McKnight v. State

182 N.W.2d 291, 49 Wis. 2d 623, 1971 Wisc. LEXIS 1146

Opinion

Robert W. Hansen, J.

Here, as in a very recent case raising the identical issue, 2 we hold that “. . . the juvenile record of the defendant, as presented, was properly before the court as such evidence of a pattern of behavior,” 3 and “. . . find no error in the trial court being informed of defendant’s prior contacts with juvenile authorities, even though resulting commitments were subsequently set aside.” 4 It is true that the information as to prior juvenile experiences reached the trial court in Neely as part of a presentence report rather than, as here, by testimony during the hearing on the guilty plea. While a presentence report may throw additional light on a defendant’s total juvenile behavior pattern, we would not require that evidence of a behavior pattern be filtered through a presentence report before it can be properly considered by a sentencing court. Neely controls and requires affirmance.

By the Court. — Order affirmed.

2 Neely v. State (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 330, 177 N. W. 2d 79. (See also: Neely v. Quatsoe (E. D. C. Wis. 1970), 317 Fed. Supp. 40, 42, denying writ of habeas corpus, stating: “. . . the trial judge, before sentencing, was entitled to inquire as to the youth’s personal background, including his previous attendance at correctional institutions.”)

3 Id. at page 335. (See also: Waddell v. State (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 364, 129 N. W. 2d 201; Deja v. State (1969), 43 Wis. 2d 488, 168 N. W. 2d 856.)

4 Id. at page 336. (See also: Waddell v. State, supra, footnote 3, at page 368, holding “The prosecuting attorney may properly use information relating to complaints of other offenses in his argument on sentence. . . .”) (Emphasis supplied.)