McManus v. Hilliard

Superior Court of Maine·Decided October 2, 2020·No. OXFre-18-001·Unpublished

Opinion

r

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT OXFORD, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. RE 18-001

LIBBY MCMANUS Plaintiff

V.

JAMES HILLIARD, et al. Defendants

Before the court are three narrow issues remaining after protracted litigation between the parties. Plaintiff, Libby McManus f/k/a Libby Ann McManus Morton owns a parcel of real property in the Town of Porter, County of Oxford and recorded in the Oxford County Western District Registry of Deeds at Book 296, Page 542 (the Deed). Defendant James Hilliard owns abutting property by virtue of a deed to him, recorded in the Oxford County Western District Registry of Deeds at Book 595, Page 179. The parties testified that the location of the right of way is depicted in a July 16, 2013 Boundary Survey Sketch Map by Robert A. Yarumian II.

On November 20, 2018, the court (Clifford, J.) decided Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs use of the right of way connecting her property to Route 25 in Porter. On January 7, 2020, the court (Horton, J.) granted the joint motion of the parties dismissing all counts of the Complaint and Counterclaim with prejudice except to the extent the November 20, 2018 decision left open issues with respect to the driveway easement raised in Count I of the Plaintiffs Complaint.

Specifically, the parties stipulated both in the joint motion and subsequent filings that the three remaining issues are:

1. The width of the driveway easement's travelled way.

2. The width of the driveway's useable sideline, and 3. The extent of any water control systems that defendants may install in the driveway.

In the joint motion, the parties requested that the court decide the remaining issues. The court scheduled a testimonial hearing on September '.30, 2020.

FACTS

At the hearing, the court heard the following evidence and finds the following facts. In 1973, Plaintiff built a home on a large parcel owned by her parents known as Lot 5. The home was accessed by a gravel driveway leading from Route 25 to the home. In 1988, Plaintiff's parents carved a new lot out of Lot 5 that included Plaintiff's home known as Lot 5.1. They conveyed Lot 5.1 to Plaintiff. In addition, the Deedconveyed an easement across the existing drive benefitting the Plaintiff and Lot 5.1 and burdening Lot 5.

The Deed granted Plaintiff "a right of way from Route #25 running North;westerly over roadway as now in existence to lot herein conveyed, to be used in common with Grantors or other persons for all purposes of ingress and egress." The gravelled portion of the roadway in existence in 1988 is the same as the current gravelled portion. The parties stipulate that it is 10 feet wide.

Plaintiff has resided or frequently came to the premises since the driveway was built in 1973. Cars passed each other on the driveway from time to time. Plaintiff or her contractors plowed the road in the winter and pushed the snow to both sides without restriction. She performed occasional road maintenance.

In 2012, Defendant Hilliard purchased the balance of Lot 5, apparently as a result of foreclosure. He moved to the property 2014. Defendant Lord joined him in 2015. Defendants worked to develop the property for a variety of agricultural uses. They raise fowl and farm animals, built a greenhouse and have engaged in similar activities on the land.

Disputes arose between the parties over each parties' rights in the road. Many of them have since been resolved. Many of the disputes arose from the lack of detail included in the description of the easement in the deed and each parties' misunderstanding with respect to the scope of rights of a dominant and a servient estate when there is a right of way.

Currently, on the face of the earth is a gravel road that exhibits rutting from wear and tear. There is storm water runoff that comes down the road from the Plaintiff's property and, uninterrupted, can reach the Defendants' greenhouse. The road needs maintenance. Both parties cite this ongoing dispute as a reason there has been no maintenance. Proper grading, a crown on the road to divert water to the side, and potential ditching would resolve water problems on this, as on any, road. All roads require periodic restoration of the proper conditions.'

To divert surface water that was reaching the greenhouse Defendants built a berm which has varied in size and currently includes a narrow trench 2 1 / 4 inches deep in one location. The trench is a limited inconvenience to vehicles as demonstrated by when vehicles go over the berm in the video exhibits. The greenhouse was constructed in 2016.

1 Other than the berm and normal use, the court is unpersuaded that the Defendants have contributed to the road's disrepair.

Over time the Defendants have erected obstacles, including boulders and posts that came within 3 feet of the gravelled road. Those boulders and obstacles have since been removed. The Defendants have also constructed animal pens of wire fences along the road in some locations, sometimes on both sides of the road. There are two large poles near the Plaintiffs' property on each side of the road. At no point do the fences or poles come within 16 feet of each other.

The Plaintiff testified that the fences get in the way of plowing snow, but did not provide any specifics on how much room is needed to plow snow. The Plaintiff also testified the fences interfered with the ability for· vehicles to pass each other on the road way. Based on the testimony from various witnesses, the court concludes those occasions when vehicles need to pass each other are rare.

ANALYSIS

"Generally, the holder of an easement may only exercise the rights granted in a reasonable maru1er, and cannot do more. Such rights are those "incidental or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement," and "an easement in general terms is limited to a use ... as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible for the use contemplated." Mill Pond Condo. Ass'n v. Manalio, 2006 ME 135, 'fI 6. The servient estate cannot interfere with the dominant estate holder's "effective use" of the easement. Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222, 227 (Me. 1979). Any right-of-way, to truly provide a useful right-of-way for vehicles, must either provide a very wide traveled way or, if the traveled way is narrow, additional space for construction and maintenance of drainage ditches and culverts and, in Maine, sufficient area beside the way to pile snow plowed from the way. Jipson v. Raubeson, 1996 Me. Super. LEXIS 144, *11.

Property subject to an easement remains within the ownership and control of the owner of the servient estate. "That ownership and control is subject only to the

restriction that the owner of the servient estate not materially impair or unreasonably interfere with the use of the right-of-way that is allowed by the easement. The owner of the servient estate has the right to use its land in a manner not inconsistent with the dominant estate holder's right. Flaherty v. Muther, 2013 ME 39, <i[ 21 (citations and quotations omitted).

As described below, the Plaintiff prevails, in part, on Count I and the court gr~nts the Plain bf£' s request for a permanent injunction, in part. Because the court is deciding the case with the future holders of the property in mind as well as the parties, the court refers to the "easement owner" to reference the Plaintiffs and their heirs and assigns and the and the "servient owner" to refer to the Defendant Hilliard and his heirs and assigns.

When determining the issues here, we start with the language of the easement.

The easement language tells us that the right of way now is the same as what was in existence when the property was transferred in 1988. The easement owner owns the right of way is held in common with the servient owner. We know the rights include "all purposes·of ingress and egress," which suggests it is interpreted broadly to allow access to be fully maintained.

1. Width of the Easement.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

McManus v. Hilliard, (Me. Super. Ct. 2020).

McManus v. Hilliard (McManus v. Hilliard) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

MILL POND CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION v. Manalio
2006 ME 135 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2006)
Badger v. Hill
404 A.2d 222 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1979)
Robert Flaherty v. Helen Muther
2013 ME 39 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2013)