McRoberts v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In Re Derickson)

226 B.R. 879, 40 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1143, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1255, 1998 WL 789795
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedOctober 1, 1998
Docket14-60287
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 226 B.R. 879 (McRoberts v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In Re Derickson)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McRoberts v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In Re Derickson), 226 B.R. 879, 40 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1143, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1255, 1998 WL 789795 (Ill. 1998).

Opinion

*880 OPINION

KENNETH J. MEYERS, Bankruptcy Judge.

The two cases under consideration present the common issue of whether a Chapter 13 trustee is entitled to recover the trustee’s statutory fee on insurance proceeds paid as a result of destruction of a secured creditor’s collateral. 1

In the first case, Trustee v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In re Derickson), the debtor executed a note and security agreement for the purchase of two Freightliner tractor trailer trucks. This obligation was assigned to Associates Commercial Corporation (“Associates”). The security agreement required the debtor to fully insure the collateral showing Associates as the loss payee of the policy.

When the debtor sought Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief in February 1997, Associates filed a secured claim for the balance remaining on the note. Approximately a month later, one of the trucks securing Associates’ claim was destroyed in a fire, and the debt- or’s insurer paid Associates for the loss. Associates applied these proceeds to the balance on the debtor’s note and released its security interest in the vehicle.

The Chapter 13 trustee, upon learning the insurance proceeds had been paid directly to Associates, filed this adversary proceeding for turnover. The trustee contends that the proceeds constitute estate property and, as such, must be toned over to the trustee for redistribution to Associates after the trustee deducts his statutory fee. Associates, for its part, concedes that the insurance proceeds are property of the estate. However, Associates maintains it is entitled to retain this property and need not remit the proceeds to the trustee for redistribution.

The second case, In re Murray, arises in a different procedural context than Derickson, but is factually similar. In March 1995, the debtor executed a note and security agreement in favor of Chrysler Financial Corporation (“Chrysler”) for the purchase of a 1995 Plymouth Voyager minivan. The debtor began the present Chapter 13 case in December 1997, and Chrysler filed a claim secured by the Voyager minivan. The debtor’s case was dismissed in April 1998 for failure to make plan payments. However, prior to dismissal of this case, the vehicle securing Chrysler’s claim was destroyed in a collision. The insurer paid the trustee for the loss in May 1998, 2 after the bankruptcy had been dismissed. Although the trustee planned to remit the insurance proceeds, less his trustee’s fee, to Chrysler as payment on its claim, Chrysler filed an application for payment of the insurance proceeds. Chrysler argues that the proceeds are not subject to the trustee’s fee and should be paid over to Chrysler in their entirety.

The trustee, in each of these cases, contends that the insurance proceeds are payments on a secured claim that must be made through the trustee, thereby subjecting them to a fee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(e). Section 586(e) provides that the trustee may impose a fee on all payments received under a Chapter 13 plan:

(e)(1) The Attorney General, after consultation with a United States trustee that has appointed an individual ... to serve as standing trustee in eases under... [Chapter 13], shall fix—
(B) a percentage fee not to exceed—
(i) in the case of the debtor who is not a family farmer, ten percent[.]
(2) Such individual shall collect such percentage fee from all payments received by such individual under plans in the cases under ... [Chapter 13] for which such individual serves as standing trustee.

28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(l)(B)(i) and (e)(2). The language “received by such individual” makes clear that the trustee’s fee is imposed only on payments he actually receives. Thus, who disburses the debtor’s payments is of great interest to the trustee, “because the trustee is entitled to his statutory [fee] only on the funds that he actually receives from *881 the debtor pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan.” Matter of Aberegg, 961 F.2d 1307, 1309 (7th Cir.1992). 3

Generally, Chapter 13 eases are funded from future earnings of the debtor. The debtor, or the debtor’s employer, typically submits periodic payments to the trustee for distribution on creditors’ claims. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1). 4 These distributions are subject to the trustee’s fee under § 586(e)(2). In re Grear, 163 B.R. 524, 526 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1994); In re Harris, 107 B.R. 204, 209 (Bankr.D.Neb.1989). However, the Bankruptcy Code does not require the Chapter 13 debtor to submit all estate property to the trustee for distribution. For instance, the debtor may liquidate estate property and make a single lump sum payment to the creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8). 5 Similarly, the debtor may surrender collateral directly to a secured creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C). 6

While there is a split of authority as to whether lump sum payments under § 1322(b)(8) are subject to the Chapter 13 trustee’s fee, 7 this Court has ruled that a debtor’s surrender of collateral consisting of cash proceeds under § 1325(a)(5)(C) results in no trustee fee being assessed because, like non-cash collateral that is transferred in kind without being reduced to cash, “the property is transferred directly to the secured creditor without involvement by the re Grear, 163 B.R. at 526. The property in Grear consisted of proceeds of the debtor’s bank accounts and life insurance policy that were subject to the lien of the I.R.S., and the Court noted that the proposed “payment” was actually a “transfer or turnover of collateral rather than a payment from the debtor’s income or other property.” Id. at 527. As such, the funds could be paid over directly without involvement by the trustee or payment of the trustee fee under § 586(e). Id.

Although Grear involved a surrender of collateral under § 1325(a)(5)(C), the situation presented there is analogous to the one at bar. In both cases before the Court, the insurance proceeds are a substitute for the creditors’ collateral which was, effectively, surrendered upon its destruction. The entire purpose of property insurance is to protect the insured in the event of damage or loss.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
226 B.R. 879, 40 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1143, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1255, 1998 WL 789795, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcroberts-v-associates-commercial-corp-in-re-derickson-ilsb-1998.