McPherson v. Hillyer Deutsch-Edwards, Inc.

143 So. 89
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 30, 1932
DocketNo. 1006.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 143 So. 89 (McPherson v. Hillyer Deutsch-Edwards, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McPherson v. Hillyer Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., 143 So. 89 (La. Ct. App. 1932).

Opinion

ELLIOTT, J.

Jesse I. McPherson, employed by Hillyer Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., as log cutter in the woods, was, while so engaged, struck on the head by the accidental fall of a limb from a tree and badly injured. The accident occurred on Aitgust 28, 1930.

Alleging his injury and that it had produced in him a “permanent total disability to do work of any reasonable character,” he brought suit against Hillyer Deutseh-Ed-wards, Inc., for compensation at the rate of $11.70 per week for 400 weeks, less payments from the time of the injury until January 3, 1931, received.

• Defendant for answer admits paying plaintiff compensation on account of said injury to his head, for the time stated, but denies owing him any more; alleges that, if the plaintiff at the present time, or has recently, been suffiering from any ailment or disability, same is due entirely to other causes and not to the said accidental injury sustained while he was working for respondent.

The lower court, after reviewing the evidence in a written opinion, held that plaintiff had not established his right to any further compensation, and rejected his demand. The plaintiff has appealed.

The evidence shows that plaintiff was employed by defendant as .alleged in his petition, and that while so engaged an oak limb, 3 or 4 inches in diameter at the large end and 12 or 14 feet long, fell from a tree, from a height of about 35 feet, and hit him on his head, a little to the right of the center of the cranium. The blow knocked him to the ground and rendered him unconscious for a period of time estimated by witnesses at from 20 to 30 minutes.

■ The plaintiff was carried from the woods to a physician employed by defendant. This physician, Dr. Waller, sewed up the scalp wound caused by the blow. He then tapped the spinal fluid, after which plaintiff was carried home. He remained at home in bed about a week, after which he got up and walked from his residence to the office of Dr. Waller, which we understand was about a quarter of a mile. After a few visits, Dr. Waller told him to stay in bed about two weeks longer. After about two weeks longer in bed, plaintiff left his bed and walked to see Dr. Waller at his office, for a time stated *90 to have been every other day for a while and then once or twice a week, in all about three months.

Dr. Waller then discharged him as well and stopped his compensation.

The plaintiff, with reference to the time of his discharge as well, testified that the physician in defendant’s employ told him that he was not able to work, but defendant’s agent told him that they were unable to determine whether the injury he got was the cause of his disability or not, and therefore stopped his compensation.

The Employers’ Liability Act, Act No. 20 of 1914, § 38 (as amended by Act No. 38 of 1918) reads: “The word ‘Accident,’ as used in this act shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening, suddenly or violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. The terms ‘Injury’ and ‘Personal Injuries’ shall include only injuries by violence to the physical structure of the body and such diseases or infections as naturally result therefrom. The said terms shall in no case be construed to include any other form of disease or derangement, howsoever caused or contracted.”

Section 18, subd. 4 (as amended by Act No. 85 of 1926) provides: “ * * * But all findings of the fact must he based upon competent evidence, and all compensation payments provided for in this act, shall mean and be defined to he for injuries and only such injuries as are proven by competent evidence, of which there are, or have been objective conditions or symptoms proven, not within the physical or mental control of the injured employee himself.”

Plaintiff must establish his right to compensation by competent evidence within the terms and intent of the law.

The trial took place on April 13, 1931, which was about nine months after the injury. Plaintiff testified that he was 44 years of age and had been engaged in work as a sawmill laborer for twenty-five or twenty-six years, which is saying in effect that he commenced such work at the age of 18 or 19 years and followed it as a vocation until he received the injury in question.

At the time plaintiff got hurt, he had been at work for defendant two or three months. Questioned as to his previous condition of health, he testified that previous to the time of his injury, he never had any disability or ailments of any kind; that he did not have any infected teeth, had never had the toothache in his life, and had always worked when he could get employment; that since his injury he had constantly suffered pain in his head and that he never had any such pain before; that he is not able to do hard labor, and that his memory is bad. He says: “I can’t speak anything quick because I can’t think as to how I am going to say it. I have noticed that;” that before his injury he never had any failings of this kind.

The evidence shows that Dr. Waller, in the employment of defendant, examined plaintiff concerning his fitness for work previous to his employment. It was Dr. Waller’s duty to ascertain by examination if the health and condition of plaintiff, seeking employment, was such as to justify the risk.

One of the physicians called by defendant was asked what kind of examination was given to a party applying for employment before he was put to work, and he answered: “Examine his eyes, ears, heart and especially for hernia, his nose ankylosis and whether crippled or not.”

Within a day or so after plaintiff was examined he was employed and put to work in the woods sawing logs.

We cannot help but feel that Dr. Waller, after examining plaintiff, found him in fit condition to do manual labor of the kind he'was ordered to do. If he had found any evidence of weakness, sickness, lack of strength, fever, high blood pressure, pains, or dizziness he would have reported it, and plaintiff would not have been employed. It is a matter of which we may take cognizance that the work of a laborer, in cutting logs in the woods, requires strength, endurance, and good physical state of health. Men suffering with any of the ailments which plaintiff was found to have following his injury would not have been employed had such ailments been known at the time.

Dr. Waller was in Rochester, N. Y., at the time of the trial, but, if his testimony concerning plaintiff’s condition at the time he was examined for employment and at the time he was first brought before him for the treatment of the injury to his head would have helped in the defense, it could and presumably would have been taken.

Plaintiff had never, so far as known, complained of any pain, weakness, or disability of any kind until he received this injury on his head.

The testimony of his saw partner was taken. This witness was asked:

“Q. What kind of a hand was he? A. All right. A good hand.
“Q. Heard any complaint from him of pains? A. No, Sir. Only he said he had not cut any logs in somé time and was kinder tender and soft.”

This last answer evidently refers to some remark made by plaintiff to his partner at some time during the early period of his employment.

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Bluebook (online)
143 So. 89, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcpherson-v-hillyer-deutsch-edwards-inc-lactapp-1932.