NO. 4-96-0380
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
McLEAN COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD and ) No. 93MR97
JAMES D. ELDER, )
Defendants-Appellees. ) Honorable
) Ronald C. Dozier,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of
the court:
In 1991, the supervisor of assessments of McLean County
(Supervisor) reclassified property owned by defendant James D.
Elder from farm to residential based upon its use. The property
in question (hereafter referred to as the parcel) is approximate-
ly 16 acres in size. In 1992, the McLean County Board of Review
(Board) affirmed the change in classification. Elder appealed
this decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB), which
concluded in July 1993 that the Board's decision was incorrect
and that the parcel should be classified farmland for property
tax purposes.
The Board sought administrative review of the PTAB's
decision, and in January 1996, the circuit court affirmed. The
Board appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. BACKGROUND
When Elder purchased the parcel in May 1986, it was
being used as pastureland for cattle. In June 1986, he received
occupancy and construction permits changing the parcel's designa-
tion from a "vacant" area to a "family recreation" area in order
to build a shelter for farm equipment, which also contained
toilet and shower facilities. In January 1987, he received
another occupancy permit for a building "for the storage of
machinery and equipment necessary to maintain a premises, bath
and shower." The record is not clear that Elder was in fact
required to apply for these permits for the construction on the
parcel, which is located in rural McLean County.
Elder built a rustic pavilion-like building containing
a picnic table, a charcoal grill, a yard chair, sanitation
facilities, and a shower, as well as a small tool storage area.
In 1991, the Supervisor changed the parcel's classification from
farm to residential "because of use." As a result, the parcel,
which previously had a total assessed value of $1,998, now had a
total assessed value of $10,088.
Elder appealed the Supervisor's classification to the
Board, which agreed with the Supervisor's conclusion that the
parcel should be taxed as residential real estate. The Board
held that because the parcel was no longer used as pasture, it no
longer fell within the definition of "farm," as defined in
section 1-60 of the Property Tax Code (Code), which, in pertinent
part, reads as follows:
"Farm. When used in connection with
valuing land and buildings for an agricultur-
al use, any property used solely for the
growing and harvesting of crops; for the
feeding, breeding and management of live-
stock; for dairying or for any other agricul-
tural or horticultural use or combination
thereof; including, but not limited to, hay,
grain, fruit, truck or vegetable crops,
floriculture, mushroom growing, plant or tree
nurseries, orchards, forestry, sod farming
and greenhouses; the keeping, raising and
feeding of livestock or poultry, including
dairying, poultry, swine, sheep, beef cattle,
ponies or horses, fur farming, bees, fish and
wildlife farming. The dwellings and parcels
of property on which farm dwellings are imme-
diately situated shall be assessed as a part
of the farm. Improvements, other than farm
dwellings, shall be assessed as a part of the
farm and in addition to the farm dwellings
when such buildings contribute in whole or in
part to the operation of the [farm]. For
purposes of this Code, `farm' does not in-
clude property which is primarily used for
residential purposes even though some farm
products may be grown or farm animals bred or
fed on the property incidental to its primary
use." 35 ILCS 200/1-60 (West 1994).
After Elder appealed the Board's decision to the PTAB,
a hearing officer for the PTAB conducted a hearing in June 1993.
Elder testified, as did his brother, Russ Elder, who also owned
an interest in the parcel. The Supervisor, three members of the
Board, and the Board's attorney appeared at the hearing, and some
of them testified. The hearing was lengthy, and some of the
pertinent testimony is described below.
The parcel consists primarily of clay and rock, which
is not suitable for row crops. When Elder and his brother pur-
chased the property, they were concerned with conservation and
the wildlife habitat in McLean County, in part because of woods
being cut down. At Elder's request, the Illinois Department of
Conservation (IDOC) developed a wildlife habitat development
plan, which it then implemented by plowing the ground and plant-
ing seed that had been donated by Pheasants Forever. In 1993,
the parcel was enrolled in a United States Forestry Department's
program which sought to develop a management plan through "forest
recreation enhancement" and "forest improvement for aesthetics."
