McKee v. United States

75 U.S. 163, 19 L. Ed. 329, 8 Wall. 163, 1868 U.S. LEXIS 1091

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: October 18, 1869
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mr. Justice DAVIS

delivered the opinion of the court.

It is a familiar principle of public law, that unlicensed business intercourse with an enemy during a time of war is not permitted. Congress, therefore, in recognition of this principle, when it declared, on the 13th day of July, 1861, that commercial intercourse between the seceding States and the rest of the United States should cease and be unlawful, after the proclamation of the President that a state of insurrection existed, authorized the President, in his discretion, to license trade. But in so far as it was licensed, it was to be conducted in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. The President proclaimed the fact of insurrection, and provided for a limited commercial intercourse, and the Secretary of the Treasury fixed the manner in which this intercourse should be carried on. Under this act of Congress, the proclamation of the President, and the trade regulations established in pursuance of it, can the purchase óf the property in question be protected ?

It was made on the 4th of March, 1864, while the war was flagrant-, by John II. McKee; a citizen of New Orleans, of A. W. McKee, a resident of Upper Louisiana, and the general agent of the Treasury Department of the Confederate States, to purchase and dispose of cotton in the State of Texas, and that part of Louisiana lying west of the Mississippi River.

Permission had been given the claimant, by the commanding officer of the Department of the Gulf, to pass through the United States lines into Upper Louisiana and bring away any property that he might purchase there. But who authorized him, while there, to make the purchase? There is no sufficient proof in the record that- any treasury officer clothed him-with this authority, and if is very clear that the power of the military extended' no.further than to protect hipa in going into the lines of the enemy and bringing- from there any'property rightfully acquired. If, as is contended, and as the evidence tends to show, the military authorities went further and granted him also a license to trade, the answer is, that this court held in The Ouachita Cotton case, reported in 6th Wallace, that such a license was void.

But even if McKee had obtained the express permission of one of the treasury agents to go into the Confederate lines and buy cotton, it would not protect him, because the agent would have been acting outside the limits of his authority, as the regulations of the department, in force at the timé, strictly prohibited commercial intercourse with •localities beyond the lines, of military occupation by the United States forces.

There is another view of this case, which is decisive of it, if the proof was ample that the claimant had a license, in conformity with treasury regulations, issued under the act of Congress of July 13th, 1861, to trade generally within insurgent territory, for the reason that such a license could give him no right to buy property of A. W. McKee, who held an important official position from the government of the Confederate States.

Section 5 of the act of Congress of July 17th, 1862, prohibited a person occupying the position of A. W. McKee from selling; his property,- and it follows, as he had no capacity-to dispose of it, that the claimant could acquire no title to it.

All licenses to trade issued under the act of July 13th, 1861, are controlled by the provisions of the act of July 17th, 1862, and must be restricted to a permission to trade with those persons who are not within the prohibitions of the latter act. It is a well-settled principle of law, that in case of' the repugnancy between two statutes, the latter one must prevail over the former. .In that particular in which the prior and the latter act cannot consistently stand together, the latter act- must be taken, pro tanto, as a modification or repeal of the former.

Decree aeeirmed.