OPINION BY
Judge COHN.
The parties are before the Court on exceptions1 filed by McNeil-PPC, Inc. (McNeil) to the memorandum opinion and order entered on June 28, 2001, by a panel of this Court which upheld the decision of the Board of Finance and Revenue (Board) not to reduce the assessment of McNeil’s sales and use tax liability.
The parties have stipulated to the relevant facts of the case pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1571(f). Cooper v. Commonwealth, 700 A.2d 553 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). McNeil, a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, is a pharmaceutical company that manufactures and markets analgesic drugs such as Tylenol. On November 9, 1994, the Department of Revenue (Department or Commonwealth) advised McNeil that it intended to conduct a sales and use tax2 (tax) audit of McNeñ’s records and [28]*28accounts for purchases McNeil made between October 1, 1991 and December 31, 1994, to determine the amount of tax due for that period.3 McNeil made approximately 780,000 purchases related to its pharmaceutical business during the period in question, and all were included by the auditor in his calculations to determine the amount of tax due. Stipulation of Facts (S/F) no. 8. At the beginning of the audit, the Department’s auditor advised McNeil’s representative that any tax McNeil paid on non-taxable purchases during the audit period would reduce any tax determined by the auditor to be due for the audit period.4
During the audit period, McNeil paid $1,599,975.99 of use tax directly to the Commonwealth for the purpose of stopping the running of interest. S/F no. 9,10. McNeil intended this amount be applied to an anticipated sales and use tax deficiency which McNeil believed would be revealed by the Department’s audit. Id. On June 25, 1996, at the conclusion of the audit, the Department mailed McNeil an assessment notice for $1,933,278.78: it reached this figure by taking the total use tax due for the audit period of $3,533,254.77, less McNeil’s anticipated use tax payment of $1,599,975.99. However, the auditor was not aware of and did not reduce his determination of the amount of tax due for this same period by sales tax that was paid by McNeil to vendors ■ on non-taxable purchases.5 S/F no. 11.
On August 9, 1996, McNeil filed a petition for reassessment with the Department’s Board of Appeals, challenging the entire amount of tax the auditor determined was due for the audit period. The Board of Appeals, also taking into account McNeil’s anticipated use tax payment, reassessed McNeil’s tax liability for the audit period, reducing it to $1,889,799.74.6
On October 6, 1997, McNeil appealed this assessment by filing a petition for review with the Board again contesting the entire use tax assessment determined to be due.7 Subsequently, McNeil submitted evidence to the Board that it had also paid sales tax directly to vendors on non-tax[29]*29able purchases during the audit period.8 Based on this evidence, on November 12, 1997, McNeil amended its appeal to request that such sales tax overpayments also be used to reduce the amount of tax owed for the audit period.9 However, the Board rejected McNeil’s request as untimely citing the former version of the three-year statutory limitation period for refund petitions then in effect.10 In its decision and order dated March 25, 1998, the Board further reduced McNeil’s tax liability to be $965,538.44;11 it reached this figure by taking the tax amount it now determined was due for the audit period, $2,565,514.13, less McNeil’s anticipated use tax payment of $1,599,975.99 only. The Board thus gave no offsetting credit for McNeil’s sales tax claim against the reassessed tax due for the audit period.
Consequently, on April 21, 1998, McNeil filed a petition for review of the Board’s decision with the Commonwealth Court.12 On June 4, 2001, McNeil argued before a panel of the Court that the Board should have allowed a credit for sales tax paid even if the claim was not filed within the required statutory time period. It reasoned that the audit statute13 and the assessment regulation14 both require the Board to determine the proper amount of tax due, which could not be accomplished if any tax paid on non-taxable purchases was ignored.15 The Commonwealth countered [30]*30that the three-year statutory period for filing a request for sales tax credit was mandatory; thus, no credit could be .considered because the claim was not timely filed. In a memorandum opinion, filed on June 28, 2001, this Court entered judgment for the Commonwealth. McNeil filed exceptions to the Court’s opinion, and the case is again before the Court for disposition.
This Court has the broadest discretion when reviewing a decision of the Board because, although brought within our appellate jurisdiction, we review the case de novo. Hilltop Properties Associates Limited Partnership v. Commonwealth, 768 A.2d 1189 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001); G.L. Marks Contracting, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 712 A.2d 816 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), affirmed per curiam, 555 Pa. 559, 725 A.2d 756 (1999).
