STATE OF MAINE PENOBSCOT, ss.
JAY MCLAUGHLIN, and ELLEN MCLAUGHLIN
Plaintiffs,
v. t~;AY 1:1 2009 PATRICK E. HUNT, PENOBSCOT COUNTY Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the
defendant, Patrick E. Hunt, Esq., filed on August 14, 2008. Oral argument was held on
March 24, 2009.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs, Jay and Ellen McLaughlin, retained Maineline Modular Homes,
Inc. to construct a motel on an undeveloped parcel in Medway owned by the plaintiffs.
In March 1995, Maineline Homes allegedly walked off the job prior to completion,
forcing the plaintiffs to incur additional expenses to complete the project. In January
2000, the plaintiffs retained the services of the defendant, Attorney Hunt, to represent
them in their case against Maineline Homes. On May 3, 2000, Attorney Hunt filed a
complaint in Penobscot County Superior Court against Maineline Homes and its owner,
Fred Copson, alleging inter alia breach of contract.
The case was set as a jury-waived waived backup on the court's July 2001 trial
list. On July 9, 2001, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the
McLaughlins in their case against Maineline Homes. The court also notified the attorneys for both parties on July 9, 2001 that the trial would commence on July 10,
200 1. Attorney Hunt was litigating a different case for the McLaughlins in U.S. District
Court ("the Denharco case") and filed a motion to continue. The court granted the
motion and notified the parties that the trial would commence on July 12, 2001 unless
Attorney Hunt's case was still going on in federal court. The case in federal court
concluded on July 11, 2001.
On July 12, 2001, the plaintiffs settled the case against Maineline Homes for
$15,000.00. They subsequently filed the complaint in the present legal malpractice suit
on June 28, 2007, alleging that Attorney Hunt was unprepared for the case and, by his
words and conduct, forced them into settling the case for far less than it value. During
discovery, Jay McLaughlin was deposed and testified as follows:
Several days before we go to court, we're in court with a case against Denharco; and Pat mentions that the date was coming up for the one with Mr. Copson and that he was going to get it postponed because it was too close to the Denharco case and if the Denharco case took a couple of days - or he might not be ready, and it could take three days and they both would be going on at the same time and he sure couldn't do that.
He allowed he had it covered because he called his secretary, I think it was Darcy, and had her do some kind of paper to send to the judge which he was pretty sure the judge would postpone it. Then as it got closer, it appeared that the judge might not postpone it.
Then the date of the Denharco case gets over, he says the judge won't postpone it. We've got to do that case tomorrow and I'm not ready. I asked Pat what he was going to do. I can't remember what word he used, but it was that he was going to win it.
And on the way walking to the courthouse the morning we went to court with Mr. Copson, Pat told me we had to settle, and that wasn't a problem because, you know, he had talked great big numbers all the way through this; and I told him as long we settled for those kind of numbers, we would be all set.
2 We get into the courthouse and Mr. Copson offered to settle for like $10,000, and I told Pat Hunt that I wanted to try it; and he kept telling me how he wasn't ready to try it, he didn't have the information to try it. We had to settle. I kept telling him that I would not settle for that or anywhere near that amount, and he informed me that he was handling that case and that he was going to settle it. I told him a number of times that I wanted to talk to the judge, there was a problem here, and I wasn't sure it was all Copson that was the problem. One time he told me I should sit down and shut up or I'd be going to jail, and I might be taking him with me.
(PIs.' Add'l S.M.F. ~ 16; Jay McLaughlin Dep. at 53-55.) The defendant has now filed a
motion for summary judgment and the McLaughlins have opposed.
DISCUSSION
"Summary judgment is appropriate when review of the parties' statements of
material facts and the referenced record evidence indicates no genuine issue of material
fact that is in dispute, and, accordingly, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Dyer v. Dep't of Transp., 2008 ME 106, ~ 14, 951 A.2d 821, 825. A
genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence to require the fact-
finder to choose between competing versions of a fact that could affect the outcome of
the case. Id.; Inkel v. Livingston, 2005 ME 42, ~ 4,869 A.2d 745, 747.
The defendant has raised two arguments in support of his motion for summary
judgment. First, he claims that the plaintiffs have not produced any evidence that the
defendant breached his duty of care. Second, he argues that, by virtue of the settlement,
the plaintiffs are estopped from denying that their case against Maineline Homes would
have been worth more than $15,000 but for the alleged breach by the defendant. The
Court takes these arguments up in turn.
