McVey v. McVey
This text of 230 S.W. 781 (McVey v. McVey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Article 2078, R. S., limits an appeal or writ of error that may be taken to the Court of Civil Appeals to a “final judgment of the district court in civil cases.” The effect of a judgment granted, as here, on a petition in the nature of a bill of review to set aside a decree of divorce of a former term for fraud is to set aside the former decree and grant a new trial. Such judgment does not operate to dismiss the original suit for divorce. The first decree of divorce being set aside by proceeding's having that object directly in view, then such decree “cannot be considered,” quoting, “as a final judgment remaining of record in the court below and subject to revision, any more so than if it had been set aside and a new trial granted in the ordinary way before court adjourned.” Stewart v. Jones, 9 Tex. 469; Gross v. McClaran, 8 Tex. 341; Hope v. Long, 122 S. W. 40. And “if it was error to set it (the first decree) aside, such error can only be revised after the final disposition of the case where the suit is still pending.” Stewart v. Jones, supra.
The appeal is dismissed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
230 S.W. 781, 1921 Tex. App. LEXIS 247, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcvey-v-mcvey-texapp-1921.