McKay v. Kellogg

120 F.2d 363, 28 C.C.P.A. 1194, 49 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718, 1941 CCPA LEXIS 88
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 9, 1941
DocketNo. 4473
StatusPublished

This text of 120 F.2d 363 (McKay v. Kellogg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McKay v. Kellogg, 120 F.2d 363, 28 C.C.P.A. 1194, 49 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718, 1941 CCPA LEXIS 88 (ccpa 1941).

Opinion

Hatfield, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal in an interference proceeding from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming [1195]*1195the decision of the examiner of Interferences awarding priority of invention of the subject matter defined in the counts in issue- — Nos. 1 and 2 — to appellee.

The interference is between appellants’ application, No. 120,498, filed January 14, 1931, and appellee’s application No. 127,612, filed February 25, 1937.

The invention relates to a process for producing a puffed corn product, and is sufficiently set forth in the counts in issue which read:

1. Process of producing a puffed corn product which comprises: cooking the corn in water, subjecting the same to mechanical pressure to alter the internal structure of the grain without reducing it to a flaked condition; drying the material to a water content suitable for explosive puffing; and thereafter explosively puffing the material.
2. Process of producing a puffed corn product which comprises: cooking the corn in water, partially drying the material, subjecting the same to mechanical pressure to alter the internal structure of the grain without reducing it to a flaked condition, drying the material to a water content of about 12%; and thereafter explosively puffing the material.

The burden was upon appellee the junior party to establish priority of invention by a preponderance of the evidence.

It appears from the record that appellants’ application has been assigned to the Kellogg Company, of Battle Creek, Mich., manufacturers of food products, and that of appellee John L. Kellog, Jr. (deceased), who died prior to the declaration of the interference, to New Foods, Inc., Chicago, Ill., also manufacturers of food products, and that John L. Kellogg, Jr., was the son of the witness, John L. Kellogg, president of New Foods, Inc., and the grandson of W. K. Kellogg, president of the Kellogg Company.

John L. Kellogg will hereinafter be referred to as Kellogg, Sr., and John L. Kellogg, Jr., as Kellogg, Jr.

It was contended before the tribunals of the Patent Office, and it is contended here by counsel for appellants, that appellants conceived the invention defined by the counts in issue, disclosed it to others, and reduced it to practice on June 19, 1936.

It appears from the record that on June 19, 1936, appellant McKay was a vice president, director, and general plant manager of the Kellogg Company; that appellant Penty was in charge of the experimental department of the Kellogg Company; and that appellants had occupied their respective positions for several years prior to that date.

It appears from appellants’ preliminary statement, which is signed by appellant Penty and dated September 9, 1938, that appellant McKay) had at that time left the employ of the Kellogg Company and had declined to sign and swear to appellants’ preliminary statement in which it was alleged that appellants had “made the invention” involved in this interference on or about June 19, 1936, [1196]*1196and successfully carried out the involved process on that date, and that they again successfully carried out the involved process “and successfully produced the product in issue on or about the 30th day of October 1986.”

In support of their contention that appellants conceived and reduced the invention to practice on June 19, 1936, counsel rely upon appellants’ exhibits Nos. 1, 2, and 6, together with the testimony of appellant Penty and the witnesses Frederic W. Swartz (who at the time of the taking of his testimony was a foreman in the plant of the Kellogg Company and who in June 1936 was employed in the experimental department of that company) and Lynn E. Rochester (an employee of the Kellogg Company, who during the year 1936 was employed in the experimental department of that company).

It appears from the testimony of appellant Penty and the witness Rochester that appellants’ exhibits Nos. 1, 2, and 6 were written by the witness Rochester and signed by appellant Penty.

Appellants’ exhibit No. 1 is dated June 18, 1936, and, so far a& pertinent, reads:

White Corn Puffs — 2% salt
(A) Cooked 100 pounds of #4 grits with 1 gallon of water which was the condensation from the cooker after heating 1 hour, and 2% salt. This was cooked 1 hour 5 minutes at 18 pounds pressure. Separated in grinder, and rolled hot on bumping mill 5th floor. Then toasted in popper. — A few puffs.
(B) After material was flaked it was dried down to 12% moisture. Then puffed in guns.
4-oz. flakes.
140 pounds pressure.
About 50% of flakes puffed well.
Weight — 6% oz. — to a 7-oz. Rice Puff sack.

It will be observed that two experiments are covered by that exhibit. In the first experiment the corn was toasted in a popper. Whether it was in a flaked condition does not appear, nor does it appear from the exhibit that the corn was dried to a moisture content “suitable for explosive puffing” as called for by the involved counts. In the second experiment the corn was reduced to a flaked condition (“a semithick flake,” according to the testimony of appellant Penty), whereas each of the counts in issue contain the limitation that the internal structure of the grain is altered by mechanical pressure without being reduced to a flaked condition.

Appellants’ Exhibit No. 2 is dated June 19, 1936, and, so far as pertinent, reads:

White Corn Puffs
(no flavor)
Cooked 100 pounds #4 grits with 1% gallons of water for 1% hours at 18 pounds pressure. Removed steam and separated in grinder. Then flaked on bumping mill. Tried puffing. Just fair.
[1197]*1197Part of corn was just bumped slightly. Then dried to 12% and tried shooting in gun.
4-oz. com.
150# pressure.
Not very good. [Italics ours.]

It will be observed that that exhibit also refers to two experiments. In the first, the corn was flaked on a bumping mill. Accordingly, for the reasons stated relative to appellants’ exhibit No. 1, that experiment does not conform to the process defined in the counts. In the second-experiment referred to in exhibit No. 2, the corn, it is stated, was “bumped slightly,” then “dried to 12% and tried shooting in gun” and that the results were “Not very good.”

It clearly appears from the record that in the art here involved the term “bumped” means altering the internal structure of the grain by mechanical pressure, without reducing it to a flaked condition.

Appellants’ exhibit No. 6 is dated June 19, 1936, and, so far as pertinent, reads:

White Corn Puffs
2% salt.
100 pounds #4 grits
1% gallons water
2% salt

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Bluebook (online)
120 F.2d 363, 28 C.C.P.A. 1194, 49 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718, 1941 CCPA LEXIS 88, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mckay-v-kellogg-ccpa-1941.