McMullen v. Green

149 S.W. 762, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 730
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 22, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 149 S.W. 762 (McMullen v. Green) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McMullen v. Green, 149 S.W. 762, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 730 (Tex. Ct. App. 1912).

Opinion

GRAHAM, C. J.

This suit originated in the county court of Scurry county, by Davis Bros., a mercantile firm, composed of T. C. Davis, W. W. Davis, and J. G. Davis, suing Sam Green on an open and verified account for the sum of $220.55, for goods sold and delivered during the year 1910; the suit having been filed October 22, 1910. On October 26, 1910, plaintiffs caused to be issued a writ of attachment which was levied upon five bales of cotton as the property of the defendant Green. Appellant, R. L. McMullen, filed in said cause his plea of intervention, in which he sued Sam Green for the sum of $517.77, alleged to be due intervener by Sam Green for advances made and supplies furnished to Green to enable him to make and harvest a crop during the year 1910, allegation being made that intervener, as landlord, had made said advances and furnished said supplies to said Sam Green as his tenant, allegation being made that intervener as landlord owned one-fourth of the cotton levied upon as his rents and held as landlord’s lien on the remaining three-fourths to secure the payment of said $517.77; intervener’s pleadings also show that as the cotton levied upon had been ginned and baled under a previous agreement between intervener and Green, Green had delivered the cotton yard receipts therefor to intervener, under an agreement that intervener would sell and dispose of the cotton and control the same, taking his rents out of the proceeds and applying Green’s portion thereof to the payment of intervener’s debt, paying the remainder, if any, over to Green. Green answered in person, admitting the justness of the debt sued on by the plaintiff in the sum sued for, and also admitting the justness of the debt sued on by intervener in the sum sued for, and also admitting the relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and intervener'and that the cotton levied upon was raised upon the rented premises and was subject to the landlord’s lien, and further that the cotton levied upon at the time of the levy, and for some time prior thereto, was in the control and possession of intervener to secure the payment of intervener’s debt. By supplemental petition and trial amendment, the plaintiff below alleged that intervener held a lien against other cotton belonging to the defendant Green, securing the payment of the debt sued on by intervener, amply sufficient to satisfy intervener’s indebtedness, and prayed that intervener be required to exhaust that collateral before being permitted to reap the benefit of his landlord’s lien on the cotton levied upon, if in fact such lien existed. A trial before a jury in the court below resulted in a judgment for plaintiffs for their debt in the sum of $220.-55, with interest and costs and a foreclosure of their attachment lien on the five bales of cotton levied upon under the writ of at *764 tachment as against the defendant and the intervener, also in a judgment for intervener and against the defendant for the sum of $517.77, less a credit of $140.25; the latter sum apparently being the proceeds of three bales of cotton raised by the defendant Green on intervener’s premises during the year 1910, and which had not been applied on the indebtedness of intervener.

A motion for a new trial by intervener having been overruled by the trial court, the cause is before us on an appeal prosecuted by intervener alone and has been submitted in this court on various assignments of error, none of which we deem necessary to discuss separately as a result of the conclusion we have reached as to the disposition which should be made of this appeal, but will state that the assignments are sufficient to raise the questions discussed in this opinion. Davis Bros, have filed in this court their motion to strike out and disregard the statement of facts, based on the proposition that the statement of facts should have been copied into the transcript and not brought up separately as has been done in this case.

[1] The record .shows that the statement of facts was filed in the trial court in this cause on May 16, 1911, which was before the act of 1911 (Laws 1911, c. 119) became operative, while the transcript on which the cause is submitted in this court shows to have been made out by the clerk of the trial court on July 3, 1911, after the act of March 31, 1911, had become operative. We are rather of the opinion that as the transcript itself was made out after the act of 1911 became operative, that act would control the manner in which the statement of facts and transcript should come into this court, and if we are correct in this view, we think section 12 of the act approved March 31, 1911, most clearly requires that the statement of facts even in appeals from a county court in civil cases must not be copied in the transcript, but that the original as filed in the court below should be brought to this court.

[2] If, however, the act of 1909, p. 375, were to control, still we think the statement of facts sought to be stricken out has been properly brought into this court, as the original statement of facts filed in the trial court is the one presented to us, and in this latter conclusion we think we are fully sustained by the cases of St. L., S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Wall, 102 Tex. 404, 118 S. W. 131, Vickrey v. Burks, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 421, 121 S. W. 177, and Tyer v. Timpson Handle Co., 135 S. W. 250. For the reasons given, the motion to strike out the statement of facts will be overruled.

On the trial below the following is the entire testimony introduced, as shown by the statement of facts on file in this court:

“The plaintiffs offered in evidence the account of Davis Bros, against Sam Green for the sum of $220.55, duly itemized and sworn to, and same was received in evidence without objection.
“Plaintiffs rested.
“R. L. McMullen, intervener, testified in his-own behalf as follows, on direct examination: ‘My name is R. L. McMullen, I reside-in Snyder, Scurry county, Tex., and own a farm some 12 miles northeast of Snyder in Scurry county, Tex. Sam Green, the defendant in this cause, made a crop on my place during the year 1910 under a contract entered into between Sam Green and myself, wherein Sam Green was to have three-fourths of all cotton and two-thirds of all grain and roughness raised on said farm, and I was to have one-fourth of all cotton and cotton seed, one-third of all grain and roughness raised on said farm, for my rent; and I agreed to furnish Sam Green supplies sufficient to enable him to make and harvest the crop for 1.910 on my place. I furnished Mr. Green for the purpose of enabling him to make and harvest his crop supplies to the-amount of $517.77, which supplies and advancements were necessary and used by him, for the purpose of making and harvesting the 1910 crop. (The items and checks - for same were introduced, but are not here-given for the reason the amount is accepted as correct by Sam Green furnished.) I have-bills and checks in evidence herein, and that Sam Green now owes me for said amounts-of money and for said articles mentioned.

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Bluebook (online)
149 S.W. 762, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 730, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcmullen-v-green-texapp-1912.