UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARTEZ DWIGHT MCKEE,
Plaintiff, Civil No. 24-cv-13370 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman v. WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFFS, et al.,
Defendants. __________________________________________________________________/
ORDER (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF No. 2); (2) RESOLVING PLAINTIFF’S PENDING MOTIONS (ECF Nos. 5, 7, 9, 10, 13); AND (3) DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SERVICE DOCUMENTS WITH THE COURT
Plaintiff Martez Dwight McKee is a state inmate confined at the Wayne County Jail in Detroit, Michigan. On December 17, 2024, McKee filed a pro se civil-rights Complaint in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Now pending before the Court are several motions that McKee has filed, including motions for a permanent restraining order and to effectuate service of his Complaint. He has also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) due to his indigency. (See IFP Application, ECF No. 2.) For the reasons explained below, the Court (1) GRANTS McKee’s application to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and his motion to order his custodian(s) to set aside twenty percent (20%) of all of future deposits in McKee’s jail trust account to pay the filing fee in this action (ECF No. 10), (2) GRANTS McKee’s motion for service of his Complaint (ECF No. 5), (3) DENIES McKee’s motion for a
permanent restraining order WITHOUT PREJUDICE (ECF No. 9), (4) TERMINATES McKee’s remaining motions (ECF Nos. 7, 13) as MOOT, and (5) directs McKee to file certain documents with the Court so that the United States
Marshals Service may serve his Complaint on the Defendants. I
A The Court begins with McKee’s application to proceed IFP (see IFP Application, ECF No. 2) and his related motion to have the custodian(s) of his jail trust account set aside twenty percent (20%) of his future deposits so that those funds can be used to pay the filing fee in this action. (See Mot., ECF No. 10.) Both McKee’s IFP application and his motion to set aside funds for the filing fee are
GRANTED. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner may bring a civil action IFP if he files an affidavit of indigency and a certified copy of his jail trust fund
account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). McKee filed an application to proceed IFP (see ECF No. 2), but he did not include a certified trust fund account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). McKee says that he requested that account statement from the Wayne County Jail, but the jail never provided him a statement to submit to the Court. McKee insists that he has filed grievances in an effort to obtain an
account statement, but those grievances have not been successful. This appears to be an ongoing issue with the Wayne County Jail. A district court has the discretion to grant or deny a plaintiff’s application to
proceed IFP. See Phipps v. King, 866 F.2d 824, 825 (6th Cir. 1988). Here, McKee alleges that he has made diligent, unsuccessful efforts to obtain and submit his trust account statement to no avail. In light of McKee’s reasonable efforts to obtain his trust account statement, the Court GRANTS McKee’s application to proceed IFP.
See McDowell v. Washington, No. 24-cv-10382, 2024 WL 1200947, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2024) (granting application to proceed IFP where plaintiff made diligent, but unsuccessful, efforts to obtain jail trust account statement).
In addition, the Court GRANTS McKee’s motion to order his jail custodian(s) to set aside twenty percent (20%) of all future deposits to McKee’s jail trust account (ECF No. 10) so that McKee may pay the filing fee in this action. The Court will assess and, if funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee, consisting of twenty
percent (20%) of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits to McKee’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in McKee’s account for the preceding six (6) months. After McKee pays the initial partial filing fee, McKee must make
monthly payments of twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to his account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court therefore ORDERS the agency having custody of McKee to: (1) withdraw or set aside the initial partial
filing fee from McKee’s jail trust fund account; (2) forward that amount to the Clerk of this Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this order; and (3) in subsequent months, or from time to time, forward payments of twenty percent (20%) of the
preceding month’s income credited to McKee’s account to the Clerk of this Court until McKee has paid the entire filing fee. B
The Court next turns to two motions that McKee has filed in which he asks the Court to order the Defendants to provide him with (1) a certified jail trust account statement and (2) grievances he filed related to the failure to provide him his trust account statement. (See Motions, ECF Nos. 7, 13.) These motions relate primarily
to McKee’s application to proceed IFP. Because the Court has granted McKee’s application to proceed IFP and has ordered his custodian(s) to forward partial payments of the filing fee to the Court as described above, the Court will
TERMINATE these motions WITHOUT PREJUDICE as MOOT. See e.g. Ewing v. Wayne Cnty. Sheriff, No. 22-cv-11453, 2023 WL 2667732, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2023) (denying similar motions as moot). C Next, the Court turns to McKee’s motion for a permanent restraining order.
