set forth below, we are compelled to deny relief.
Corbett argues before our Court that the use of prohibition has been
the established method when one seeks to review orders denying motions
to dismiss based on Stand Your Ground immunity. Specifically, since
Bretherick v. State, 135 So. 3d 337, 339–40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), aff’d, 170
So. 3d 776 (Fla. 2015), prohibition has been the recognized vehicle for
2 challenging Stand Your Ground denials, even when the denials were based
on procedural grounds. Corbett further relies on Heilman v. State, 135 So.
3d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), in which we granted a petition for writ of
prohibition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing where the trial court
denied the Stand Your Ground motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Typically, a writ of prohibition is the appropriate method for obtaining
review before trial of the denial on the merits of a motion to dismiss under
the Stand Your Ground statute. Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2012). This is because a “lower court has no authority to proceed
against an immunized defendant.” Jefferson v. State, 264 So. 3d 1019, 1023
(Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (citing Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 216 n.1 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2013) (explaining that “the supreme court has consistently held” that
prohibition “is an appropriate vehicle to review orders denying motions to
dismiss criminal prosecutions based on immunity”)).
However, within the last few years, the Second District has recognized
in a series of cases that where the issue is procedural, e.g., whether the trial
court applied the correct evidentiary burden, rather than substantive, e.g.,
whether the defendant is entitled to immunity, then prohibition is not the
appropriate remedy. See Rich v. State, 311 So. 3d 126, 130 (Fla. 2d DCA
2020) (“Recently, our court expanded the circumstances in which immunity
3 claim rulings under section 776.032 may alternatively be considered in
certiorari . . . . However, an elemental requisite of our court’s certiorari
jurisdiction is a definitive ruling on the merits by the lower tribunal of whatever
it is the petitioner would have us review.”); Garcia v. State, 286 So. 3d 348,
350 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (“[B]ecause the trial court erred in its construction of
the Stand Your Ground statute, we are unable to determine whether Mr.
Garcia is entitled to immunity on the merits. Thus, prohibition is not the
appropriate vehicle under which to proceed. We best proceed under our
certiorari jurisdiction.”); Jefferson, 264 So. 3d at 1023 (“[Where] petitioner
challenges the procedure the circuit court employed in denying his motion to
dismiss . . . we cannot discern whether petitioner is entitled to immunity on
the merits, and therefore prohibition is not the proper vehicle to review the
alleged error.”); Figueroa v. State, 247 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)
(treating petition for writ of prohibition as petition for writ of certiorari and
granting because trial court departed from essential requirements of law by
not applying section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2017)).
The Third and First Districts have also issued recent opinions in which
the courts addressed Stand Your Ground procedural errors in petitions for
writ of certiorari. Penalver v. State, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D320 (Fla. 3d DCA
Feb. 2, 2022) (reviewing order dismissing motion to dismiss based on Stand
4 Your Ground immunity by petition for writ of certiorari); Bailey v. State, 333
So. 3d 761, 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“This court has certiorari jurisdiction to
review the denial of a motion for statutory immunity.”); Casanova v. State, 46
Fla. L. Weekly D2326 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 27, 2021); Rogers v. State, 301 So.
3d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).
This Court, however, has not directly addressed the issue of when a
petitioner should file a petition for writ of prohibition or a writ of certiorari to
review orders denying Stand Your Ground immunity. As Corbett notes in this
case, confusion on the issue may derive from our opinion in Bretherick,
where we held that “the appropriate vehicle to obtain review before trial of
the denial of a ‘Stand Your Ground’ motion invoking self-defense immunity
is by petition for writ of prohibition.” Bretherick, 135 So. 3d at 339–40.
Bretherick dealt with which party had the burden of proof (pre-statutory
amendment), but it also discussed the merits of the immunity claim and
whether the findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence.
We take this opportunity to clarify our position on this issue by joining
the majority of our sister courts and holding that the determination of whether
the order denying Stand Your Ground immunity is reviewable by certiorari or
prohibition rests on the judicial acts challenged in the petition. If the
defendant asserts that on the merits he or she is entitled to immunity, is
5 challenging the legal determinations and factual findings of immunity or lack
of immunity, and the relief to be afforded is prohibition against further
prosecution, then a petition for writ of prohibition is appropriate to review the
claim. “[P]rohibition’s ‘purpose is to prevent the doing of something, not to
compel the undoing of something already done. It cannot be used to revoke
an order already entered.’” Stokes v. Jones, 319 So. 3d 166, 170−71 (Fla.
1st DCA 2021) (quoting Hamlin v. E. Coast Props., Inc., 616 So. 2d 1175,
1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)).
However, if the defendant asserts that the trial court applied the wrong
procedure, and the relief requested would require remand for further
proceedings on the defendant’s motion, then prohibition is not appropriate
because the defendant is seeking correction of an order. An appellate court
cannot determine whether the trial court’s legal conclusions on immunity are
correct when the trial court employs the wrong evidentiary burdens. While
the defendant may seek a writ of prohibition to prevent further prosecution in
this scenario, the appropriate relief in such situations is for the order under
review to be quashed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
Therefore, certiorari relief is more appropriate.
Here, because the trial court applied both an improper procedure and
the wrong evidentiary burden, and both the court’s oral and written rulings
6 are ambiguous as to what burden it applied when “weighing all the evidence,”
this Court cannot determine the merits of the immunity decision. The relief
Corbett seeks is another hearing as required by section 776.032. A writ of
certiorari is the proper mechanism to provide this relief.
By this opinion, we express our agreement with the series of cases
holding that procedural errors regarding Stand Your Ground motions should
be raised in a petition for writ of certiorari rather than a petition for writ of
prohibition. Because Corbett’s petition challenges the procedure employed
below, we treat it as a petition for certiorari. However, doing so compels us
to dismiss the petition as untimely.1
PETITION DISMISSED.
COHEN, HARRIS and SASSO, JJ., concur.
1 We acknowledge the absence of prior delineation from this Court as to which petition should be filed and under what circumstances when challenging the denial of a Stand Your Ground motion. However, we note that the cases and analysis adopted by our opinion today in holding that certiorari is the proper vehicle when challenging the lower court on procedural grounds were not only in existence at the time Corbett filed her petition but were in fact cited by her at length therein. See, e.g., Jefferson, 264 So. 3d at 1023; Rich, 311 So. 3d at 129.