McKeon v. Tillotson

3 Abb. Ct. App. 110
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 15, 1864
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 3 Abb. Ct. App. 110 (McKeon v. Tillotson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McKeon v. Tillotson, 3 Abb. Ct. App. 110 (N.Y. 1864).

Opinion

By the Court.

Davies, J.

[After stating the facts.] — The matters stated in this answer are not set up as a counter-claim on the part of the defendant. They do not fall within the provisions of the Code of Procedure. They do not arise out of contract, or from any transaction set forth in the complaint on the foundation of the plaintiff’s claim, connected with the subject of the action.

The subject of the action is the collection of a debt, admitted by the defendant, at the time of the execution of the bond and mortgage, to be due by him, to the United States, and to secure which, this mortgage was given. That debt was origi[118]*118nally secured by a mortgage upon other lands. In 1840, the defendant admitted his liability to the United States to pay the sum mentioned in his bond and mortgage to Mr. Butler. It is of no moment whether such indebtedness arose upon his liability as surety upon a bond or otherwise. It was a conceded indebtedness, and its justice has been admitted by the subsequent payments. In 1840, when the first mortgage had been given, the Indians had not removed from the reservation as the defendant now contends they should have done, in conformity with the treaty of 1838, and if there was any neglect of duty on the part of the United States, it had occurred at that time. Yet the defendant, setting up no such claim in discharge of his indebtedness to the United States government, gave a mortgage on his interest in the lands of the five reservations, to secure the whole amount of such indebtedness, and such mortgage remained a lien upon his interest in the lands of the said five reservations, until the United States, upon the application of the defendant, in 1856, released such lien, and canceled said mortgage, and took the mortgage now in process of foreclosure in this action, upon other lands of the defendant, for the balance due of said original debt. And it is a singular fact, that at the time this new security was given, all the transactions mentioned and referred to in the defendant’s answer had happened and all the equities now interposed by him, if any, existed, and yet no mention seems then to have been made' of them, and no claim set up that the debt mentioned in the new bond and mortgage was not due. The giving of that bond and mortgage was an act entirely inconsistent with the allegation now made, that at that time there was nothing due to the United States by the defendant. No cause of action is set up by this answer, against the United States, and the equities claimed by the defendant will next be considered, as well as the affirmative relief asked for, namely, that the mortgage debt be adjudged to be fully paid, and that the bond and mortgage should be given up and canceled.

The gravamen of the defendant’s answer is, that the United States was bound by the terms of the treaty of 1838, to remove the Indians from the five reservations then conveyed to Ogden and Fellows, and that in consequence of such neglect and [119]*119refusal the defendant had sustained damages greater than the balance upon said original bond and mortgage. The duty of the United States thus to remove the Indians is stated in various forms in the answer. In one place it is alleged, that by the terms of the treaty of 1838, and by the conveyances to Ogden and Fellows, they were entitled to the immediate possession of said lands. Again, that the possession of said land to the defendant and his ten owners was fully guaranteed by the United States by the treaty of 1838. Again, it is alleged, that the United States, by becoming parties to the treaties of 1838 and 1842, guaranteed to the said pre-emption owners the possession of said lands; and again, that in consequence of the undertaking of the government to enforce said treaties, and its neglect and refusal so to do, the defendant had lost the interest on the moneys paid to the government, and the large sums paid to obtain possession of said lands. These are the various forms in which the defendant states the duty, obligation, agreement or guaranty of the United States, the failure to perform which creates the equitable defense contended for. There is no pretense that any such duty is recognized or referred to in either of the bonds and mortgages executed by the defendant to the agents of the United States, or that any agreement or understanding was ever had or existed between the defendant and the United States, or any of its officers or agents, that any such duty existed, or that the United States would undertake its performance. The nearest approach to this is the allegation in the answer that the mortgage to Butler was executed upon the express understanding and assumption on his part that the government of the United States would in good faith execute the provisions of the treaty of 1838, and give to the pre-emption owners the possession of the said reservation lands. This allegation falls far short of any understanding or agreement on the part of the United States to do the things specified, made or entered into at the time of the execution of the mortgage.

The word “ express as here used might seem to imply that an expression had been given to some understanding on the part of both parties at the time, but the other words used, negative any such inference. It was an understanding or assumption on the part of the defendant only, that the United [120]*120States would execute the treaty of 1831, and put the owners of the lands conveyed by the Indians into the possession thereof. The form of the allegation is evidently intended to convey the idea, that the United States were bound by the terms of the treaty of 1838, to put the defendant and his associates into the possession of the Indian lands. The same idea, as has been observed, is presented in different language several times, in the answer, and in one instance as though the United States by that treaty fully guaranteed such possession to them. The political and judicial history of the country, and the statutes of the State of New York and Massachusetts show, that at an early day a dispute had arisen between the two States, in respect jrothe title to a large tract of land within the territorial limits of the State of New York, of which the Indian reservation mentioned and referred to in the defendant’s answer formed a part. In 1786 the dispute was amicably settled by a cession from Massachusetts to New York of the sovereignty and jurisdiction over the tract then occupied by the nations of Indians mentioned, and by a cession from New York to Massachusetts of the right of pre-emption to the soil from the Indians. The lands were then in the independent occupancy of the Seneca nation and the Tuscarora nation, and owned by them, and Massachusetts acquired by the cession the exclusive right of purchasing their title to said lands whenever they became disposed to sell the same. This right became vested in the said Ogden and Fellows by proper conveyances from the State of Massachusetts. By the constitution of the United States the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes was vested in Congress, and by virtue of that power, Congress has passed various laws regulating intercourse with the Indian tribes. Negotiations with them must be had by and with the assent and under the authority of the United States. They are treated as a quasi nation possessing none of the attributes of an independent people, and are to be dealt with accordingly.

The Indian tribes are in a state of pupilage toward the United States government, and hold the relation to it which a ward owes to his guardian. Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. U. S., 366.

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Bluebook (online)
3 Abb. Ct. App. 110, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mckeon-v-tillotson-ny-1864.