McNeil v. Baldwin

2020 IL App (4th) 190305-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 15, 2020
• Docket: 4-19-0305
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 190305-U This order was filed under Supreme FILED NO. 4-19-0305 June 15, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

HENRY ERIC McNEIL, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County JOHN BALDWIN, in His Official Capacity as the Acting ) No. 18MR798 Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections; and ) CRAIG FINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Chairman ) Honorable of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, ) Rudolph M. Braud Jr., Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court held plaintiff’s request for mandamus relief is moot. Plaintiff completed his term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) and the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) discharged him from its custody.

¶2 Plaintiff, Henry Eric McNeil, appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his petition

seeking mandamus relief against defendants, John Baldwin, in his official capacity as the Acting

Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections and Craig Findley, in his official capacity as

Chairman of the Prisoner Review Board (Board). For the following reasons, we dismiss

plaintiff’s appeal as moot.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On November 6, 2015, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one year

imprisonment and four years’ MSR for domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2014)). On January 15, 2016, plaintiff completed his term of imprisonment and began serving his MSR

term.

¶5 On October 1, 2016, DOC issued a parole violation report, stating plaintiff

received positive drug screens on February 2, 2016, and June 18, 2016, and “fled the day

reporting center after testing positive for THC and PCP” on August 31, 2016. Plaintiff’s

whereabouts remained unknown until he was arrested in Arizona on October 21, 2016.

¶6 In January, March, and June 2017, the Board entered a series of orders and found

plaintiff in violation of certain conditions of his MSR on February 2, 2016, and August 31, 2016.

The Board ultimately continued plaintiff’s MSR. Plaintiff received day-for-day good-conduct

credit while serving his MSR term in confinement and completed his MSR term at Lawrence

Correctional Center because he did not have an approved host site. On October 13, 2018, DOC

discharged plaintiff from its custody.

¶7 On October 15, 2018, plaintiff, pro se, filed a petition seeking mandamus relief,

alleging defendants improperly denied him additional earned good-conduct credit for time spent

on MSR and electronic home monitoring. Plaintiff argued defendants incorrectly calculated his

remaining sentence based on the February 2016 violation date—stating that violation led only to

a “verbal warning”—instead of the August 2016 violation date. “As a result of defendants and

their agents[’] actions,” by refusing to apply the additional sentencing credit, plaintiff asserted he

would suffer “irreparable damages and be subjected to spending 0 to 4¼ months extra time

incarcerated.”

¶8 On February 1, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition

pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)) and a

memorandum in support of the motion. Defendants argued the petition was moot and should be

-2- dismissed as plaintiff had been discharged and “there is no sentence remaining to which

additional credits can be applied.”

¶9 On February 21, 2019, the trial court entered a written order granting defendants’

motion to dismiss stating, “The claim is moot pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-619, as Plaintiff has

been fully discharged from the custody of [DOC].”

¶ 10 On March 15, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s

dismissal of his mandamus petition, which the court denied.

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiff claims the trial court erred in dismissing his mandamus

petition in which he requested 259 days of additional sentencing credit. In his mandamus

petition, plaintiff claimed he was entitled to having his projected discharge date changed from

October 13, 2018, to June 4, 2018. Defendants argue this appeal is moot because both dates have

long since passed and plaintiff has failed to argue any exception to the mootness doctrine applies.

According to defendants, plaintiff’s appeal should be dismissed because “it is undisputed that

[plaintiff] completed his entire sentence.”

¶ 14 Appellate jurisdiction requires an actual controversy. Reviewing courts will

generally not hear abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions. In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148,

156, 802 N.E.2d 782, 787 (2003). “A case is moot if the issues involved in the trial court have

ceased to exist because intervening events have made it impossible for the reviewing court to

grant effectual relief to the complaining party.” People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 435, 819

N.E.2d 761, 764 (2004). Thus, a claim for additional sentence credit is moot when a defendant

has completed serving his sentence. Id.

-3- ¶ 15 A reviewing court may examine an otherwise moot issue when “ ‘the magnitude

or immediacy of the interests involved warrant[s] action by the court.’ ” People v. Jackson, 231

Ill. 2d 223, 227-28, 897 N.E.2d 752, 755 (2008) (quoting People ex rel. Black v. Dukes, 96 Ill. 2d

273, 277, 449 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1983)). The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine

requires (1) the existence of a question of public importance, (2) the desirability of an

authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers in the performance of their

duties, and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 156. This

exception is construed narrowly and requires a clear showing of each element before it may be

applied. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d at 436.

¶ 16 Here, there is no question plaintiff completed his term of imprisonment on

January 15, 2016, and completed MSR on October 13, 2018. Thus, it is impossible to provide

plaintiff his requested relief as he has completed serving his entire sentence. As stated, plaintiff

fails to argue any exception to the mootness doctrine applies, and given the law as set forth

above, no public interest is served by addressing the merits of the petition. Because no effectual

relief can be granted, we conclude this appeal is moot.

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

¶ 19 Dismissed.

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