Our Supreme Court has noted that statutory limitations periods, particularly in tax cases, are absolute conditions to the right to obtain relief and are necessary to avoid great uncertainty in the budgetary planning and fiscal affairs of the Commonwealth. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Board of Finance and Revenue, 368 Pa. 463, 469-70, 84 A.2d 495, 498-99 (1951), cited with approval in Silberman v. Commonwealth, 738 A.2d 508 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999). See also Davis v. Commonwealth, 719 A.2d 1121 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Biro v. Commonwealth, 707 A.2d 1205 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Cooper.
When the audit of McNeil’s sales and use tax records was in process, between October 1991 and December 1994, pertinent sections of* the Tax Code required affirmative action on the part of the taxpayer within a specified time period in order for the taxpayer to receive a refund or credit. Section 252 of the Tax Code authorized a refund as follows:
The department shall, pursuant to the provisions of sections 253 and 254, refund all taxes .:. paid to the Common-1 wealth under the provisions of this article and to which the Commonwealth is not rightfully entitled.
72 P.S. § 7252 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). However, at that time, section 253 of the Tax Code stated, in pertinent part:
[T]he refund or credit of tax, interest or penalty provided for by section 252 shall be made only where
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OPINION BY
Judge COHN.
The parties are before the Court on exceptions1 filed by McNeil-PPC, Inc. (McNeil) to the memorandum opinion and order entered on June 28, 2001, by a panel of this Court which upheld the decision of the Board of Finance and Revenue (Board) not to reduce the assessment of McNeil’s sales and use tax liability.
The parties have stipulated to the relevant facts of the case pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1571(f). Cooper v. Commonwealth, 700 A.2d 553 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). McNeil, a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, is a pharmaceutical company that manufactures and markets analgesic drugs such as Tylenol. On November 9, 1994, the Department of Revenue (Department or Commonwealth) advised McNeil that it intended to conduct a sales and use tax2 (tax) audit of McNeñ’s records and [28]*28accounts for purchases McNeil made between October 1, 1991 and December 31, 1994, to determine the amount of tax due for that period.3 McNeil made approximately 780,000 purchases related to its pharmaceutical business during the period in question, and all were included by the auditor in his calculations to determine the amount of tax due. Stipulation of Facts (S/F) no. 8. At the beginning of the audit, the Department’s auditor advised McNeil’s representative that any tax McNeil paid on non-taxable purchases during the audit period would reduce any tax determined by the auditor to be due for the audit period.4
During the audit period, McNeil paid $1,599,975.99 of use tax directly to the Commonwealth for the purpose of stopping the running of interest. S/F no. 9,10. McNeil intended this amount be applied to an anticipated sales and use tax deficiency which McNeil believed would be revealed by the Department’s audit. Id. On June 25, 1996, at the conclusion of the audit, the Department mailed McNeil an assessment notice for $1,933,278.78: it reached this figure by taking the total use tax due for the audit period of $3,533,254.77, less McNeil’s anticipated use tax payment of $1,599,975.99. However, the auditor was not aware of and did not reduce his determination of the amount of tax due for this same period by sales tax that was paid by McNeil to vendors ■ on non-taxable purchases.5 S/F no. 11.
On August 9, 1996, McNeil filed a petition for reassessment with the Department’s Board of Appeals, challenging the entire amount of tax the auditor determined was due for the audit period. The Board of Appeals, also taking into account McNeil’s anticipated use tax payment, reassessed McNeil’s tax liability for the audit period, reducing it to $1,889,799.74.6
On October 6, 1997, McNeil appealed this assessment by filing a petition for review with the Board again contesting the entire use tax assessment determined to be due.7 Subsequently, McNeil submitted evidence to the Board that it had also paid sales tax directly to vendors on non-tax[29]*29able purchases during the audit period.8 Based on this evidence, on November 12, 1997, McNeil amended its appeal to request that such sales tax overpayments also be used to reduce the amount of tax owed for the audit period.9 However, the Board rejected McNeil’s request as untimely citing the former version of the three-year statutory limitation period for refund petitions then in effect.10 In its decision and order dated March 25, 1998, the Board further reduced McNeil’s tax liability to be $965,538.44;11 it reached this figure by taking the tax amount it now determined was due for the audit period, $2,565,514.13, less McNeil’s anticipated use tax payment of $1,599,975.99 only. The Board thus gave no offsetting credit for McNeil’s sales tax claim against the reassessed tax due for the audit period.