(See Mot., ECF No. 9.) In that motion, McKee alleges several constitutional violations: (1) that he has been physically assaulted by deputies, (2) that the sheriff has failed to protect him from the assaults, (3) that he is being denied access to the
courts, and that (4) that he is being denied pencils and paper. (See id.) The Court DENIES this motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE. To the extent that McKee claims that he is being denied access to the courts and denied pencils and paper that he needs to draft legal correspondence, those
claims are belied by the multiple motions and other filings that McKee has been able to make in this case. The Court is therefore not persuaded, at this time, that he is entitled to permanent equitable relief based on his claim that he is being denied
access to the courts. McKee may renew his motion if future actions by the Defendants warrant renewal. To the extent that McKee claims that he has been physically assaulted, and that the sheriff has failed to adequately protect him, those claims are not raised in
his Complaint, and they therefore are not currently part of this case. Cf. Blackwell v. Nocerini, 123 F.4th 479, 486 (6th Cir. 2024) (“When deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court should typically limit
itself to the well-pleaded allegations within the complaint’s four corners”) (internal citation omitted). The Court therefore DENIES relief on those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If McKee files an Amended Complaint against a properly-named
Defendant that includes the allegations raised in his motion, McKee may filed a renewed motion at that time. D
Next, McKee has filed a motion to effectuate service of his Complaint. (See Mot., ECF No.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARTEZ DWIGHT MCKEE,
Plaintiff, Civil No. 24-cv-13370 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman v. WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFFS, et al.,
Defendants. __________________________________________________________________/
ORDER (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF No. 2); (2) RESOLVING PLAINTIFF’S PENDING MOTIONS (ECF Nos. 5, 7, 9, 10, 13); AND (3) DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SERVICE DOCUMENTS WITH THE COURT
Plaintiff Martez Dwight McKee is a state inmate confined at the Wayne County Jail in Detroit, Michigan. On December 17, 2024, McKee filed a pro se civil-rights Complaint in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Now pending before the Court are several motions that McKee has filed, including motions for a permanent restraining order and to effectuate service of his Complaint. He has also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) due to his indigency. (See IFP Application, ECF No. 2.) For the reasons explained below, the Court (1) GRANTS McKee’s application to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and his motion to order his custodian(s) to set aside twenty percent (20%) of all of future deposits in McKee’s jail trust account to pay the filing fee in this action (ECF No. 10), (2) GRANTS McKee’s motion for service of his Complaint (ECF No. 5), (3) DENIES McKee’s motion for a
permanent restraining order WITHOUT PREJUDICE (ECF No. 9), (4) TERMINATES McKee’s remaining motions (ECF Nos. 7, 13) as MOOT, and (5) directs McKee to file certain documents with the Court so that the United States
Marshals Service may serve his Complaint on the Defendants. I
A The Court begins with McKee’s application to proceed IFP (see IFP Application, ECF No. 2) and his related motion to have the custodian(s) of his jail trust account set aside twenty percent (20%) of his future deposits so that those funds can be used to pay the filing fee in this action. (See Mot., ECF No. 10.) Both McKee’s IFP application and his motion to set aside funds for the filing fee are
GRANTED. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner may bring a civil action IFP if he files an affidavit of indigency and a certified copy of his jail trust fund
account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). McKee filed an application to proceed IFP (see ECF No. 2), but he did not include a certified trust fund account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). McKee says that he requested that account statement from the Wayne County Jail, but the jail never provided him a statement to submit to the Court. McKee insists that he has filed grievances in an effort to obtain an
account statement, but those grievances have not been successful. This appears to be an ongoing issue with the Wayne County Jail. A district court has the discretion to grant or deny a plaintiff’s application to
proceed IFP. See Phipps v. King, 866 F.2d 824, 825 (6th Cir. 1988). Here, McKee alleges that he has made diligent, unsuccessful efforts to obtain and submit his trust account statement to no avail. In light of McKee’s reasonable efforts to obtain his trust account statement, the Court GRANTS McKee’s application to proceed IFP.
