McLeod v. Whitney Stores, Inc.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

McLeod v. Whitney Stores, Inc.

157 S.E.2d 254, 250 S.C. 273, 1967 S.C. LEXIS 189

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedOctober 11, 1967

Docket18713

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 157 S.E.2d 254 (McLeod v. Whitney Stores, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McLeod v. Whitney Stores, Inc., 157 S.E.2d 254, 250 S.C. 273, 1967 S.C. LEXIS 189 (S.C. 1967).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an action brought by Edward A. McLeod, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Florence County, to, enjoin the *275 defendants from violating Sections 64-2 to -2.2, Code of 1962, (Cum. Supp.), by carrying on their ordinary business of selling goods, wares and merchandise on Sunday. Section 64-2.4, id., which is invoked by the complaint, authorizes .any State, county or municipal law enforcement officer to apply for such an injunction. The defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground of defect of parties “in that Section 10-1802, S. C. Code of Laws, 1962, does not permit a Sheriff to maintain an action in his own name or in his official capacity to abate a public nuisance.” The circuit court overruled the demurrer, and the defendants have appealed.

Section 10-1802, Co,de of 1962, is part of an act of 1918, 30 Stat. 814, relating to houses of assignation and prostitution. It is wholly inapplicable to the conduct against which the Sheriff seeks an injunction under Section 64-2.4, supra. It is, therefore, without legal significance that Section 10-1802 does not permit the Shériff to maintain this action. The demurrer on this ground is without merit and was properly overruled.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

This is an action brought by Edward A. McLeod, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Florence County, to, enjoin the *275 defendants from violating Sections 64-2 to -2.2, Code of 1962, (Cum. Supp.), by carrying on their ordinary business of selling goods, wares and merchandise on Sunday. Section 64-2.4, id., which is invoked by the complaint, authorizes .any State, county or municipal law enforcement officer to apply for such an injunction. The defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground of defect of parties “in that Section 10-1802, S. C. Code of Laws, 1962, does not permit a Sheriff to maintain an action in his own name or in his official capacity to abate a public nuisance.” The circuit court overruled the demurrer, and the defendants have appealed.

Section 10-1802, Co,de of 1962, is part of an act of 1918, 30 Stat. 814, relating to houses of assignation and prostitution. It is wholly inapplicable to the conduct against which the Sheriff seeks an injunction under Section 64-2.4, supra. It is, therefore, without legal significance that Section 10-1802 does not permit the Shériff to maintain this action. The demurrer on this ground is without merit and was properly overruled.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

157 S.E.2d 254, 250 S.C. 273, 1967 S.C. LEXIS 189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcleod-v-whitney-stores-inc-sc-1967.

Opinion

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