Consequently, on April 21, 1998, McNeil filed a petition for review of the Board’s decision with the Commonwealth Court.12 On June 4, 2001, McNeil argued before a panel of the Court that the Board should have allowed a credit for sales tax paid even if the claim was not filed within the required statutory time period. It reasoned that the audit statute13 and the assessment regulation14 both require the Board to determine the proper amount of tax due, which could not be accomplished if any tax paid on non-taxable purchases was ignored.15 The Commonwealth countered [30]*30that the three-year statutory period for filing a request for sales tax credit was mandatory; thus, no credit could be .considered because the claim was not timely filed. In a memorandum opinion, filed on June 28, 2001, this Court entered judgment for the Commonwealth. McNeil filed exceptions to the Court’s opinion, and the case is again before the Court for disposition.
This Court has the broadest discretion when reviewing a decision of the Board because, although brought within our appellate jurisdiction, we review the case de novo. Hilltop Properties Associates Limited Partnership v. Commonwealth, 768 A.2d 1189 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001); G.L. Marks Contracting, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 712 A.2d 816 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), affirmed per curiam, 555 Pa. 559, 725 A.2d 756 (1999).
Our Supreme Court has noted that statutory limitations periods, particularly in tax cases, are absolute conditions to the right to obtain relief and are necessary to avoid great uncertainty in the budgetary planning and fiscal affairs of the Commonwealth. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Board of Finance and Revenue, 368 Pa. 463, 469-70, 84 A.2d 495, 498-99 (1951), cited with approval in Silberman v. Commonwealth, 738 A.2d 508 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999). See also Davis v. Commonwealth, 719 A.2d 1121 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Biro v. Commonwealth, 707 A.2d 1205 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Cooper.
When the audit of McNeil’s sales and use tax records was in process, between October 1991 and December 1994, pertinent sections of* the Tax Code required affirmative action on the part of the taxpayer within a specified time period in order for the taxpayer to receive a refund or credit. Section 252 of the Tax Code authorized a refund as follows:
The department shall, pursuant to the provisions of sections 253 and 254, refund all taxes .:. paid to the Common-1 wealth under the provisions of this article and to which the Commonwealth is not rightfully entitled.
72 P.S. § 7252 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). However, at that time, section 253 of the Tax Code stated, in pertinent part:
[T]he refund or credit of tax, interest or penalty provided for by section 252 shall be made only where the person who has actually paid the tax files a petition for refund with the department within three years of the actual payment of the tax to the Commonwealth.
72 P.S. § 7253(a) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Thus, for the relevant times in question, the Department did not have statutory authority to grant McNeil a credit for sales tax paid to third party vendors. The only remedy available to obtain a credit for overpayment of sales tax paid during the audit period was for McNeil to file a petition for refund within three years of the actual payment of the tax. Since McNeil made the sales tax overpayments during the audit period, it was required to file said petition within three years of payment of tax. To date, McNeil has not filed such a petition. S/F no. 16. Therefore, McNeil failed to comply with the statutory requirements and time limitations in place at the time in question, and there are no means by which to grant a credit for its sales tax overpayment. “[EJquitable principles cannot vary the statutory requirements and this Court lacks the power to alter the explicit lan[31]*31guage of the statute.” Davis, 719 A.2d at 1122 (emphasis added).16
McNeil should have been sufficiently familiar with statutory requirements to know that it had to file a petition for a refund of its sales tax overpayments within the appropriate time period. It has been the subject of a sales and use tax audit for every year that it has operated within Pennsylvania, S/F no. 3, and was able to successfully obtain a credit for use tax overpayments in this case. S/F nos. 10, 13,17.
In addition, although the outcome appears harsh, McNeil’s sales and use tax liability has actually gone from an initial $3,533,254.77 due and owing, to a credit balance in McNeil’s favor of $34,461.56. S/F nos. 10,19.
Accordingly, McNeil’s exceptions to the Court’s Order of June 28, 2001, are denied.17
Judge LEADBETTER dissents.
ORDER
NOW, June 28, 2002, the exceptions to the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order of June 28, 2001, are denied.