The plaintiffs have complained that the defendant breached his duty of care by
failing to be prepared for trial and by forcing them to settle the case for an amount far
3 below its value without their consent. The defendant now argues that the plaintiffs have
not produced any evidence of such breach. The Court need not look beyond the above-
quoted deposition testimony of Jay McLaughlin. Such testimony is evidence of a breach
of the duty of care, creating a genuine issue of material fact on this issue.
Moving to the defendant's assertion of estoppel, the application of this doctrine is
misplaced in this context. Settlement of a case does not bar a litigant from later
maintaining an action for legal malpractice against the attorney who negotiated and
entered into the settlement. Although the Law Court has not specifically addressed this
issue, this Court's decision is in accord with the majority of those jurisdictions that have.
[A]n attorney is liable for negligently causing a client to settle a claim for an amount below what a properly represented client would have accepted.
Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1379 (Mass. 1986).
[W]e recognize that litigants rely heavily on the professional advice of counsel when they decide whether to accept or reject offers of settlement, and we insist that the lawyers of our state advise clients with respect to settlements with the same skill, knowledge, and diligence with which they pursue all other legal tasks. . .. Accordingly, like the majority of courts that have addressed this issue, we decline to adopt a rule that insulates attorneys from exposure to malpractice claims arising from their negligence in settled cases if the attorney's conduct has damaged the client."
Grayson v. Woj~ey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 646 A.2d 195, 199-200 (Conn. 1994)
(internal quotations omitted).
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STATE OF MAINE PENOBSCOT, ss.
JAY MCLAUGHLIN, and ELLEN MCLAUGHLIN
Plaintiffs,
v. t~;AY 1:1 2009 PATRICK E. HUNT, PENOBSCOT COUNTY Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the
defendant, Patrick E. Hunt, Esq., filed on August 14, 2008. Oral argument was held on
March 24, 2009.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs, Jay and Ellen McLaughlin, retained Maineline Modular Homes,
Inc. to construct a motel on an undeveloped parcel in Medway owned by the plaintiffs.
In March 1995, Maineline Homes allegedly walked off the job prior to completion,
forcing the plaintiffs to incur additional expenses to complete the project. In January
2000, the plaintiffs retained the services of the defendant, Attorney Hunt, to represent
them in their case against Maineline Homes. On May 3, 2000, Attorney Hunt filed a
complaint in Penobscot County Superior Court against Maineline Homes and its owner,
Fred Copson, alleging inter alia breach of contract.
The case was set as a jury-waived waived backup on the court's July 2001 trial
list. On July 9, 2001, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the
McLaughlins in their case against Maineline Homes. The court also notified the attorneys for both parties on July 9, 2001 that the trial would commence on July 10,
200 1. Attorney Hunt was litigating a different case for the McLaughlins in U.S. District
Court ("the Denharco case") and filed a motion to continue. The court granted the
motion and notified the parties that the trial would commence on July 12, 2001 unless
Attorney Hunt's case was still going on in federal court. The case in federal court
concluded on July 11, 2001.
On July 12, 2001, the plaintiffs settled the case against Maineline Homes for
$15,000.00. They subsequently filed the complaint in the present legal malpractice suit
on June 28, 2007, alleging that Attorney Hunt was unprepared for the case and, by his
words and conduct, forced them into settling the case for far less than it value. During
discovery, Jay McLaughlin was deposed and testified as follows:
Several days before we go to court, we're in court with a case against Denharco; and Pat mentions that the date was coming up for the one with Mr. Copson and that he was going to get it postponed because it was too close to the Denharco case and if the Denharco case took a couple of days - or he might not be ready, and it could take three days and they both would be going on at the same time and he sure couldn't do that.
He allowed he had it covered because he called his secretary, I think it was Darcy, and had her do some kind of paper to send to the judge which he was pretty sure the judge would postpone it. Then as it got closer, it appeared that the judge might not postpone it.
Then the date of the Denharco case gets over, he says the judge won't postpone it. We've got to do that case tomorrow and I'm not ready. I asked Pat what he was going to do. I can't remember what word he used, but it was that he was going to win it.
And on the way walking to the courthouse the morning we went to court with Mr. Copson, Pat told me we had to settle, and that wasn't a problem because, you know, he had talked great big numbers all the way through this; and I told him as long we settled for those kind of numbers, we would be all set.
2 We get into the courthouse and Mr. Copson offered to settle for like $10,000, and I told Pat Hunt that I wanted to try it; and he kept telling me how he wasn't ready to try it, he didn't have the information to try it. We had to settle. I kept telling him that I would not settle for that or anywhere near that amount, and he informed me that he was handling that case and that he was going to settle it. I told him a number of times that I wanted to talk to the judge, there was a problem here, and I wasn't sure it was all Copson that was the problem. One time he told me I should sit down and shut up or I'd be going to jail, and I might be taking him with me.