The building erected on the parcel has gravel floors
and is open on three sides, with a closed storage area in the
back, which contain a John Deere 400 tractor with a belly mower,
a welder, axes, shovels, rakes, and similar items. The building
has gravel floors. When Elder and his brother go to the parcel
to work, they camp there. However, they only camp there when
they are working. Both Elders testified that the building's
function is completely incidental to working the land. The
Elders go out to the parcel a total of 12 to 15 days a year and
have spent eight days camping on it.
The "farm land habitat project" the IDOC developed for
the parcel included plans telling what crops should be grown in
what location in order to maximize conservation of the soil and
create a hospitable environment for wildlife. Because of soil
quality, IDOC recommended that the bottom third of the pasture-
land and an existing walnut grove remain intact and that the
upper portion be planted in prairie grass. Approximately seven
acres of the parcel now consist of prairie grass, three more
acres are pastureland, and five are wooded.
The Elders maintain the parcel by mowing the paths sur-
rounding the grasses and the perimeter of the property, as well
as periodically burning the grasses. They also created a cistern
to provide water for wildlife. The Elders removed about 150
honey locust and black locust trees from the parcel, but those
trees were not marketable for any use.
Although Elder planted oak and pruned walnut trees on
the property, he had no current plans to harvest the timber.
Elder tries to keep the parcel as natural as possible. Because
no livestock grazes on it, he must periodically burn the thatch.
Elder has seen numerous species of birds on the property, but he
made no effort to feed them. He and his brother have hunted
pheasant only twice. They are trying to develop an area where
the birds can live on their own without depending on people.
Elder testified that he did grow crops on the land, and
that he and others have harvested wildlife that live on this
property by hunting them. He testified that before wildlife can
be harvested, they must be grown in numbers, and he maintained
the parcel in order to do that. Although he does not actively
feed the animals, he maintains an environment in which wildlife
can find adequate food.
Elder testified that he was trying to grow and manage
wildlife in the area, as well as grow trees for eventual harvest.
He said that prairie grass is a cash crop, with the seeds selling
for about $60 per pound. However, it takes about 10 years to
establish that crop. He intends to harvest the prairie grass and
the trees when they were mature.
In its July 1993 written order, the PTAB referred to
the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing and concluded
that the parcel was entitled to the farmland classification and
assessment. In so concluding, the PTAB specifically referred to
the statutory definition of "farm" (35 ILCS 200/1-60 (West 1994)
(formerly section 1(21) of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 482(21)))), quoted earlier. In support
of its conclusion, the PTAB wrote, in part, the following:
"[Elder] testified that the land has been
managed as a wildlife habitat since 1987 and
that the land has continued in this use to
the present. [The] [t]estimony revealed that
native prairie grasses and timber had been
planted to improve the property for wildlife
habitat and management."
The PTAB held that Elder's use of the parcel brought it within
the definition of "farm" for property tax purposes. The PTAB
also included the following in its decision:
"[The PTAB] hereby orders the [Board] to com-
pute a farmland assessment for the subject
parcel. The agricultural assessment is to be
certified to the [PTAB] within 15 days of the
date of this decision."
On administrative review, the circuit court affirmed
the decision of the PTAB regarding the classification of the
parcel, although it did so for reasons other than those specified
by the PTAB. The circuit court concluded that Elder
"is managing the subject property as a wild-
life and land conservation area, he is in
fact farming said area by the planting, cul-
tivation and growth of hardwood trees and
native prairie grasses, either of which can
be harvested at an appropriate time in the
future, that any recreational use of the
property is incidental and insignificant, and
that a property can be farmed and managed
simultaneously as a conservation area, with-
out losing its [farmland] assessment."
The circuit court concluded that the PTAB decision was
not against the manifest weight of the evidence presented.