See McDowell v. Washington, No. 24-cv-10382, 2024 WL 1200947, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2024) (granting application to proceed IFP where plaintiff made diligent, but unsuccessful, efforts to obtain jail trust account statement).
In addition, the Court GRANTS McKee’s motion to order his jail custodian(s) to set aside twenty percent (20%) of all future deposits to McKee’s jail trust account (ECF No. 10) so that McKee may pay the filing fee in this action. The Court will assess and, if funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee, consisting of twenty
percent (20%) of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits to McKee’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in McKee’s account for the preceding six (6) months. After McKee pays the initial partial filing fee, McKee must make
monthly payments of twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to his account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court therefore ORDERS the agency having custody of McKee to: (1) withdraw or set aside the initial partial
filing fee from McKee’s jail trust fund account; (2) forward that amount to the Clerk of this Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this order; and (3) in subsequent months, or from time to time, forward payments of twenty percent (20%) of the
preceding month’s income credited to McKee’s account to the Clerk of this Court until McKee has paid the entire filing fee. B
The Court next turns to two motions that McKee has filed in which he asks the Court to order the Defendants to provide him with (1) a certified jail trust account statement and (2) grievances he filed related to the failure to provide him his trust account statement. (See Motions, ECF Nos. 7, 13.) These motions relate primarily
to McKee’s application to proceed IFP. Because the Court has granted McKee’s application to proceed IFP and has ordered his custodian(s) to forward partial payments of the filing fee to the Court as described above, the Court will
TERMINATE these motions WITHOUT PREJUDICE as MOOT. See e.g. Ewing v. Wayne Cnty. Sheriff, No. 22-cv-11453, 2023 WL 2667732, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2023) (denying similar motions as moot). C Next, the Court turns to McKee’s motion for a permanent restraining order.
(See Mot., ECF No. 9.) In that motion, McKee alleges several constitutional violations: (1) that he has been physically assaulted by deputies, (2) that the sheriff has failed to protect him from the assaults, (3) that he is being denied access to the
courts, and that (4) that he is being denied pencils and paper. (See id.) The Court DENIES this motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE. To the extent that McKee claims that he is being denied access to the courts and denied pencils and paper that he needs to draft legal correspondence, those
claims are belied by the multiple motions and other filings that McKee has been able to make in this case. The Court is therefore not persuaded, at this time, that he is entitled to permanent equitable relief based on his claim that he is being denied
access to the courts. McKee may renew his motion if future actions by the Defendants warrant renewal. To the extent that McKee claims that he has been physically assaulted, and that the sheriff has failed to adequately protect him, those claims are not raised in
his Complaint, and they therefore are not currently part of this case. Cf. Blackwell v. Nocerini, 123 F.4th 479, 486 (6th Cir. 2024) (“When deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court should typically limit
itself to the well-pleaded allegations within the complaint’s four corners”) (internal citation omitted). The Court therefore DENIES relief on those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If McKee files an Amended Complaint against a properly-named
Defendant that includes the allegations raised in his motion, McKee may filed a renewed motion at that time. D
Next, McKee has filed a motion to effectuate service of his Complaint. (See Mot., ECF No. 5.) The Court GRANTS that motion. At the same time that the Court issues this order, the Court will issue a separate order DIRECTING McKee to submit certain documents and information to the Clerk of the Court so that the
United States Marshals Service can serve the Defendants with the Complaint. The Complaint cannot be served by the Marshals Service without the information identified in that order, so it is important that McKee follow and comply with those
instructions upon receipt of the order. If McKee fails to follow the directions in that order, the Court will dismiss his Complaint without prejudice. II For all of the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as
follows: (1) McKee’s application to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; (2) McKee’s motions to have his custodian(s) set aside funds from his jail trust account to pay the filing fee and for service of his Complaint (ECF Nos. 5, 10)
are GRANTED; (3) McKee’s motion for a permanent restraining order (ECF No. 9) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
(4) McKee’s remaining motions (ECF Nos. 7, 13) are TERMINATED AS MOOT. s/Matthew F. Leitman MATTHEW F. LEITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 14, 2025
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or counsel of record on April 14, 2025, by electronic means and/or ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Ryan Case Manager (313) 234-5126