McLaughlin v. City Bank
This text of McLaughlin v. City Bank (McLaughlin v. City Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Bluebook
McLaughlin v. City Bank, (1st Cir. 1992).
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
September 22, 1992
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 92-1041
RICHARD McLAUGHLIN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
JOHN MORTON, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Shane Devine, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
____________________
and Torruella, Circuit Judge.
_____________
____________________
Edwin Paul Gale with whom Stephen R. Fine & Associates was on
________________ ______________________________
brief for appellants.
Peter W. Mosseau with whom Peter G. Beeson and Nelson, Kinder
_________________ ________________ _______________
Mosseau & Gordon, P.C. were on brief for appellee John Morton.
______________________
Mark H. Gardner for appellees Edward Reichert and Berlin City
________________
Bank.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Appellants, McLaughlin Chevrolet-
___________
Buick, Inc. (the "corporation"), and its sole shareholder,
Richard McLaughlin, appeal from a district court order
dismissing, on grounds of res judicata, the second of two
___ ________
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and various state laws
for an allegedly illegal attachment of the corporation's
inventory. In its opinion dated December 6, 1991, the
district court ruled that the second action was precluded
because the district court had already determined in the
prior litigation that McLaughlin lacked standing and because
it had accepted, for purposes of ruling on a motion by
plaintiff to alter judgment, that the corporation lacked the
capacity to sue. We affirm for substantially the reasons
stated in the district court order dated December 6, 1991.
We write only to add the following.
At argument before us, plaintiffs' counsel
suggested that the corporation was not bound by the earlier
suit brought by McLaughlin individually because no privity
existed between McLaughlin and the corporation. We find no
merit to this contention. It is well-settled that a nonparty
is bound by a prior adjudication where there is sufficient
legal identity between the nonparty and the prior litigant.
E.g., Explosives Corp. of America v. Garlam Enterprises
____ ______________________________ ___________________
Corp., 817 F.2d 894, 906-07 (1st Cir.) (majority stockholder
_____
that financed and controlled initial litigation brought
-2-
against corporation is bound by judgment against
corporation), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925 (1987); Aetna Cas. &
_____ ______ ____________
Sur. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp.,
__________________________________ ______________________
875 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1989) (judgment in action
brought by shareholder of closely held corporation is binding
on corporation in later litigation, absent evidence of harm
to another shareholder or creditor); Restatement (Second) of
Judgments 59 (3)(b) (1982). Here, there was virtually
total identity between Richard McLaughlin, plaintiff in the
first suit, who was the sole shareholder of the corporation,
and the corporation itself. McLaughlin, indeed, sought to
represent the corporation's interests in the initial action
by seeking damages for the allegedly illegal attachment of
the corporation's inventory. Under these circumstances, the
corporation as well as McLaughlin personally are bound by the
prior adverse judgment.
We are also unpersuaded by plaintiffs' argument
that the district court's dismissal of the original
litigation was not a decision on the merits and cannot,
therefore, be given preclusive effect. While dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication that reaches the
merits of an underlying claim, it precludes relitigation of
the same issue of jurisdiction in a second action on the same
claim. E.g., Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir.
____ _____ _____
1980); 18 Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and
_____________________
-3-
Procedure: Jurisdiction 4402 at 11 (1981). The district
________________________
court properly held that its prior rulings with respect to
jurisdiction, including its refusal to allow substitution of
the corporation, precluded relitigation of the same issues in
the subsequent action.
Finally, we find no merit in plaintiffs' contention
that the district court's application of the doctrine of res
___
judicata was improper because the district court's prior
________
ruling with respect to the corporation's capacity to sue was
erroneous. Even assuming arguendo that the district court's
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie
452 U.S. 394 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Joe Boone and Mary Alice Boone v. Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal Revenue and David C. Loesel
617 F.2d 435 (Fifth Circuit, 1980)
Explosives Corporation of America v. Garlam Enterprises Corporation, (Two Cases) Explosives Corporation of America v. Garlam Enterprises Corporation
817 F.2d 894 (First Circuit, 1987)
Aetna Casualty And Surety Company Of Hartford, Connecticut v. Kerr-Mcgee Chemical Corporation
875 F.2d 1252 (Seventh Circuit, 1989)
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Bluebook (online)
McLaughlin v. City Bank, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mclaughlin-v-city-bank-ca1-1992.