McKnight v. Koniar

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 28, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00513
StatusUnknown

This text of McKnight v. Koniar (McKnight v. Koniar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McKnight v. Koniar, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ BARQUIS D’MOIN MCKNIGHT,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-cv-513-pp

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Barquis D’Moin McKnight, who is confined at the Gordon Correctional Center and who is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his federal rights have been violated. The plaintiff has paid the full filing fee. This decision screens his complaint. Dkt. No. 1. I. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison,

668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by

plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges on August 15, 2022, while incarcerated at McNaughton Correctional Center, he was working with a log splitter when his finger got caught between a piece of log and the metal plate at the end of the

splitter. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. He states that he immediately reported the matter to staff and two hours later he received “professional medical attention[.]” Id. The plaintiff alleges that two days later he received his first set of x-rays and that he subsequently received a second set of x-rays. Id. The x-rays allegedly showed a “tuft fracture to the distal phalanx right index finger.” Id. at 2-3. The plaintiff states that he seeks damages for the deliberate indifference created by McNaughton staff because he had no training on the log splitter. Id. at 3. He also states that he had a “very late” medical response. Id. For relief,

the plaintiff seeks $65,000. Id. at 4. C. Analysis The plaintiff has named the Department of Corrections as the only defendant. “[S]tates are not among the ‘persons’ covered by” 42 U.S.C. §1983. Sebesta v. Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 . . . (1989); Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2005)). And the Department of Corrections is an agency of the

state of Wisconsin. See, e.g., Miller v. Wisconsin, Dep’t of Corr., Case No. 10- CV-383, 2010 WL 3432836, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 31, 2010). This means that “[n]either the State of Wisconsin nor the State’s Department of Corrections is a proper defendant.” Andreola v. Wisconsin, 171 F. App’x 514, 515 (7th Cir. 2006). Because it is not a “person” subject to suit under §1983, the plaintiff may not sue the Department of Corrections. Because the complaint does not name a defendant who is subject to suit, the complaint fails to state a claim. That said, the court makes a few observations about the plaintiff’s

allegations. “A prison official’s deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (internal quote omitted). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim a plaintiff must demonstrate two components; (1) that he was subjected to an objectively serious deprivation and (2) that the defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to the deprivation. Id. at 834. The Eighth Amendment “forbids knowingly compelling an inmate to perform labor that is beyond the inmate’s strength, dangerous to his or her life or health, or

unduly painful.” Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2007)). Deliberate indifference means that “the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Smith v. Peters
631 F.3d 418 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Herbert L. Board v. Karl Farnham, Jr.
394 F.3d 469 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Andreola, Daniel M. v. State of Wisconsin
171 F. App'x 514 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Livell Figgs v. Alex Dawson
829 F.3d 895 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Elizabeth Sebesta v. Andrea Davis
878 F.3d 226 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
McKnight v. Koniar, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcknight-v-koniar-wied-2024.