McKenna v. Chater

893 F. Supp. 163, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10164, 1995 WL 431219
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJuly 7, 1995
DocketNo. 94 CV 4495
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 893 F. Supp. 163 (McKenna v. Chater) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McKenna v. Chater, 893 F. Supp. 163, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10164, 1995 WL 431219 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NICKERSON, District Judge:

Plaintiff brought this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Services (the Commissioner) denying his application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act (the Act).

Both parties move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

I

Plaintiff, born on April 23, 1959, has had, despite his relatively young age, a lengthy employment history. As soon as he completed high school he started to work. He was employed first as a supermarket clerk from 1976 to 1982, then as a police officer from 1982 to 1984, and finally as a firefighter from 1984 to 1991. He also worked a second job from 1988 to 1991, as a self-employed butcher.

Plaintiff says he has been disabled since October 3, 1991. Various physicians have diagnosed him as having several physically and mentally disabling conditions, including a herniated disc, degenerative disc disease, shoulder impingement, and depression.

The Social Security Administration (the Administration) denied plaintiffs December 15, 1992 application for benefits both initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing on November 22, 1993 an Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ), Jonathan Jacobs, found him not disabled in what may, charitably, be described as a cursory decision.

Upon plaintiffs request for review the Appeals Council (the Council) on March 24,1994 vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded the ease to “an” Administrative Law Judge. The Council’s order provided as follows.

The Appeals Council grants the request for review under the substantial evidence provision of the Social Security Administration regulations (20 CFR 404.970). Under the authority of 20 CFR 404.977, the Appeals Council vacates the hearing decision and remands this case to an Administrative Law Judge for resolution of the following issue:

[165]*165The hearing decision indicates, page 8, last paragraph and Finding No. 4, that the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain are not credible but does not address the following factors: prior work record; daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; treatment other than medication; other measures used to relieve symptoms; and the possibility of a medically determinable mental impairment. Although the decision cites and quotes parts of Social Security Ruling 88-13 and summarizes the claimant’s allegations made at the hearing, there is no articulation of the specific medical findings and physicians’ opinions, the claimant’s reports of daily activities and symptoms to various physicians and other officials, and the other relevant factors noted above which contradict the claimant’s testimony of subjective disabling pain and limitations (Exhibits 8, 12,16, (pages 4 and 5), 18 and 19, among others).

Upon remand, the Administrative Law Judge will:

Further evaluate the claimant’s subjective complaints and provide rationale in accordance with the disability regulations pertaining to evaluation of symptoms (20 CFR 404.1529) and Social Security Ruling 88-13.

After a hearing on March 17,1994 the ALJ made the following findings on June 20,1994.

1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on October 3, 1991.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 3, 1991.
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has severe cervical herniation with impingement, mild depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and pain, but that he does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. The claimant’s subjective complaints of pain were considered exaggerated and not supported by the medical evidence or his description of his daily activities.
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertion requirements except for prolonged standing and walking or lifting and carrying over ten pounds.
6. The claimant is unable to perform his past relevant work as a firefighter.
7. The claimant has the full residual functional capacity to perform the full range of sedentary work.
8. The claimant in 36 years old, which is defined as a younger individual.
9. The claimant has a high school education.
10. In view of the claimant’s age and residual functional capacity, the issue of transferability of work skills is not material.
11. Section 404.1569 of Regulations No. 4 and Rules 201.28, Table No. 1 of Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4, direct a conclusion that, considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, he is not disabled.
12. The claimant was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this decision.

The Council declined plaintiffs request for review on September 14, 1994. This action followed.

II

The relevant medical evidence may be summarized as follows.

On July 4, 1990 plaintiff was admitted to St. Vincent’s Medical Center after a falling beam struck him on the back of the neck as he fought a fire. X-rays and computed tomography (CAT) scans showed no evidence of fractures, dislocations, or other abnormalities. Plaintiff was released on July 8, 1990 and prescribed Motrin and Tylenol with Codeine to control his pain. He did not resume work.

Dr. Michael Lavyne, a neurosurgeon at the New York Hospital and an associate professor at Cornell Medical School, examined [166]*166plaintiff on July 30,1990 and diagnosed bilateral brachial plexopathy with injury to the right long-thoracic nerve, to be treated with “time and analgesics.” He recommended that plaintiff “be followed by a neurologist” and that an electromyogram (EMG) be performed “to better delineate the extent of the brachial plexopathy.” The doctor stated: “He remains one hundred percent disabled from work.”

After examinations on August 6 and 29, 1990 Dr. Michael Schuman, a neurologist, reported that plaintiff complained of neck pain radiating to the right shoulder. He noted no indication of spinal cord compromise but stated that plaintiff would “need further investigation with EMG and evoked potentials of both arms as well as an MRI [magnetic resonance imaging] of the cervical region.” He opined that plaintiff “is totally disabled from work at this time.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
893 F. Supp. 163, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10164, 1995 WL 431219, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mckenna-v-chater-nyed-1995.