McIntyre v. County Commissioners of County of Bristol

254 N.E.2d 242, 356 Mass. 520, 1969 Mass. LEXIS 738
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedDecember 23, 1969
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 254 N.E.2d 242 (McIntyre v. County Commissioners of County of Bristol) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McIntyre v. County Commissioners of County of Bristol, 254 N.E.2d 242, 356 Mass. 520, 1969 Mass. LEXIS 738 (Mass. 1969).

Opinion

Cutter, J.

Twenty inhabitants of Bristol County, each of whom is an attorney, seek a writ of mandamus to compel the county commissioners to select a court house site, to have plans and specifications' prepared, and to take other steps to “provide adequate and suitable facilities and accommodations” in that county for the Superior Court. It is alleged that the present court house facilities are inadequate, that the county commissioners are charged by G. L. c. 34, §§ 3 and 14, with a duty of providing suitable court houses, and that by St. 1966, c. 393, the county commissioners were given certain powers and authority which they have not exercised. Twelve attorneys have intervened to oppose granting relief. Certain respondents filed demurrers. Two were largely on the grounds that the petition seeks to require the. county commissioners to perform a discretionary act and fails to state grounds for judicial relief. The .demurrers were overruled. After hearing evidence, taking judicial notice of specified facts, and receiving certain stipulations of fact, the trial judge made detailed findings.

The order for judgment directed the county commissioners “with all practicable speed ... to take all steps and measures which are lawfully available to them to provide court house facilities for [the] Superior Court and [the] Probate Court which are suitable in all necessary characteristics, including but not limited to” sixteen types of facilities.2 Execution of the order was stayed pending a [522]*522determination by this court, upon the trial judge’s report for our review, of (a) his orders overruling the demurrers and (b) his order for judgment. Before us are the pleadings, the evidence, his written statement of. the matters of which he took judicial notice, and the findings. The findings (supplemented by facts of which the judge took judicial notice),are summarized below. - .

Bristol County has three court houses, which are used by the Superior Court. These are in Fall River, Taunton, and New Bedford. Superior Court sittings of two judges in the same court house were held in four months in 1968, all in New Bedford. In four other months, two Superior Court judges presided simultaneously over single sessions in. separate court houses. In three other months, one Superior Court judge presided over a single session. Single session sittings (as compared with sessions where more than one judge is available at the same court house at the same time) cause waste and duplication (of overhead and personnel).3 Each of the three existing court houses, and the total facilities thereby afforded are inadequate in respects described by the judge. Accommodations for the courts, court officials, jurors, lawyers, and members of the general public are unsuitable and, for the most part, out of date. Facilities for the Superior Court must be shared, in some instances, with the Probate Court, for which some of the facilities are also inadequate (including a room in a District Court .house in Attleboro). Except for a new "wing of the New Bedford court house built in 1953, “not even a substantial renovation of any facilities for . . . ¡[the Superior Cour.t3 buildings has. been accomplished in this century, in Bristol County.”

[523]*523By St. 1966, c. 393,4 the county commissioners “were given permission and authority to construct a new court house for [the] Superior and Probate Courts.” This “legislative recognition that the court house facilities . . . [have] reached a stage of acute . . . inadequacy” has not led the county commissioners to take a “step of any kind to . . . [carry out] the legislative permission . . . [or] to build a court house or even to renovate . . . present facilities.” Indeed, the evidence shows that on January 25, 1967, the commissioners voted that, “inasmuch as a majority ... is now on record as . . . opposed to the construction of a centralized court house in Bristol County . . . no monies should be included in the 1967 budget for a study of court house facilities.”

The trial judge correctly ruled that c. 393 “is permissive in nature and imposed no legal duty upon the . . . county commissioners.” He thus placed reliance upon G. L. c. 34, § 3 (as amended through St. 1965, c. 513), which reads in part, “Each county shall provide suitable court houses, jails, houses of correction, fireproof offices and other public buildings necessary for its use, and suitable accommodations for district courts” (with exceptions not now relevant). As to § 3, he ruled that it “is mandatory in nature and imposes a legal duty upon the . . . county commissioners to pro[524]*524vide suitable court houses for the Superior and Probate Courts.”

As indicated above, differing views, exist concerning the relief, if any, which should be granted. The twenty original petitioners seem to request the selection of a site and the construction of a single central court house for the use of Bristol County. The interveners contend that the northern part of Bristol County is now adequately served by the court house at Taunton. They assert “that the congestion and delay in the trial of cases . . . has been caused by ... a definite lack of a sufficient number of Superior Court judges to handle the increased volume of . . . cases.” The intervening respondents and two of the county commissioners assert in their demurrers and answers somewhat varying grounds for the denial of relief. These two county commissioners, among other things, state “that the proposed facilities cannot be acquired, built, and equipped for $2,500,000, ” a matter on which no substantial evidence was offered.

The order for judgment does not direct the county commissioners to make any particular decision. It commands them merely, apparently pursuant to G. L. c. 34, § 3, to “provide [suitable] court house facilities.” In his preliminary findings, the judge had defined “[s]uitable” court house facilities as “those which provide the minimum necessities for speedy . . . and efficient disposition of court business . . . [and] to maintain public respect for the dignity and stature of the Superior and Probate courts.” His order pointed out specific respects in which the facilities should be “suitable” but did not direct the provision of any particular .facilities.

We think that the judge’s conclusions are abundantly justified by the record. We have no doubt that, in the interest of proper judicial administration, prompt improvement of the court house facilities in Bristol County is imperative in respects specified by the trial judge. The question before us, however, is whether relief can, or should, now be afforded by mandamus. ...

1. We deal first with the demurrers. The petition [525]*525asserts only (a) the duty of the county commissioners under G. L. c. 34, §§ 3 and 14; (b) the bare conclusion that present facilities “are unsuitable and inadequate”; and (c) the existence of St. 1966, c. 393, and the county commissioners’ “arbitrary and unreasonable” failure to act under it. These allegations provide an unsatisfactory basis for action by mandamus. The acts which the county commissioners are asked to carry out are not adequately specified in the petition. Indeed, it appears from St. 1966, c. 393, that there exists a wide range of permissible and largely discretionary action open to the county commissioners under that statute or (under G. L. c. 34, §§ 3, 14) by way of improvement and renovation of existing facilities. The demurrers could properly have been sustained. See e.g. Nason v. Commissioner of Mental Health,

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Bluebook (online)
254 N.E.2d 242, 356 Mass. 520, 1969 Mass. LEXIS 738, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcintyre-v-county-commissioners-of-county-of-bristol-mass-1969.