McKeever v. Israel

476 F. Supp. 1370, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9438
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 1, 1979
Docket78-C-427
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 476 F. Supp. 1370 (McKeever v. Israel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McKeever v. Israel, 476 F. Supp. 1370, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9438 (E.D. Wis. 1979).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WARREN, District Judge.

This is a pro se civil case filed by the plaintiff, a prisoner at Waupun State Prison, alleging that the defendants violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants have filed motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, to strike paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 21 of the plaintiff’s complaint and paragraphs 3(a), (b), (c) and 4 of the prayer for relief. The defendants have also filed a motion for costs and attorney’s fees. In addition, the plaintiff has filed motions for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of appointed counsel, for service by mail and for a preliminary injunction. These motions are the subject of this memorandum and order.

On December 13,1978, the Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim regarding alleged limitations on the mail because the plaintiff lacked standing. The Court, however, denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the other claims of the plaintiff regarding the alleged deprivation of personal property.

On April 30, 1979, the Court granted the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, “but only on the condition that plaintiff consolidates in one document the remaining claim in the original complaint with the claim in the proposed amended complaint.” McKeever v. Israel, No. 78-C-427 (E.D.Wis. April 30, 1979). The amended complaint referred to by the Court in that order contained only an allegation relating to the defendants’ rules regarding mail kept by the plaintiff at the prison. On May 25, 1979, the plaintiff filed his amended complaint which is the basis of the defendants’ motions.

*1372 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

The defendants have renewed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants’ claim that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his state administrative remedies prior to bringing this action. In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, earlier the Court declined to consider the need for an exhaustion of state administrative remedies in light of the Supreme Court ruling in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1972). There, the court held:

When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights. Id. at 405, 94 S.Ct. at 1807.

The defendants now seek to have the Court reconsider its decision in light of the recent decision of the Seventh Circuit in Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978).

In Secret v. Brierton, supra, the court held that when a prisoner alleges deprivation without due process of law of tangible items of personal property of no great monetary value, he must first utilize state administrative procedures and remedies before filing a § 1983 action. The court’s holding was based on a finding that the administrative procedures available to the plaintiff were adequate and that the exhaustion requirement enhanced the likelihood of filtering out frivolous complaints and readily resolvable complaints before they got to court. The court indicated that it believed the procedures would “provide an adequate remedy in many cases, weed out specious claims in some cases, and offer the prisoner an acceptable settlement in others.” Id. at 828.

In reaching its decision, the court of appeals first reviewed the language of the Supreme Court cases that had indicated that an exhaustion requirement was not required in section 1983 actions. The court distinguished Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), noting that in Monroe, the court held that a plaintiff did not have to exhaust state judicial remedies before filing a 1983 action. Id. at 826. (emphasis added). The court also distinguished McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 82 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647 (1967) and Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S.Ct. 2119, 20 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1968). According to the Seventh Circuit, these cases do not establish a general rule that there is no exhaustion requirement in section 1983 actions. Rather, the court held that these cases indicate that any exhaustion remedy must provide a plaintiff with some assurance of getting the relief they request, it cannot be a futile act. Id. at 826-829.

The court then considered the cost of requiring a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. Recognizing that the delay in proceeding to federal court was the most burdensome drawback to an exhaustion requirement, the court balanced this delay against the proper utilization of judicial time and energy and the particular deprivation involved in the case. The court concluded:

We confine the applicability of our holding to prisoner § 1983 cases which allege deprivation without due process of law of tangible items of personal property of no great monetary value. The delayed access to federal court resulting from exhaustion is less likely to impose severe burdens on the constitutional rights of prisoners than in other civil rights cases such as those raising liberty interest issues, or property deprivation claims, such as deprivation of legal materials, which might directly reflect upon liberty issues. . Although an individual does not lose [sic] all of his constitutional rights upon being imprisoned his rights are clearly circumscribed. . . . There is no constitutional right prohibiting prison officials from confiscating most of a prisoner’s personal property pending release from prison. The constitutional violation arises only if they confiscate the property without due process of law. Therefore, *1373 any delay attending the return . of property confiscated without due process is necessarily less onerous than a delay in redressing the violation of other rights because of the diminished nature of a prisoner’s property rights. A fortiori the delay is generally less onerous if the property is not of great monetary value. 584 F.2d at 829-830.

The court also based its decision to require an exhaustion of administrative remedies on “the policy of affording deference to state officials’ administration of their prisons.” Id. at 830.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
476 F. Supp. 1370, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9438, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mckeever-v-israel-wied-1979.