McLaughlin v. Superior Court

29 Cal. App. 3d 35, 105 Cal. Rptr. 384, 1972 Cal. App. LEXIS 673
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 30, 1972
DocketCiv. 32013
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 29 Cal. App. 3d 35 (McLaughlin v. Superior Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McLaughlin v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 35, 105 Cal. Rptr. 384, 1972 Cal. App. LEXIS 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

Opinion

ROUSE, J.

Plaintiff, Lawrence L. Lighthill, commenced a personal injury action against Tim McLaughlin, Milton Allen, and the State of California, acting by and through the Division of Highways, in the Humboldt County Superior Court. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in that action was denied and defendants have now petitioned this court for a writ of mandate to compel respondent superior court to vacate such order. If the motion should have been granted, mandamus sought in this *37 proceeding is an appropriate remedy. (Whitney's at the Beach v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 258 [83 Cal.Rptr. 237]; Bank of America v. Superior Court (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 435 [84 Cal.Rptr. 421].)

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants, who are the petitioners in this action, contended that plaintiff’s cause of action for damages for personal injuries was barred by his failure to comply with applicable statutes governing the presentation of claims against a public entity. Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiff failed to comply with the provisions of Government Code, section 946.6, which require a claimant to petition the court for an order relieving him from the provisions of section 945.4, when his application for leave to present a claim has been denied. 1

Defendants established that the cause of action in the instant case accrued on July 24, 1970; that plaintiff failed to present a claim to the public entity within 100 days; 2 that plaintiff made application for leave to present such claim on June 30, 1971 ; 3 that the State Board of Control “declined to grant [his] request” on August 4, 1971; and that thereafter plaintiff filed suit on the cause of action to which the claim related without first obtaining a court order relieving him from the provisions of section 945.4, as required by section 946.6. 4

*38 Compliance with section 946.6 is mandatory unless excused on the basis of equitable estoppel. (Kendrick v. City of La Mirada (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 325, 328 [77 Cal.Rptr. 444].)

Plaintiff admits that he did not petition for such relief in the superior court before he filed his action; however, he asserts that the letter he received from the State Board of Control misled him into believing that the board had rejected his claim rather than his application for leave to file a late claim, 5 and that his action is not barred since he filed his action within a six months’ period, as required by section 945.6, subdivision (a), subsection (l). 6

The letter which plaintiff received from the State Board of Control reads as follows: “Re: Application for leave to present late claim on behalf of Lawrence Lighthill. . . .

“The above entitled application was referred to the Board of Control at its meeting of August 3, 1971. After reviewing said application, the board declined to grant your request.” (Italics partially added.)

Although this paragraph, standing alone, would seem to constitute a denial of the application for leave to present a late claim, the bottom of the letter contains the following “Warning”: “Subject to: certain exceptions, you have only six (6) months from the date this notice was personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court action on the rejected claim, or the portion of the claim rejected. See Government Code Section 945.6. You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice in connection with this matter. If you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so immediately.” (Italics added.)

The warning appearing on the written notice mailed to the petitioner specifically refers to a “rejected claim” or “portion of the claim, rejected.” It is a warning notice which is required to be given under section 913, when *39 “the claim is rejected in whole or in part.” 7 (Italics added.) No such warning notice is required to be given under section 911.8, when an application for leave to present a claim is denied. 8

Section 915.4 lists three types of statutory notices as the “notices provided for in Sections 910.8, 911.8, and 913. . . .” 9 Section 910.8 provides for written notice of a claim’s insufficiency; section 911.8 provides for written notice of the board’s action upon an application for leave to present a claim; and section 913 provides for written notice of the action taken on a claim.

In the instant case, action by the board of control concerned plaintiff’s application for leave to file a late claim and not the claim itself. We conclude, therefore, that it was both confusing and misleading to include in the board’s letter to petitioner a warning which only pertains to action taken upon a claim. 10

*40 In Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 31 [56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818], our Supreme Court referred to the intricacies of the claims statutes: “ ‘The 1963 legislation is remedial and should be liberally construed. Both the courts and Legislature have recognized that the labyrinth of claims statutes previously scattered throughout our statutes were traps for the unwary. [Citations.] An attempt has been made by the Legislature to remove such snares. Courts should not rebuild them by a too narrow interpretation of the new enactments.' ”

It was in an attempt to remove such snares that the Legislature revised section 913. 11

Unlike the plaintiff in Kendrick v. City of La Mirada, supra, 272 Cal.App.2d 325, plaintiff here has presented facts which, in our opinion, justify his failure to petition for judicial relief pursuant to section 946.6. He has demonstrated to the satisfaction of this court that the written notice he received from the board misled him into believing that the board had rejected his claim rather than his application for leave to present a claim. Such notice erroneously included a warning required to be given under section 913 when a claim is rejected. Plaintiff contends that he acted in reliance upon that notice, to his injury.

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Bluebook (online)
29 Cal. App. 3d 35, 105 Cal. Rptr. 384, 1972 Cal. App. LEXIS 673, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mclaughlin-v-superior-court-calctapp-1972.