McLeod v. Mershon

19 Fla. Supp. 34
CourtCircuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Miami-Dade County
DecidedDecember 1, 1961
DocketNo. 61 C 6131
StatusPublished

This text of 19 Fla. Supp. 34 (McLeod v. Mershon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Miami-Dade County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McLeod v. Mershon, 19 Fla. Supp. 34 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1961).

Opinion

PHILLIP GOLDMAN, Circuit Judge.

This cause came on to be heard upon the defendant’s motion for decree on bill and answer, served and filed herein October 11, 1961, the plaintiffs’ motion for extension of time for taking testimony and motion to strike defendant’s motion for decree on bill and answer, served and filed herein October 30, 1961.

The court having heard argument, examined the record and briefs submitted on request, and being fully advised in the premises, finds — that this cause has not been set for trial by the court; that the court has not entered an order fixing the time within which the testimony of the parties shall be taken; that the time for taking testimony has expired; and that good cause (as delineated in the cases hereinafter cited) was not timely shown for extending the time for taking testimony.

The court further finds that the plaintiffs have not taken any testimony in this cause, and therefore necessarily have failed to sustain the material allegations of their complaint which were denied by the answer.

Hence, on the authority of City of Miami v. Miami Transit Company (Fla. App. 3d), 96 So. 2d 799; Nystrom v. Nystrom (Fla. App. 2d), 105 So. 2d 605; Needle v. A. F. Kissinger & Associates, Inc. (Fla. App. 2d), 118 So. 2d 35; Muller v. Maxcy, Fla., 74 So. 2d 879; E. B. Elliott Co. v. Elliott, 137 Fla. 456, 188 So. 89; and Axtell v. Lyons (Fla. App. 1st), 105 So. 2d 610, 611, it is ordered and decreed—

That the plaintiffs’ motion for extension of time for taking testimony and motion to strike defendant’s motion for decree on bill and answer, be and each of them are hereby denied.

That the defendant’s motion for decree on bill and answer be and the same is hereby granted; that the defendant go hence without day, and that the complaint herein be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

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Related

City of Miami v. Miami Transit Company
96 So. 2d 799 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1957)
Muller v. Maxcy
74 So. 2d 879 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1954)
Nystrom v. Nystrom
105 So. 2d 605 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1958)
E. B. Elliott Co. v. Elliott
188 So. 89 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1939)
Axtell v. Lyons
105 So. 2d 610 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1958)
Needle v. A. F. Kisinger & Associates, Inc.
118 So. 2d 35 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1960)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
19 Fla. Supp. 34, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcleod-v-mershon-flacirct11mia-1961.