McLaurin v. MISSISSIPPI EMPLOYMENT SEC. COM'N

435 So. 2d 1170, 12 Educ. L. Rep. 1311
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 3, 1983
Docket54244
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 435 So. 2d 1170 (McLaurin v. MISSISSIPPI EMPLOYMENT SEC. COM'N) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McLaurin v. MISSISSIPPI EMPLOYMENT SEC. COM'N, 435 So. 2d 1170, 12 Educ. L. Rep. 1311 (Mich. 1983).

Opinion

435 So.2d 1170 (1983)

John McLAURIN, et al., Trustees of the Newton County Unit School District
v.
MISSISSIPPI EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and Terry W. McElhenney.

No. 54244.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

August 3, 1983.

*1171 Leon Mangum, Decatur, for appellants.

Fred J. Lotterhos, Jackson, for appellees.

Before PATTERSON, C.J., and ROY NOBLE LEE and ROBERTSON, JJ.

ROBERTSON, Justice, for the Court.

I.

On September 17, 1979, Terry W. McElhenney filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. At that time McElhenney was working on a part-time basis as a school bus driver for the Newton County Unit School District (sometimes hereinafter "N.C.U.S.D." or "the school district"). Despite this part-time work, the Mississippi Employment Security Commission's Board of Review held that McElhenney was "unemployed" within the meaning of the Mississippi Employment Security Law. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-5-11[O](1) (Supp. 1982).

The primary question presented is whether the school district, as the part-time employer of McElhenney, is liable under the Act for pro rata reimbursement of the Mississippi Employment Security Trust Fund. The MESC Board of Review held that the school district was so liable. The Circuit Court of Newton County, Mississippi, upheld that determination. Having carefully reviewed the matter, we affirm.

II.

Our threshold inquiry is whether McElhenney was "unemployed". This question must be answered by reference to the definition of the term "unemployed" as found in the statute and not in the dictionary. Our legislature has provided that an individual shall be deemed "unemployed"

*1172 in any week during which he performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to him, or in any week of less than full-time work if the wages payable to him with respect to such week are less than his weekly benefit amount.[1] Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-11(O)(1) (Supp. 1982) [Emphasis added].

The legislature has thus declared that individuals not wholly unemployed in fact may nevertheless be deemed "unemployed" as a matter of law. The Mississippi Employment Security Commission's lawfully promulgated regulation is to like effect:

"... [A]n individual shall be deemed to be part-totally unemployed in any week of less than full-time work, if the wages payable to him with respect to such week are less than his weekly benefit amount... ." MESC Reg. No. 102

At all times relevant hereto McElhenney was working for the Newton County Unit School District as a school bus driver. He worked for approximately one and a half hours each morning and a like time each afternoon. He was in fact employed.

Both the statute and regulation, however, make clear that amount of work activity is not determinative. What is determinative is whether McElhenney's wages were less than his benefit amount. It is undisputed, as a matter of fact, that McElhenney's wages were $53.75 per week and his weekly benefit amount was $80.00.[2] His weekly wages were thus less than his weekly benefit amount. As a matter of law McElhenney was unemployed.

Unemployment, in this context a function of law, does not arise from lack of work activity, from lack of engagement to work, or from a complete absence of wages, all of which are wholly matters of fact. The legislature has the power to designate by general definition those individuals eligible for benefits. It certainly has the power to provide that those individuals earning less than their weekly benefit amount shall be eligible for benefits without regard to the fact that they may be engaged in some part-time work activity. And, it certainly has the power, if it wishes to do so, to use the word "unemployed" and define that word in a way different from what may be in the dictionary or different from common or accepted usage among lay persons.[3] These powers our legislature has exercised.

When the legal definition of "unemployed" as prescribed in Section 71-5-11(O)(1) is applied to the facts of this case, it becomes indisputable that Terry W. McElhenney was unemployed for purposes of determining his eligibility for benefits under the Mississippi Employment Security Law.

III.

During the "base period"[4] McElhenney was employed and had earnings as follows:

*1173
   BASE                                CALENDAR
  PERIOD                                 YEAR
  QUARTER         EMPLOYER              QUARTER             EARNINGS
  1st Qtr.   Kendrick Fence Co.      2nd Qtr. 1978          $2,080.00
  2nd Qtr.   Kendrick Fence Co.      3rd Qtr. 1978           2,080.00
  3rd Qtr.   N.C.U.S.D.              4th Qtr. 1978             440.00
  4th Qtr.   N.C.U.S.D.              1st Qtr. 1979             660.00
                                                            _________
                                    Total Earnings          $5,260.00

McElhenney being unemployed within the meaning of the law and thus eligible for benefits under the law, the only question is how and by whom McElhenney's benefits shall be financed. As before, the answer is purely a function of legislative directive. That directive may be found in Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-357 (Supp. 1982).[5] See Mississippi Employment Security Commission v. City of Columbus Light & Water Department, et al., 424 So.2d 553, 557 (Miss. 1982).

Here, during the base period, McElhenney was employed by two separate employers, one, Kendrick Fence Company, a contributing employer [see Section 71-5-351 (Supp. 1982)] and the second, Newton County Unit School District, a reimbursing employer [see Section 71-5-357 (Supp. 1982)]. In this factual context, we find an express legislative directive making clear the reimbursement obligation of the school district in Section 71-5-357(c)(i) (Supp. 1982). This section requires reimbursement payment to the trust fund in

"an amount which bears the same ratio to the total benefits paid to the individual as the total base period wages paid to the individual by such employer bear to the total base-period wages paid to the individual by all of his base-period employers".

Under the facts of this case, the school district's pro rata allocation is 20.91 percent, computed as follows:

                                              PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BASE
                           AMOUNT EARNED      PERIOD EARNINGS ATTRIBUTIVE
        EMPLOYER           BY MCELHENNEY            TO EACH EMPLOYER
    Kenrick Fence Co.        $4,160.00                   79.09%
    N.C.U.S.D.               $1,100.00                   20.91%

This Court has recently recognized the view we take here in Mississippi Employment Security Commission v. City of Columbus Light & Water Department, et al., 424 So.2d 553 (Miss. 1982). There the Court stated that the legislature of this state had enacted that, in such cases as this,

reimbursing employers shall pay to the commission their proportionate share of unemployment benefits based upon the length of time the unemployed worker had worked for the political subdivision in the base period. 424 So.2d at 557.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Gunn v. Principal Cas. Ins. Co.
605 So. 2d 741 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1992)
Pennock v. State
550 So. 2d 410 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1989)
Stong v. Freeman Truck Line, Inc.
456 So. 2d 698 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1984)
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd.
457 So. 2d 1298 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1984)
MESC v. Philadelphia Mun. Sep. Sch. D.
437 So. 2d 388 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1983)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
435 So. 2d 1170, 12 Educ. L. Rep. 1311, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mclaurin-v-mississippi-employment-sec-comn-miss-1983.