(PIs.' Add'l S.M.F. ~ 16; Jay McLaughlin Dep. at 53-55.) The defendant has now filed a
motion for summary judgment and the McLaughlins have opposed.
DISCUSSION
"Summary judgment is appropriate when review of the parties' statements of
material facts and the referenced record evidence indicates no genuine issue of material
fact that is in dispute, and, accordingly, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Dyer v. Dep't of Transp., 2008 ME 106, ~ 14, 951 A.2d 821, 825. A
genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence to require the fact-
finder to choose between competing versions of a fact that could affect the outcome of
the case. Id.; Inkel v. Livingston, 2005 ME 42, ~ 4,869 A.2d 745, 747.
The defendant has raised two arguments in support of his motion for summary
judgment. First, he claims that the plaintiffs have not produced any evidence that the
defendant breached his duty of care. Second, he argues that, by virtue of the settlement,
the plaintiffs are estopped from denying that their case against Maineline Homes would
have been worth more than $15,000 but for the alleged breach by the defendant. The
Court takes these arguments up in turn.
The plaintiffs have complained that the defendant breached his duty of care by
failing to be prepared for trial and by forcing them to settle the case for an amount far
3 below its value without their consent. The defendant now argues that the plaintiffs have
not produced any evidence of such breach. The Court need not look beyond the above-
quoted deposition testimony of Jay McLaughlin. Such testimony is evidence of a breach
of the duty of care, creating a genuine issue of material fact on this issue.
Moving to the defendant's assertion of estoppel, the application of this doctrine is
misplaced in this context. Settlement of a case does not bar a litigant from later
maintaining an action for legal malpractice against the attorney who negotiated and
entered into the settlement. Although the Law Court has not specifically addressed this
issue, this Court's decision is in accord with the majority of those jurisdictions that have.
[A]n attorney is liable for negligently causing a client to settle a claim for an amount below what a properly represented client would have accepted.
Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1379 (Mass. 1986).
[W]e recognize that litigants rely heavily on the professional advice of counsel when they decide whether to accept or reject offers of settlement, and we insist that the lawyers of our state advise clients with respect to settlements with the same skill, knowledge, and diligence with which they pursue all other legal tasks. . .. Accordingly, like the majority of courts that have addressed this issue, we decline to adopt a rule that insulates attorneys from exposure to malpractice claims arising from their negligence in settled cases if the attorney's conduct has damaged the client."
Grayson v. Woj~ey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 646 A.2d 195, 199-200 (Conn. 1994)
(internal quotations omitted).
It would be patently unfair to allow attorneys who may have committed malpractice in handling a case to turn around and rely on a defense that effectively says that, because the client knowingly settled his or her case, the issue of whether the attorney was negligent was also settled.
Prande v. Bell, 660 A.2d 1055, 1064 (Md. 1995).
4 Application of estoppel in this context would permit attorneys who have violated
standards of care to advise their clients to settle in order to shield themselves from
liability. Neither the public nor the legal profession would be well served by such a rule.
CONCLUSION
Genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the defendant violated
professional standards of care; therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment
is denied.
The entry is:
1. The defendant's motion for summary judgment, filed on August 14, 2008, is DENIED.
2. This order is incorporated into the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
Date: May {f ,2009 M. Michaela Murpl Justice, Superior Cour
'1· ~' ,
5 SUPERIOR COURT JAY MCLAUGHLIN - PLAINTIFF PENOBSCOT, ss. POBOX 637 Docket No BANSC-CV-2007-00I62 MEDWAY ME 04460 Attorney for: JAY MCLAUGHLIN JED DAVIS - RETAINED 06/28/2007 DOCKET RECORD MITCHELL & DAVIS 86 WINTHROP STREET AUGUSTA ME 04330
ELLEN MCLAUGHLIN - PLAINTIFF POBOX 637 MEDWAY ME 04460 Attorney for: ELLEN MCLAUGHLIN JED DAVIS - RETAINED 06/28/2007 MITCHELL & DAVIS 86 WINTHROP STREET AUGUSTA ME 04330
vs PATRICK E HUNT - DEFENDANT 19 SHERMAN STREET, ISLAND FALLS ME 047470130 Attorney for: PATRICK E HUNT JAMES M BOWIE - RETAINED 07/18/2007 THOMPSON & BOWIE THREE CANAL PLAZA PO BOX 4630 PORTLAND ME 04112-4630