McKay v. Fairfield Manor at Douglaston, LLC Props.

CourtAppellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York
DecidedNovember 21, 2019
Docket2019 NYSlipOp 51879(U)
StatusPublished

This text of McKay v. Fairfield Manor at Douglaston, LLC Props. (McKay v. Fairfield Manor at Douglaston, LLC Props.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McKay v. Fairfield Manor at Douglaston, LLC Props., (N.Y. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion



Roland McKay, Appellant, Tara Johnson, Plaintiff,

against

Fairfield Manor at Douglaston, LLC Properties, Respondent.


Roland McKay, appellant pro se. Warren Berger, P.C. (Warren M. Berger of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Third District (Janine A. Barbera-Dalli, J.), enter0ed May 3, 2018. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, after a nonjury trial, dismissed so much of the action as was brought by plaintiff Roland McKay.

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs commenced this small claims action to recover the sum of $5,000, alleging that defendant, their landlord, had leased a one-bedroom apartment to them and had charged them the monthly rent for a two-bedroom apartment. After a nonjury trial, the District Court dismissed the action. Plaintiff Roland McKay appeals.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). Upon a review of the record, we find no basis to disturb the District Court's determination to dismiss so much of the action as was brought by plaintiff Roland McKay, since it provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1804, 1807). McKay did not demonstrate that plaintiffs did not get the exact apartment they had contracted for, which apartment McKay testified he had seen [*2]before he had signed the lease. Furthermore, plaintiffs used both the master bedroom and a second room in the apartment as bedrooms, which was how the apartment was advertised and how they had intended to use it when they had signed the lease. Consequently, it is irrelevant that the room plaintiffs used as a second bedroom may have been labeled differently on the architect's plans.

Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

ADAMS, P.J., RUDERMAN and EMERSON, JJ., concur.



ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: November 21, 2019

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Related

Williams v. Roper
269 A.D.2d 125 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000)
Ross v. Friedman
269 A.D.2d 584 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
McKay v. Fairfield Manor at Douglaston, LLC Props., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mckay-v-fairfield-manor-at-douglaston-llc-props-nyappterm-2019.