McManus v. Hilliard

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedOctober 2, 2020
DocketOXFre-18-001
StatusUnpublished

This text of McManus v. Hilliard (McManus v. Hilliard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McManus v. Hilliard, (Me. Super. Ct. 2020).

Opinion

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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT OXFORD, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. RE 18-001

LIBBY MCMANUS

Plaintiff

V.

JAMES HILLIARD, et al.

Defendants

Before the court are three narrow issues remaining after protracted litigation

between the parties. Plaintiff, Libby McManus f/k/a Libby Ann McManus Morton

owns a parcel of real property in the Town of Porter, County of Oxford and recorded in

the Oxford County Western District Registry of Deeds at Book 296, Page 542 (the

Deed). Defendant James Hilliard owns abutting property by virtue of a deed to him,

recorded in the Oxford County Western District Registry of Deeds at Book 595, Page

179. The parties testified that the location of the right of way is depicted in a July 16,

2013 Boundary Survey Sketch Map by Robert A. Yarumian II.

On November 20, 2018, the court (Clifford, J.) decided Plaintiffs motion for

summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs use of the right of way connecting her

property to Route 25 in Porter. On January 7, 2020, the court (Horton, J.) granted the

joint motion of the parties dismissing all counts of the Complaint and Counterclaim with

prejudice except to the extent the November 20, 2018 decision left open issues with

respect to the driveway easement raised in Count I of the Plaintiffs Complaint.

1 Specifically, the parties stipulated both in the joint motion and subsequent filings that

the three remaining issues are:

1. The width of the driveway easement's travelled way.

2. The width of the driveway's useable sideline, and

3. The extent of any water control systems that defendants may install in the

driveway.

In the joint motion, the parties requested that the court decide the remaining

issues. The court scheduled a testimonial hearing on September '.30, 2020.

FACTS

At the hearing, the court heard the following evidence and finds the following

facts. In 1973, Plaintiff built a home on a large parcel owned by her parents known as

Lot 5. The home was accessed by a gravel driveway leading from Route 25 to the home.

In 1988, Plaintiff's parents carved a new lot out of Lot 5 that included Plaintiff's home

known as Lot 5.1. They conveyed Lot 5.1 to Plaintiff. In addition, the Deedconveyed an

easement across the existing drive benefitting the Plaintiff and Lot 5.1 and burdening

Lot 5.

The Deed granted Plaintiff "a right of way from Route #25 running

North;westerly over roadway as now in existence to lot herein conveyed, to be used in

common with Grantors or other persons for all purposes of ingress and egress." The

gravelled portion of the roadway in existence in 1988 is the same as the current

gravelled portion. The parties stipulate that it is 10 feet wide.

Plaintiff has resided or frequently came to the premises since the driveway was

built in 1973. Cars passed each other on the driveway from time to time. Plaintiff or

her contractors plowed the road in the winter and pushed the snow to both sides

without restriction. She performed occasional road maintenance.

2 In 2012, Defendant Hilliard purchased the balance of Lot 5, apparently as a result

of foreclosure. He moved to the property 2014. Defendant Lord joined him in 2015.

Defendants worked to develop the property for a variety of agricultural uses. They

raise fowl and farm animals, built a greenhouse and have engaged in similar activities

on the land.

Disputes arose between the parties over each parties' rights in the road. Many of

them have since been resolved. Many of the disputes arose from the lack of detail

included in the description of the easement in the deed and each parties'

misunderstanding with respect to the scope of rights of a dominant and a servient estate

when there is a right of way.

Currently, on the face of the earth is a gravel road that exhibits rutting from wear

and tear. There is storm water runoff that comes down the road from the Plaintiff's

property and, uninterrupted, can reach the Defendants' greenhouse. The road needs

maintenance. Both parties cite this ongoing dispute as a reason there has been no

maintenance. Proper grading, a crown on the road to divert water to the side, and

potential ditching would resolve water problems on this, as on any, road. All roads

require periodic restoration of the proper conditions.'

To divert surface water that was reaching the greenhouse Defendants built a

berm which has varied in size and currently includes a narrow trench 2 1 / 4 inches deep

in one location. The trench is a limited inconvenience to vehicles as demonstrated by

when vehicles go over the berm in the video exhibits. The greenhouse was constructed

in 2016.

1 Other than the berm and normal use, the court is unpersuaded that the Defendants have contributed to the road's disrepair.

3 Over time the Defendants have erected obstacles, including boulders and posts

that came within 3 feet of the gravelled road. Those boulders and obstacles have since

been removed. The Defendants have also constructed animal pens of wire fences along

the road in some locations, sometimes on both sides of the road. There are two large

poles near the Plaintiffs' property on each side of the road. At no point do the fences or

poles come within 16 feet of each other.

The Plaintiff testified that the fences get in the way of plowing snow, but did not

provide any specifics on how much room is needed to plow snow. The Plaintiff also

testified the fences interfered with the ability for· vehicles to pass each other on the road

way. Based on the testimony from various witnesses, the court concludes those

occasions when vehicles need to pass each other are rare.

ANALYSIS

"Generally, the holder of an easement may only exercise the rights granted in a

reasonable maru1er, and cannot do more. Such rights are those "incidental or necessary

to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement," and "an easement in general

terms is limited to a use ... as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the

use contemplated." Mill Pond Condo. Ass'n v. Manalio, 2006 ME 135, 'fI 6. The servient

estate cannot interfere with the dominant estate holder's "effective use" of the easement.

Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222, 227 (Me. 1979). Any right-of-way, to truly provide a useful

right-of-way for vehicles, must either provide a very wide traveled way or, if the

traveled way is narrow, additional space for construction and maintenance of drainage

ditches and culverts and, in Maine, sufficient area beside the way to pile snow plowed

from the way. Jipson v. Raubeson, 1996 Me. Super. LEXIS 144, *11.

Property subject to an easement remains within the ownership and control of the

owner of the servient estate. "That ownership and control is subject only to the

4 restriction that the owner of the servient estate not materially impair or unreasonably

interfere with the use of the right-of-way that is allowed by the easement. The owner of

the servient estate has the right to use its land in a manner not inconsistent with the

dominant estate holder's right. Flaherty v. Muther, 2013 ME 39,

quotations omitted).

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Related

MILL POND CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION v. Manalio
2006 ME 135 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2006)
Badger v. Hill
404 A.2d 222 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1979)
Robert Flaherty v. Helen Muther
2013 ME 39 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2013)

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