McIver Lessee v. Walker

17 U.S. 444, 4 L. Ed. 611, 4 Wheat. 444, 1819 U.S. LEXIS 322
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 11, 1819
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 17 U.S. 444 (McIver Lessee v. Walker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McIver Lessee v. Walker, 17 U.S. 444, 4 L. Ed. 611, 4 Wheat. 444, 1819 U.S. LEXIS 322 (1819).

Opinion

17 U.S. 444

4 Wheat. 444

4 L.Ed. 611

McIVER'S Lessee
v.
WALKER et al.

March 11, 1819

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of East Tennessee. This was an ejectment brought in that court, by the plaintiff in error, against the defendants. Upon the first trial of the cause, a judgment was rendered in the circuit court in favor of the defendants, and upon that judgment a writ of error was taken out, and the judgment reversed by this court, at February term 1815 (9 Cranch 173); and the cause was sent back to be tried according to certain directions prescribed by this court.

As the opinion given by this court upon the reversal of the first judgment contains a statement of the facts given in evidence upon the first trial, it is deemed proper to insert the opinion in this place. It is as follows:

'On the trial of this cause, the plaintiff produced two patents for 5000 acres each, from the state of North Carolina, granting to Stokely Donelson (from whom the plaintiff derived his title), two several tracts of land, lying on Crow creek, the one, No. 12, beginning at a box elder standing on a ridge, corner to No. 11, &c., as by the plat hereunto annexed will appear. The plat and certificate of survey were annexed to the grant. The plaintiff proved that there were eleven other grants of the same date for 5000 acres each, issued from the state of North Carolina, designated as a chain of surveys joining each other, from No. 1 to No. 11, inclusive, each calling for land on Crow creek as a general call, and the courses and distances of which, as described in the grants, are the same with the grants produced to the jury. It was also proved, that the beginning of the first grant was marked and intended as the beginning corner of No. 1, but no other tree was marked, nor was any survey ever made, but the plat was made out at Raleigh, and does not express on its face that the lines were run by the true meridian. It was also proved, that the beginning corner of No. 1, stood on the north-west side of Crow creek, and the line running thence down the creek, called for in the plat and patent, is south, forty degrees west. It further appeared, that Crow creek runs through a valley of good land, which is on an average about three miles wide, between mountains unfit for cultivation, and which extends from the beginning of survey No. 1, in the said chain of surveys, until it reaches below survey No. 13, in nearly a straight line, the course of which is nearly south, thirty-five degrees west, by the needle, and south, forty degrees west, by the true meridian; that on the face of the plats annexed to the grants, the creek is represented as running through and across each grant. The lines in the certificate of survey do not expressly call for crossing the creek; but each certificate and grant calls generally for land lying on Crow creek. If the lines of the tracts herein before mentioned, No. 12 and 13, in the said chain of surveys, be run according to the course of the needle and the distances called for, they will not include Crow creek, or any part of it, and will not include the land in possession of the defendant. If they be run according to the true meridian, or so as to include Crow creek, they will include the lands in possession of the defendants. Whereupon, the counsel for the plaintiffs moved the court to instruct the jury, 1st. That the lines of the said lands ought to be run according to the true meridian, and not according to the needle. 2d. That the lines ought to be run so as to include Crow creek, and the lands in possession of the defendants. The court overruled both these motions, and instructed the jury, that the said grant must be run according to the course of the needle, and the distances called for in the said grants, and that the same could not legally be run, so as to include Crow creek, and that the said grants did not include the lands in possession of the defendants. To this opinion, an exception was taken by the plaintiff's counsel. A verdict and judgment were rendered for the defendants, and that judgment is now before this court on a writ of error.

'It is undoubtedly the practice of surveyors, and the practice was proved in this cause, to express in their plats and certificates of survey, the courses which are designated by the needle; and if nothing exists to control the call for course and distance, the land must be bounded by the courses and distances of the patent, according to the magnetic meridian. But it is a general principle, that the course and distance must yield to natural objects called for in the patent. All lands are supposed to be actually surveyed, and the intention of the grant is to convey the land, according to that actual survey; consequently, if marked trees and marked corners be found, conformable to the calls of the patent, or if water-courses be called for in the patent, or mountains, or any other natural objects, distances must be lengthened or shortened, and courses varied, so as to conform to those objects. The reason of the rule is, that it is the intention of the grant to convey the land actually surveyed, and mistakes in courses or distances are more probable, and more frequent, than in marked trees, mountains, rivers, or other natural objects, capable of being clearly designated, and accurately described. Had the survey in this case been actually made, and the lines had called to cross Crow creek, the courses and distances might have been precisely what they are, it might have been impracticable to find corner, or other marked trees, and yet the land must have been so surveyed as to include Crow creek. The call in the lines of the patent, to cross Crow creek, would be one to which course and distance must necessarily yield. This material call is omitted, and from its omission arises the great difficulty of the cause. That the lands should not be described as lying on both sides of Crow creek, nor the lines call for crossing that creek, are such extraordinary omissions as to create considerable doubt with the court, in deciding whether there is any other description given in the patent, of sufficient strength to control the call for course and distance. The majority of the court is of opinion, that there is such a description. The patent closes its description of the land granted, by a reference in the plat which is annexed. The laws of the state require this annexation. In this plat, thus annexed to the patent, and thus referred to as describing the land granted, Crow creek is laid down as passing through the tract. Every person having knowledge of the grant, would also have knowledge of the plat, and would by that plat be instructed, that the lands lay on both sides the creek. There would be nothing to lead to a different conclusion but a difference of about five degrees in the course, should he run out the whole chain of surveys in order to find the beginning of No. 12; and he would know that such an error in the course would be corrected by such a great natural object as a creek, laid down by the surveyor in the middle of his plat. This would prove, notwithstanding the error in the course, that the lands on both sides of Crow creek were intended to be included in the survey, and intended to be granted by the patent.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
17 U.S. 444, 4 L. Ed. 611, 4 Wheat. 444, 1819 U.S. LEXIS 322, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mciver-lessee-v-walker-scotus-1819.