McLaughlin v. New York Life Insurance

Sixth Circuit

McLaughlin v. New York Life Insurance

84 F.2d 1008, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 4764

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

DecidedJune 3, 1936

DocketNos. 7025, 7026

StatusPublished

This text of 84 F.2d 1008 (McLaughlin v. New York Life Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McLaughlin v. New York Life Insurance, 84 F.2d 1008, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 4764 (6th Cir. 1936).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This suit is for damages alleged to have resulted from anticipatory breaches of policies of insurance under which the insured, the appellant, was entitled, upon becoming totally disabled, to a waiver of payment of premiums and to stipulated benefits per month. No claim was asserted in the petition for benefits, if any, having already accrued under the policies. The judgment adjudged that the defendant, appellee, go hence without day and recover of the plaintiff, appellant, its cost expended.

This court being of opinion that there was no repudiation or anticipatory breach of the policies by the appellee entitling the appellant to recover their present value as damages (New York Life Insurance Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 56 S.Ct. 615, 80 L.Ed. 971, decided by the Supreme Court March 30, 1936), and being further of the opinion that the appellant is not by the judgment estopped from making timely claim for disability benefits, if any, which have accrued and remain unpaid, it is ordered that the judgment be, and it is hereby, affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

This suit is for damages alleged to have resulted from anticipatory breaches of policies of insurance under which the insured, the appellant, was entitled, upon becoming totally disabled, to a waiver of payment of premiums and to stipulated benefits per month. No claim was asserted in the petition for benefits, if any, having already accrued under the policies. The judgment adjudged that the defendant, appellee, go hence without day and recover of the plaintiff, appellant, its cost expended.

This court being of opinion that there was no repudiation or anticipatory breach of the policies by the appellee entitling the appellant to recover their present value as damages (New York Life Insurance Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 56 S.Ct. 615, 80 L.Ed. 971, decided by the Supreme Court March 30, 1936), and being further of the opinion that the appellant is not by the judgment estopped from making timely claim for disability benefits, if any, which have accrued and remain unpaid, it is ordered that the judgment be, and it is hereby, affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

84 F.2d 1008, 1936 U.S. App. LEXIS 4764, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mclaughlin-v-new-york-life-insurance-ca6-1936.

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