McNeal v. Gib Lewis Prison Unit

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 14, 2023
Docket4:23-cv-02950
StatusUnknown

This text of McNeal v. Gib Lewis Prison Unit (McNeal v. Gib Lewis Prison Unit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McNeal v. Gib Lewis Prison Unit, (S.D. Tex. 2023).

Opinion

Southern District of Texas . ENTERED August 15, 2023 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS . HOUSTON DIVISION CEDRIC DEWAYNE McNEAL, (TDCJ #02317254) § § Plaintiff, § . § □□ VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-23-2950 § GIB LEWIS PRISON UNIT, eg al., § Defendants.

_ MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Cedric McNeal, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice— Correctional Institutions Division (“TDCJ”), has filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his prison grievances are being improperly handled by prison officials at the Gib Lewis Unit. (Dkt. 1). McNeal has neither paid the applicable filing fee nor filed a motion seeking to proceed in forma pauperis. Because McNeal is a prisoner seeking relief from the government, the Court is -

required to screen his complaint as soon as feasible after docketing. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (providing for screening of suits by prisoners under § 1983). Based on the Court’s screening, this action will be dismissed for the reasons explained below. First, this action was filed in the incorrect district. The applicable federal □ 1/6 □

venue statute provides that a civil action may be brought only in one of the following: (1) “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;” (2) “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . or (3) “if there is no district where the action may otherwise be brought ..., any judicial

district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with

respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). McNeal filed this action in the Southern District. of Texas. However, McNeal is currently incarcerated in the Gib Lewis Unit of TDCJ, and he alleges that this □ harm occurred there. .(Dkt. 1). He also alleges that he suffered similar harm when he was at.-TDCJ’s Bill.Clements Unit. (/d. at 5). However, neither of these TDCJ units are located within the Southern District of Texas. The Gib Lewis Unit is in □

Tyler County, Texas, which is located within the Eastern District of Texas, Lufkin Division. See 28 U.S.C. § 124(c)(6). The Bill Clements Unit is in Potter County, □ Texas, which is located within the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division. See 28 U.S.C. § 124(a)(5). It appears from McNeal’s complaint that none of the acts giving rise to the alleged civil rights violations occurred in the Southern District of Texas, nor are the TDCJ Units or their employees who would be defendants located within this District. Therefore, the Court concludes that McNeal’s complaint was not properly filed in this district and so is subject to dismissal. See Mayfield v. 2/6

Klevenhagen, 941 F.2d 346, 348 (Sth Cir. 1991). Second, while a district court has the authority to transfer a case to another district in which the action might have been brought, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406, this Court in its discretion determines that the transfer of McNeal’s complaint to another judicial district would not be in the interest of justice because he is barred from proceeding with this action in forma pauperis by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). □ As noted above, McNeal has not paid the filing fee applicable to civil rights complaints. And his action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which was enacted, in part, to prevent prisoners from abusing the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. See Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 535 (2015) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)). Under the “three- strikes rule” established in the PLRA, a prisoner may not proceed in forma pauperis in a civil action if, while incarcerated, three or more of his civil actions or appeals have been dismissed.as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. 1721, 1723 (2020) (noting that the three-strikes rule was enacted to “help staunch.a ‘flood of nonmeritorious’ prisoner litigation”) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 203). Court records reflect that, while incarcerated, McNeal has filed more than three actions that have been dismissed by the federal courts as frivolous or for failure 3/6

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See McNeal v. Tex. Bd. of Probation & Paroles, et al., Civil No. A-23-cv-502-DIl (W.D. Tex. June 29, 2023); McNeal v. State of Tex., et al., Civil No. A-23-cv-084-LY (W.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2023); McNeal v. Schaap, et al, Civil No. 2:22-cv-249 (N D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2023); McNeal v. Schaap, et al., Civil No. 2:23-cv-29 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2023); McNeal

v. Riley, et al., Civil No. 2:22-cv-85 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2023); see also McNealv. Director, Civil No. 4:23-0v-2298 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2023) (dismissing action as barred under § 1915(g)); McNeal v. S. Perez et al., Civil No. 4:23-cv-2608 (S.D. Tex. July 25, 2023) (same); McNeal v. S. Perez, et al., Civil No. 4:23-cv-2350 (S.D. -

Tex. July 26, 2023) (same). As a result, McNeal has incurred three strikes □□□

purposes of the PLRA’s three-strikes rule, and he is barred from. proceeding with this civil action in forma pauperis unless the pleadings nor that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g); Baitos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884 (5th Cir, 1998) (per curiam).

But McNeal’s complaint contains no allegations that he is in imminent danger serious physical injury, nor would the nature of his claims support such allegations. While McNeal makes ambiguous references to being targeted by the “Illuminati Satanic Secret Society Organization,” these allegations are conclusory at □

best and have no connection to the claims he raises. See Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Texas, 73 F.4th 315, 321 (Sth Cir. 2023) (requiring a prisoner to show a connection 4/ 6

or nexus between the alleged imminent danger and the allegations and claims in the underlying action to be entitled to relief under § 1915(g)’s imminent danger exception); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (permitting a district court to reject allegations of imminent danger that are “conclusory or ridiculous” (quoting Ciarpaglini v. Saini,

Related

Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Chavis v. Chappius
618 F.3d 162 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Coleman v. Tollefson
575 U.S. 532 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Prescott v. UTMB
73 F.4th 315 (Fifth Circuit, 2023)

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McNeal v. Gib Lewis Prison Unit, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcneal-v-gib-lewis-prison-unit-txsd-2023.