The circuit court further noted that because the Board
had refused to accept the case for remand with regard to the
proper assessment of the parcel,
"and no specific authority exists for the
matter to be remanded to the [Board], the
Court finds there is evidence in the record
to support a valuation of the property on the
basis by which it was evaluated in years
prior to 1991, in the amount of $1,988, and
the Court so orders."
II. ANALYSIS
In arguing that this court should reverse the PTAB's
determination that the parcel should be classified for tax
purposes as farmland and not as residential property, the Board
contends that this court can decide the issue of classification
de novo because "the proper classification of property as a farm
is a question of law." The Board further asserts that "[f]ew[,]
if any, of the facts in this case are in dispute. It is the
legal effect of these facts which has created the controversy."
We disagree.
In Illini Country Club v. State Property Tax Appeal
Board, 263 Ill. App. 3d 410, 416-17, 635 N.E.2d 1347, 1353
(1994), this court wrote the following:
"Under the Administrative Review Law, judi-
cial review extends to all questions of law
and fact presented by the record. [Cita-
tion.] An agency's findings on questions of
law, such as the interpretation of a statute,
are not binding on the courts. When a ques-
tion of law is presented below, the reviewing
court considers the question de novo. [Cita-
tion.] However, the agency's findings of
fact will not be disturbed on review unless
they are against the manifest weight of the
evidence."
In the present case, no one disputes that the defini-
tion of "farm" contained in section 1-60 of the Code governs the
classification of the parcel at issue. However, how Elder uses
that parcel does constitute a question of fact, and the PTAB's
findings of fact regarding that use will not be disturbed on
review by this court unless we conclude those findings are
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
When judged in accordance with the proper standard of
review, we have no difficulty in concluding that the PTAB's
decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We
agree with the PTAB that the definition of "farm" in section 1-60
of the Code is very broad and easily fits the facts in this case,
as the PTAB found.
The parties are familiar with the record, and we see no
need to belabor further the evidence presented at the hearing
conducted by the PTAB hearing officer. We note in particular--in
support of the PTAB's decision--the summary of the evidence
supporting that decision which is set forth in 23 separate points
in Elder's brief and argument submitted to the circuit court on
administrative review.
In our judgment, the best that can be said of the
Board's position is that the PTAB could have found otherwise on
the evidence before it, but it did not. Accordingly, we affirm
the decision of the circuit court which affirmed the PTAB's
decision regarding the classification of the parcel for tax
purposes.
Before concluding this case, we address an additional
matter, which is the Board's claim that the circuit court exceed-
ed its authority--while conducting an administrative review--by
"searching the record and making [the court's] own determination
of the proper assessment." In response, the PTAB does not
address the Board's argument at all, but instead asserts that the
PTAB had the power to remand the case to the Board for a farmland
assessment, even though the circuit court seemed to hold other-
wise. The PTAB's brief on this point concludes as follows:
"Thus, the PTAB's order, remanding Elder's appeal to the Board[,]
was within its authority, and this Court should reverse the
circuit court's order on that issue."
As the Board points out, although the PTAB had once
filed a cross-appeal in this case (presumably on this very
point), it has since dismissed that cross-appeal. Accordingly,
given the PTAB's role as appellee, its posture is to defend the
decision of the circuit court, not to ask this court to reverse
it.
On the merits, it appears to us that the trial court's
purported valuation of the property exceeds its authority in this
case, which is essentially limited to reviewing the PTAB's
decision. See American National Bank Trust Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 242 Ill. App. 3d 716, 719, 611 N.E.2d 32, 34 (1993).
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the circuit court's
judgment that appears after the court concludes that the decision
of the PTAB is not against the manifest weight of the evidence
and "is hereby affirmed." The portion of the judgment reversed
refers to the circuit court's ordering the valuation of the
parcel in the amount of $1,988, its valuation in the years prior
to 1991.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court in part and reverse that judgment in part.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
McCULLOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.