McNelley v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

McNelley v. State

497 S.E.2d 235, 269 Ga. 189

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedMarch 9, 1998

DocketS98A0294

StatusPublished

This text of 497 S.E.2d 235 (McNelley v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McNelley v. State, 497 S.E.2d 235, 269 Ga. 189 (Ga. 1998).

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Opinion

Sears, Justice.

Appellant McNelley was arrested in Clayton County for driving under the influence, and was informed of the implied consent laws associated with DUI arrests. McNelley then consented to a breath sobriety test, which was administered twice at a local hospital. The tests revealed a bodily alcohol content of .124 percent and .127 percent, respectively. McNelley was charged with having an alcohol concentration of .10 grams or more within three hours of driving as a result of consuming alcohol before driving activity ceased, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). He then filed a pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of § 40-6-391 (a) (5). That motion was denied, and the issue was certified by the trial court for immediate review. This Court granted McNelley’s interlocutory appeal to determine his constitutional challenge.

The challenge and arguments raised by McNelley were considered and decided adversely to him in Bohannon v. State, 269 Ga. 130 (497 SE2d 552) (1998). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision finding OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5) to be constitutional.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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Sears, Justice.

Appellant McNelley was arrested in Clayton County for driving under the influence, and was informed of the implied consent laws associated with DUI arrests. McNelley then consented to a breath sobriety test, which was administered twice at a local hospital. The tests revealed a bodily alcohol content of .124 percent and .127 percent, respectively. McNelley was charged with having an alcohol concentration of .10 grams or more within three hours of driving as a result of consuming alcohol before driving activity ceased, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). He then filed a pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of § 40-6-391 (a) (5). That motion was denied, and the issue was certified by the trial court for immediate review. This Court granted McNelley’s interlocutory appeal to determine his constitutional challenge.

The challenge and arguments raised by McNelley were considered and decided adversely to him in Bohannon v. State, 269 Ga. 130 (497 SE2d 552) (1998). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision finding OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5) to be constitutional.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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497 S.E.2d 235, 269 Ga. 189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcnelley-v-state-ga-1998.

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