McNeely Ex Rel. McNeely v. Walters

Supreme Court of North Carolina

McNeely Ex Rel. McNeely v. Walters

189 S.E. 114, 211 N.C. 112, 1937 N.C. LEXIS 12

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedJanuary 6, 1937

StatusPublished

Cited by47 cases

This text of 189 S.E. 114 (McNeely Ex Rel. McNeely v. Walters) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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McNeely Ex Rel. McNeely v. Walters, 189 S.E. 114, 211 N.C. 112, 1937 N.C. LEXIS 12 (N.C. 1937).

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Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

Conceding that the note and deed of trust were executed by Grady McNeely without authority, still we think the plaintiff must fail in his suit, if not upon the principle of ratification, then upon the doctrine of estoppel. Sugg v. Credit Corp., 196 N. C., 97, 144 S. E., 554; Lawson v. Bank, 203 N. C., 368, 166 S. E., 177.

Plaintiff was fully aware of all the facts surrounding the transaction in June, 1926, when he accepted from the defendants further indulgence and forbearance. Grady McNeely was then living and the note was not barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff made no contention at that time that the note and deed of trust were not genuine. By remaining silent when it was his duty to speak, plaintiff has disadvantaged the defendants. He ought not to be heard now in repudiation of his former conduct. Rand v. Gillette, 199 N. C., 462, 154 S. E., 746; Lewis v. Nunn, 180 N. C., 159, 104 S. E., 470.

“If certain acts have been performed or contracts made on behalf of another without his authority, he has, when he obtains knowledge thereof, an election either to accept or repudiate such acts or contracts. If he accept them, his acceptance is a ratification of the previously unauthorized acts or contracts, and makes them as binding upon him from the time they were performed as if they had been authorized in the first place.” Gallup v. Liberty County, 57 Tex. Civ. App., 175, 122 S. W., 291.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on an application of the golden rule to the everyday affairs of men. It requires that one should do unto others as, in equity and good conscience, he would have them do unto him, if their positions were reversed. Boddie v. Bond, 154 N. C., 359, 70 S. E., 824; 10 R. C. L., 688, et seq. Its compulsion is one of fair play.

In this view of the record, the judgment of nonsuit would seem to be correct.

Affirmed.

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Stacy, C. J.

Conceding that the note and deed of trust were executed by Grady McNeely without authority, still we think the plaintiff must fail in his suit, if not upon the principle of ratification, then upon the doctrine of estoppel. Sugg v. Credit Corp., 196 N. C., 97, 144 S. E., 554; Lawson v. Bank, 203 N. C., 368, 166 S. E., 177.

Plaintiff was fully aware of all the facts surrounding the transaction in June, 1926, when he accepted from the defendants further indulgence and forbearance. Grady McNeely was then living and the note was not barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff made no contention at that time that the note and deed of trust were not genuine. By remaining silent when it was his duty to speak, plaintiff has disadvantaged the defendants. He ought not to be heard now in repudiation of his former conduct. Rand v. Gillette, 199 N. C., 462, 154 S. E., 746; Lewis v. Nunn, 180 N. C., 159, 104 S. E., 470.

“If certain acts have been performed or contracts made on behalf of another without his authority, he has, when he obtains knowledge thereof, an election either to accept or repudiate such acts or contracts. If he accept them, his acceptance is a ratification of the previously unauthorized acts or contracts, and makes them as binding upon him from the time they were performed as if they had been authorized in the first place.” Gallup v. Liberty County, 57 Tex. Civ. App., 175, 122 S. W., 291.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on an application of the golden rule to the everyday affairs of men. It requires that one should do unto others as, in equity and good conscience, he would have them do unto him, if their positions were reversed. Boddie v. Bond, 154 N. C., 359, 70 S. E., 824; 10 R. C. L., 688, et seq. Its compulsion is one of fair play.

In this view of the record, the judgment of nonsuit would seem to be correct.

Affirmed.

Walker Manufacturing Company, a Division of Tenneco, Inc. v. Dickerson, Inc., Seaboard Surety Company, a Corporation v. Piedmont Engineering & Architects, Inc., Also D/B/A Piedmont Engineers& Architects, Edward's Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., a Corp., Also D/B/A Edward's Sheet Metal Co., the Celotex Corp., Third-Party

560 F.2d 1184 (Third Circuit, 1977)

Walker Manufacturing Co. v. Dickerson, Inc.

560 F.2d 1184 (Fourth Circuit, 1977)

Smith v. William Muirhead Construction Co.

218 S.E.2d 717 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1975)

Gaston-Lincoln Transit, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co.

206 S.E.2d 155 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1974)

Willis v. J. M. Davis Industries, Inc.

186 S.E.2d 913 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1972)

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189 S.E. 114, 211 N.C. 112, 1937 N.C. LEXIS 12, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcneely-ex-rel-mcneely-v-walters-nc-1937.

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